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1. S ee generally AME RICAN  BAR ASSOCIATION CO M M I S S I O N  ON  SEPARATION OF
P OWERS  AND J UDICIAL INDEPE NDENCE , AN  INDEP ENDE NT J UDICIARY (199 7).
2. The sch olar ly com me nt ar y on  cong res siona l contr ol of juris diction is
volu mi nou s and r edunda nt. As Profess or  Chem erin sky obs erve d, “The s cholar ly
l it e r a tu re is rich with articles arguing both sides of whether, and when, Congress
may re st ri ct fed er al cou r t  j u r isdiction .” ERWIN  CHEME RINSKY, F EDERAL J URISDICTION
§ 3.1, at  169 (2d ed . 1994). Actua lly, “cor pu le n t ” is  a  more  su itab le  ad ject ive  than
“r i ch . ”
Prominen t a r t i cl es  publ ished with in  the past  fifteen yea rs or  so include  Akhil
Amar, A N eo-Fed eral ist  Vi ew of  Ar ticl e II I: S epa rat in g th e T wo T iers of Federal
Ju risdiction , 65  B.U . L. RE V. 205 (1985) [her eina fter  Amar , A N eo-Fed eral ist  Vi ew ];
Akh i l Amar ,  Th e Two-Tiered Stru cture of the Jud iciary Act of 1789, 138 U. P A. L.
RE V. 1499 (1990); William R. Cas to, An  Ort hod ox V iew  of th e Tw o-Ti er An aly sis  of
Congressional Con trol  Over  Fed eral  J ur isd icti on , 7 CO N S T . CO M M . 89 (1990); Robert
N . C li n ton, A M an da tory  View  of Fed eral  Cou rt J ur isd icti on: A G ui ded  Qu est f or the
Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. P A. L. RE V. 741 (1 984); B a r ry  F r iedman ,
A Di ff eren t Di al ogue: T h e S u prem e Cou rt,  Con gress , an d F eder al J ur isd icti on , 85 NW .
U. L. RE V. 1 (1990); Joh n H ar rison , Th e Pow er of Con gress  to L im it t he J ur isd icti on
of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64 U. C H I . L. RE V. 203 (1997); Daniel
J . Meltze r, The History and S tructure of Article III,  138 U. P A. L. RE V. 1569 (1990);
Rober t J . Pu sha w, J r., Congressional Power  Ov er  Federal  Court  J uri sd ic tion: A
Defense of th e N eo-Federalist Interpretation of Article III, 1997 BYU L.  RE V. 847;
Michael Wells, Congress’ Paramount R ole in Setting the S cope of Federal J u r isd icti on ,
85 NW . U. L. RE V. 465 (1991 ); Gor don G. Youn g, A Critical Reassessment of the Case
Law  Bearing on Congress’ Power to Restrict the Ju risdiction of the Lower Federal
Courts, 54 MD . L. RE V. 132  (199 5).
Som e of th e comme nt ar y dealin g specifically with  Sup rem e Cour t jur isdiction is
summ arized in  Ch r istoph er T . Ha ndm an , The Doctrine of Political Accountability:
App ly ing a N ew E xt ern al C ons tr ain t t o Con gres s’ Excep tion s Cl au se Pow er, 106 YALE
L.J . 197,  205-2 11 (19 96). F or s yn opse s of t he  olde r com me nt ar y as  to ju ri sdi ction  of
federa l court s in ge ner al, se e, fo r  ex a mple, CHEME RINSKY, supra , ch. 3; DAVID P .
CURRIE , F EDERAL J URI SDI CTIO N IN  A NUTSHE LL 31-37 (3d e d. 1 990 ); MARTIN H. RE D I S H ,
F ED ERAL  J URISDICTION : TE N S I ON S  I N  TH E  ALLOC A T I ON  O F  J UDICIAL P O W E R ch. 1 (2d ed.
199 0);  and  CH A R L E S  AL A N  WR I GH T , LA W  OF  F EDERAL COURTS  § 10 (5 th  ed . 19 94).
3. S ee H onig v. Doe, 484 U .S. 305, 329-32 (1988) (Rehnq uist , C.J., concur rin g).
4. S ee, e.g., Rex E. Lee & Richa rd G . Wilkin s, An Analysis of Supplemental
J ur isd icti on  and  Absten tion w ith R ecomm enda tions for L egisla tiv e Act ion , 19 90  BYU
L. RE V. 321, 361.
Three  J us ti ces  in  198 4 la me nt ed  th e s ta tu te  dir ect in g wh at  pr eclu sio na ry  effect
federa l court s mu st give  to pr ior st at e pr oceedings . S ee Migra  v. War ren  C ity  Sch .
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 The qu estion of Congres s’ power perva des th e law of federa l
court s. This crucial aspect of the Constitution’s separat ion  of
powers1 ha s been  discu ssed  exten sively (alt hou gh s till
ina dequ at ely) in connect ion  wit h  su bject  mat ter  ju r isdict ion ,2
but  th ere h as been  less critical discussion of Congress’ power to
legisla te  abou t  other  asp ect s of judicial business . It seem s to be
sim ply a s sumed,  for  example, t ha t  Con gr es s cou ld  lift  the
mootness  ba r3 or  cur ta i l judicial  abs tent ion .4 When  the
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Dis t . Bd.  of Ed uc. , 46 5 U .S.  75,  88 (1 984 ) (Whit e, J., concu rr ing); see als o Mar res e v.
Ame ri can  Acad. of Orth opaedic  Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). None, however,
questioned  Congress’ power to impose the directive.
5. Federa l Election Comm’n v. Akins, 118 S. Ct. 1777 (1998). The J ustices split
6-3  as  to whether  a  constitutional impediment to stan ding remained.
6. A year ea rli er, Ch ief Ju stice Reh nqu ist, for t he Cou rt , sta ted t he following
in  a footnote:
It  is s et tl ed t ha t C ong re ss  can n o t  er a se Article III’s stan ding requirem ents
by sta tu torily gr an tin g t h e  r ig h t to s ue  to a  pla int iff wh o wou ld n ot
otherwise have s t and ing . We acknowledg e, t hou gh , th at  Con gr ess ’ decis ion
t o g r a nt a  pa rt icu la r p la in ti ff th e r igh t t o cha llen ge a n a ct’s
constit ut ionalit y . . . elimin at es a ny pr ude nt ial st an ding lim ita tion s . . . .
Raines  v. Byrd, 117 S . Ct. 2312, 2318  n.3 (1997). The on ly explan at ion give n  fo r  this
“ackn owledgm ent ,” however , was a  citat ion to a  shor t pa ssa ge in Bennett v. Spear,
117 S. Ct. 1 154, 1162 -63 (1997). B e nn et gave no explanation eith er; it simply cited
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.  Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). Th e sta tu te a t issu e in
Trafficante, however, was t he Fa ir Housin g title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,
en acted pur sua nt  to Congr ess’ enum era ted p ower t o enforce th e Thir te e n th
Amendmen t “by appropr ia t e  legis lat ion.” S ee Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968). The laws involved in the B ennett, Raines,  and Akins c a ses  were  noth ing
of tha t  sor t ,  and no thing in  Trafficante s e em s  r el ev a n t t o t h e m .
Ju stice  Douglas assert ed in 1970 that  “Congress can, of course, resolve the
qu est ion  [of sta nd ing ] one  wa y or a not h er, save as the r equirement s of Article III
d ic t at e oth erw ise.” Association  of Data  Pr ocessin g Ser v. Or g. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970 ). He  gav e n o re as on or  explan at ion, however ; and  th e only au th ority h e
cited was Mu sk rat  v. U ni ted  S ta tes ,  219 U.S. 346 (1911), which is the classic case
i ll u st r a t ing th at  Article III  somet imes  does “dictat e oth erwis e.” He cited n o aut horit y
for  the pur ported general rule to which deemed Muskrat  an  excep t ion .
Thus, wha tever  reas on  th ere m ight  be for “acknowledgin g” in Congress  a genera l
power to dispense with prudential stan ding rules, it  st ill  remains una rticulated,
perhaps  because it is so poorly conceived.
The grounds and intrinsic l imits of Congress’ power to dispense wi t h  “p r udent ia l
sta ndin g” are discussed in t he last pa rt of this ar ticle.
7. United  St at es  v. F ish er , 6 U .S.  (2 Cr an ch) 3 58,  396  (180 4).
Supreme Cour t  applied a  st at ut e in 19 98 dis pen sin g with
“pruden t ia l” standing rules,5 no Jus t i ce  t roub led e ithe r  t o
que st ion or  t o explain Congress ’ presu med power  to d isp lace  the
jud iciar y’s own “prudence” in this regard.6 The fact  tha t
Congress la cks t he p ower  to dispen se with  ru le s t ha t  a r e
“cons t itu t iona l” in cha ract e r  does not  imp ly  tha t  it  h a s  t he
power to ma ke or un ma ke ru les a b ou t  ever yth ing s o long as
those ru les are n on-constitu tional in char acter. Our s i s not  a
system  of pa r li amen ta ry omnicompeten ce: “un der  a  cons t it u t ion
conferr ing specific powers, t he power conten ded for mus t be 
gra nt ed, or  it ca nn ot be e xer cised.”7
At  le a st  as t o subject m at ter  jurisdiction, some ha ve argu ed
th at  a “plena ry” power in  Congr ess t o medd le wit h  th e court s is
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8. F o r exa mp le,  “[t]h ere is  . . . a  fun da me nt al r igh t t o ha ve t he  sys te m of
che cks  and ba lances main tained in  working order. . . . [Selective divestmen t  of
jur isd icti on] would restore the balance of governm ental powers and h el p u n do som e
of the  un fo r tun a t e consequ ences  of judicial exces s.” Char les E . Rice, Lim iting Federal
Court Ju risdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the Proposals in Congress Today, 65
J U D ICATURE  190,  195,  197 (1 981).  Th is vi ew p ur por te dly “a ffords  legit im acy t o th e
otherwise un dem ocrat ic pr actice of judicial r eview an d reconciles t wo seem ingly
conflicting s t ructura l  commitments  of  the Amer ican  constit ut ional sys tem  by providin g
Congress a  sign ifican t r ole in  th e de velop me nt  of cons tit ut iona l doct ri ne  wit hou t
comprom ising  the  jud icia ry’s  au thor i ty as the final a rbit er of const itu tion al m ean ing.”
The S up rem e Cou rt,  1995  Ter m : Lead in g Cas es: Feder al J ur isd icti on a nd  Proce dure:
Except ions Clause, 110 HARV. L. RE V. 135, 277 (1996) [hereina fter Lea di ng  Cas es].
9. La wr en ce G. Sa ger, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term–Foreword: Constitutional
Lim ita t ions on Congress’ Auth ority to Regulate the Ju risdiction of the Federal Court s ,
95 H ARV. L. RE V. 17, 32 (1981). For example, J ustice Fra nkfurt er once wrote,
“Congress ne ed n ot gi ve t his  Cou rt  an y appe ll a t e power ; i t  may withd raw appel la t e
jur isd icti on  on ce con ferred a nd it  may do so even while a case is su b ju di ce. ” Nat iona l
M u t . Ins . Co. v. Tidewa ter  Tra nsfer  Co., 337 U.S . 582, 655 (1949 ) (Fra nk furt er, J .,
dissent ing). In one ear lier opinion th e Court ha d said, “Not only may whole classes
of cases be  kept  out of th e jur isdiction a ltoget he r, b ut  pa rt icul ar  clas ses  of que st ions
may be su bjected  to r e-exam ina tion  an d re view, wh ile oth ers  ar e not . . . . The  genera l
power to re gula te im plies power  to re gula te in  all th ings.” Dun can v. Th e Fr an cis
Wrigh t , 105 U.S. 381, 385-86 (1882). Several such car te blanche dicta a re collected
and criti cized in Le ona rd G . Rat ner , Congressional Power Over the Appellate
J ur isd icti on  of the Suprem e Court ,  109 U. P A. L. RE V. 157 , 17 3-82  (196 0).
The chronic dribble of such dicta still continues. In the 1994  cas e of Dalton v.
S pect er, th e Cour t confron ted t he a rgu men t t ha t a  sta tu te const ru ed as  foreclosing
jud icia ry review of th e discre tion given  th e Pr esiden t r egar ding m ilitar y base  clos u r es
“would virtua lly repudiate Ma rbu ry v . Ma di son .” 511 U.S. 462, 477. In stea d of simply
pointin g o u t  th a t  th is a rg um en t i s s uffi cien tl y di sp ose d of on  th e fa ce of Marbury
i tself, see 5 U.S. (1 Cra nch) 137, 166 (1803) (ar guin g th at  when  th e exec u t ive
pos sesses a l ega l dis cre ti on,  hi s “act s a re  onl y pol it ica lly e xa mi na ble ”), Chi ef J us ti ce
Rehnqu is t , for th e plurality, wrote,
[O]u r  conclus ion th at  judicial r eview is n ot ava ilable for r espond ent s’ claim
follows from our interpreta tion of an Act of Congress, by which we and a ll
federa l courts ar e bound. The judicial power of the United States conferred
by Art icle I II of  t h e Const itu tion is u pheld  just  as s ur ely by with holding
judicial  relief wh ere Con gress  ha s per miss ibly foreclosed it, as it is by
gran t ing such relief where au thorized by the Constit ution or by stat ute.
Dal ton , 511 U.S. at 477. Here the first sentence connotes ca r te blanche competence;
the adver b “permis sibly” in th e second s ent ence, h owever, iden tifi es —b u t begs—the
crucia l quest ion .
an  as pect  of const itu tion al “checks  an d ba lan ces,”8 and the re
a re Suprem e Court  dicta exhibitin g what  one observer
described a s  “an  a lmos t  unseemly en thu s ia sm in  di scuss ing
Congress’ power  to lop off diverse heads of . .  . art icle III
jurisdiction.”9 Some comm ent at ors h ave m ore or les s cred ibly
ur ged some cons tit ut iona l lim it s t o th is  “congr es siona l
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10. S ee, e.g., Wells, supra  note 2, at  476.
11. S ee, e.g., RE D I S H , supra  not e 2, at  42-47; Pa ul Ba tor , Con gres sion al P ower
Ov er th e J ur isd ict ion  of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL . L. RE V. 103 0, 1 033 -34 (1 982 );
Mar tin  H. Red ish, Con sti tu tion al L im ita tion s on  Con gress ion al P ower to C ont rol
Federal J ur isd icti on: A  R eact ion  to P rofes sor S ager , 77 NW . U. L. RE V. 143, 158-59
(1982) [her eina fter  Redish , Constitutional L imi tat ions]; Martin H. Redish, Text,
Stru cture, an d C om m on S ens e in  th e In terp reta tion  of Article III,  138 U. P A. L. RE V.
1633, 1648 (1990) [he rein afte r Re dish , Text, Stru cture, and Comm on Sense].
12. S ee, e.g., Leona rd G . Rat ner , Majori tar ian  Cons t ra in ts  on  Jud icia l  Rev iew:
Congressional Con trol  of S up rem e Cou rt J ur isd icti on , 27 VILL . L. RE V. 929 , 95 4 (19 82);
La urence H. Tr ibe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights out of
the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RE V. 129  (198 1).
13. S ee, e.g., RE D I S H , supra  not e 2, a t 4 7-52; see also Pla ut  v. S p en d t h r ift  F a r m ,
Inc.,  514  U. S. 2 11,  217 -40 (1 995 ).
14. S ee Fe lk er  v. T ur pin , 51 8 U .S.  651 , 66 6-67  (199 6) (S ou te r,  J ., con cur ri ng ).
In  gra nt ing cert iorar i, the  Sup rem e Cour t spe cifically dir ected the pa rties to brief
“(1) Wheth er Title I of the Ant i-Terrorism a nd Effective Death  Pena lty Act of 1996
(Act),  and  in  par ticu lar  § 106(b)(3)(E), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(B)(3)(E), is an
unconstit ut iona l rest riction of the jurisdiction of this Court .” Felker  v. Turpin, 517
U.S. 1182, 1182-83 (No. 95-8836) (grant ing cert iorari Ma y 3, 1 996).  Th at  wa s on e of
severa l “ju r isd ic t ion  st r ipp ing” measu res ena cted by Con gress  dur ing t he pr eceding
weeks. Ot he rs  wer e s ect ion  440 (a) of t he  sa me  Act  ( am e n d ing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10)
(199 4)),  and section 377 of the Imm i gr a n t Res ponsibilit y Act of 1996 (amen ding 8
U.S.C. § 125 5a (f )(4)(C) (1 994 )).
Because the  Cour t  sua sponte ident ified and  dir ect ed briefing of tha t very curr ent
issue, it wa s widely expe cted t ha t t he de cision in  Felk er  might tu rn upon it; and,
given th e va ri ous  Su pr em e Cou rt  dict a con cedi ng  car te  bla nch e congre ssiona l contr ol,
it  was gener ally assu med t hat  this r estr ictive legislation wou l d b e  u phe ld . The
Ju stices noneth eless avoided addressing th e issue. Perh aps th ey came to realize tha t
the iss ue  is fa r m or e com pli cat ed  th an  ha d b ee n t ho ug ht . An  ea r l ie r  m a n u scri pt  dr aft
of th is ar ticle was  in t he cha mber s of each jus tice (an d in t he h an ds of all couns el)
pr ior  t o  br i ef ing  and o ra l a rgumen t  i n  Felk er.
pr ima cy,”10 including du e process,1 1  equa l  protect ion ,12 and
nebulous inferences fr om  t he concept of separ at ion of powers;13
and two years  ago, thr ee justices encoura ged such a rgum ent s
by filing a  sh or t  concu r ring opinion solely to emph asize th at
doub t s abou t Con gres s’ power  rega rd ing the  jud icia ry remain .14
Ther efore,  th ere is some h ope for a sober r eassessmen t even
rega rd ing ju r isdict ion . An d i f th is  is  t rue a s t o ju r isdict ion
desp it e th e volum es alr eady wr itten , t h e r e is  more r ea son  to
hope for some rethinking about aspects of judiciary legis la t ion
wh ich  have r ece ived les s a t t en t ion .
The ar guable l imits  suggest ed in t he liter at ur e to dat e ar e
a l l extrinsic to t he congr ession al p ower s up posed: t hey p osit a
legisla tive  competence  wi th no impor t an t  intrinsic  bou nd s, a nd
th en  fence it fr om a  few ap plicat ions wit h  st icks from sources
independen t of th e posit ed power  its elf. This a rt icle, in
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15. The origin, sign ifica nce, and funda ment ality of the pr inciple of enumer ated
powers is discussed at some length  in Da vid E. E ngda hl, The  Bas is  of  t he Spend ing
Pow er, 18 SEATTLE  U. L. RE V. 215 , 22 8-34  (199 5).
16. S ee Gib bon s v.  Ogd en , 22  U. S. (9  Wh ea t. ) 1 (18 24).
17. S ee McCulloch v . Ma ry lan d, 17  U.S . (4 Wh ea t.) 3 16 (18 19); see als o United
Stat es v. F ish er , 6 U .S.  (2 Cr an ch) 3 58 (1 804 ).
18. “In  assessin g th e bre adt h of § 5’s enforcem ent  power, we  begin wit h  it s
t ext . . . . [Congress] has b een given  th e power ‘to enforce,’ not the  power t o deter min e
what cons t i t u t es  a  constitu tional violation.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157,
2163-64 (199 7).
19. U.S. CO N S T . art . I, § 8, cl. 18.
20. S ee infra Par t III.C.
21. S ee infra Par t III.D.
con t ra s t , ident ifies an d exam ines t he in trinsic lim it s of
Congress’ power to legislate regarding the judiciary. These
intrinsic  l imi t s,  it  tu rns  out , are mor e definit e, mor e cert ain ,
a nd of much  grea te r  pract i ca l  impor tance , even  though  for  a
long time th ey have been  almost  un iversally overlooked.
Intrin sic lim it s d er ive  from t he prin ciple of enum era ted
powers15 an d t he cons tit ut iona l ter ms  by which  a p ar ticu lar
“power” is conferr ed. Cla ssic illust ra t ion s inclu de  Ch ief J ust ice
Mar sh all’s analyses of the Commerce Clause 16 and  the
Necessa ry an d Pr oper Claus e.1 7  O n e more  recen t  il lus t ra t ion  i s
the Sup rem e Court ’s elucidat ion of Con g ress ’ Four t een th
Amendment  en forcem en t  pow er  wh en  it  in va lid a ted  the s o-
called  “Religious  Fr eedom  Rest ora tion  Act.”18
The constitut ional provision  from which  a lmos t  a ll  of
Congress’ p ow er  regarding the judiciary derives is the
Necessa ry an d Pr oper Claus e.19 In  fact, a s sh own be low, th at
clause  was deliberately designed  for  th i s purpose  (among
others); and  for gener at ions its operat ion in this r egard wa s
expr essly  recogn ized.  Wh ile  th is  claus e confers a  power  th at  is
very subs tan t ia l , in  con junct ion wit h  Art icle  II I of t he
Con st it u t ion  i t  a lso guarantees judicial independ ence by
imp osing cru cial intrinsic  l imitat ions.
Or thodox opinion  in t he  tw en tie th  cent ur y, howeve r, h as
overlooked  th e Ne cessa ry a nd  Pr oper  Clau se a s t he  ground of
judicia ry  leg is la t ion , a nd s o has failed  to conside r t he in tr ins ic
limit s it en ta ils. Or th odoxy inst ea d a tt rib ut es t he  re leva nt
power to a s upp osed “im pl ica t ion ” of one cla use  of th e
Con st it u t ion 20 and a m ere a llusion ma de in a noth er, 21 neith er  of
which  en ta ils  any in t r in sic lim it a t ion  a t  a ll.  For  rea son s
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22. U.S. CO N S T . art . III, § 1.
23. “All legislat ive Power s her ein gr an ted s ha ll be vest ed in  a  Congres s  of  the
United  Sta tes .” Id. ar t. I, § 1. “ The executive Power sha ll be ve s te d  in  a  P res iden t
of th e Un ited  Sta tes  of America .” Id. art . II, § 1.
24. Id . art . I, §§ 2-3.
25. “The Con gr e s s  sh a ll asse mble a t lea st on ce in ever y Year, a nd s uch Me etin g
sha ll be on  th e first  Monda y in Decem ber, u nless  th ey sha ll by Law a ppoint  a
different  Day.” Id . ar t. I, § 4, cl. 2, amended  by i d . amend.  XX, § 2.
26. Whether  an d how t o organ ize its elf was le ft to Con gres s’ own d iscret ion. S ee
id . art . I, § 5.
27. S ee id . art . II, § 1, cl. 8. Compare th is with th e general  o a th  r equ ir emen t
deta iled in t his  ar ticle, h owever, each of th ose pr emis es is
utt erly unsound.
Of cour se t he cr edible s cope of Congr ess’ power var ies wit h
the premise employed. The re fore, a ckn owledgin g th e Necessa ry
and P roper  Cl a u se as  th e tr ue p rem ise for m ost la ws r egar din g
the judiciary necessarily changes the ar gumen t (an d sometim es
changes the  ou tcome) regard ing var ious ju diciar y laws , exist ing
or  possib ly to be pr oposed. Th is a rt icle cann ot explor e all t he
ram ifications, but  it does pur sue sever a l su fficie n t ly t o sh ow
the poten tia l significan ce of acknowledging this n eglected
safeguar d of the Constitution’s separat ion of powers.
II. SE L F -EX E C U T I N G  AN D  NO N -SE L F -EX E C U T I N G  DI M E N S IO N S
O F  T H E  J U D I C I A L  P O W E R
 Pr elimina ry to the q u es t ion  of w h a t  Con g r es s  m a y do
regard ing the ju dicia l br anch is  the qu es t ion  of wha t  the
Cons t itu t ion  accompli shes by i t se lf r egard ing  tha t  b ranch .
The Const itu tion  sa ys “the ju dicial Power of the Un ited
Sta tes, shall be vested” in certain court s.22 Pa ra llel “vestin g”
clauses  appear  in Articles I and II,23 b u t  the s im ila r it y of
wor ding con cea ls  som e com pl ica t in g con side ra t ion s.
There wa s t o be but  one Con gre ss, a nd  n o act by any other
federal  official or entity wa s pre r equis ite t o its comin g int o
exi st en ce and  acqu ir ing  it s  con templated powers. Congress
would  exist  as soon as th e Senators and Representat ives,
select ed as prescribed in Article I,24 a s sembled on  the  da te  tha t
Art icle I specified;25 and  noth ing more  was  needed to
accom plish its existen ce or best ow its cont empla ted powers .26
Likewise, there wa s to be bu t  one  Pres iden t ,  and as  soon  as  the
certified elect ora l vot es  were cou nted  and t he p res cr ibe d oa th
was t aken ,27 th e “executive Power” contem plated by Article II
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in  Article VI, Claus e 3.
28. S ee id . art . II, § 2. The Presiden t as a  solitary hum an bein g might be
un able  to per form a ll his d ut ies a lone, bu t h is lega l “power” to veto, t o par don, t o
make tr eat ies su bject to Sen at e consen t, an d to execu te t he la ws wa s complet e. His
powers to nominat e and t o fill vacancies would remain  idle until offices were c r ea t ed
tha t  he m i gh t  fill , but nothing more than t he Constitution itself was required to vest
those powers  in h im. Th ere m ight  be no Arm y or Na vy; but r egar dless of whe th er it
pleased any  othe r  b r a n ch  o r an y sta te, h e would be com ma nder  of the m ilitia in
na t iona l s e rvi ce  because  the Con stit ut ion by its  own force ma de him  Comm an der in
Ch ief.
29. “The Congr ess s ha ll ha ve Powe r . . . T o constitu t e Tr ibu na ls in fer ior t o th e
s u p re m e Cour t . ” Id . art . I, § 8, cl. 9.
30. John Har r i so n  observed  th at  “Judicia l power a nd ju risdict ion ar e obviously
closely related concepts, but, just as obviously, they are not th e same concept. . . .
The judicial power is .  .  . less specific than a particular court’s jurisdiction, as the
poten t ia l is less  specific th an  th e act ua l.” Har rison , supra  n o t e 2 , a t  214-15.
Har r i son ’s actual/potentia l and specific/general contrast s, however, do no t  seem apt .
I fin d it  mor e u se ful  to a na logiz e t o th e di ffer en t d im en sion s of a  ph ysi cal  obje ct.
31. Likewise in pr ivate  affairs , a “power of att orne y,” for exam ple, ca n b e
considered in a t le as t t wo dim en sion s: t o do wh at , an d for  wh om.  Per ha ps one could
would  au tomat ica l ly  vest  i n h im.28 In  oth er  word s, Art icles I
and II are “self-exe cut in g” both  as t o the exis t en ce of t he
resp ective bran ches an d as t o the vestin g of th eir powers.
The “judicia l Power ,” however , was  to be ves ted  not  in jus t
one, but potentially in several tribunals, the choice b et ween  one
and sever al bein g expr essly left  to Congr ess b y th e Tr ibun als
Claus e.29 Moreover, not even th e ma nda ted “one su prem e
Cour t ” could  exi st  un t il s omeon e  de t erm ined h ow man y judges
it  shou ld have,  the Presiden t  made nomina t ions , and  the
Sena te ga ve i t s con se n t . In  other  wor ds , t o a  sign ifica n t  e xt en t ,
Art icle III ca n n ot be  consider ed “self-execut ing”: the t hir d
branch  was complete ly depen den t u pon t he ot her  two for it s
coming in to bein g.
More difficult is th e quest ion of whet her  act ion  by e it her  of
th e other  bra nch es wa s r equ isit e to in vest ing t he ju diciar y with
its  “judicial Power.” One might be t empt ed to sup pose tha t t he
judicia l pow er  ves t s in  ea ch  fed er a l t r ibu na l a u tomat ica lly  upon
tha t  part icular tr ibunal’s cr e a t ion . Th e p ict ure is  more
complicated, however, because “power” has m ore th an  one
dim ens ion.30 By way of compa rison, one might  describe th e
legisla tive  power as Congr ess’ prer ogat ive to “mak e” laws (in
contr ast , for  example, to “executing” them), but there is also
an other  d imension . In  tha t  other dimension, Congress’
compe ten ce is defined by the pr inciple of enum era ted powers.31
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ide nt ify more (e.g., how long), but i t  i s n o t  necessary here  to push  the  spa t ia l
me taphor  of “dim en sio n” s o far .
32. As to cr im ina l cas es,  tw o clau ses —Art icle I II,  Sect ion 2 , C la u se  3,  and
Amendmen t VI—both contemplat e tha t th ere will be statu tes reg ar ding ve nue for
cr i m in a l tr ia ls. H oweve r, n eit he r is  a gr an t of p ower ; bot h r at he r a re  all us ions  to t he
power Congress has by virtu e of the N ecessary and P roper Clause.
33. S ee Turn er v. Bank  of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799)
(Chase,  J ., wr iti ng  in a  footn ote ) (“If congr ess  ha s giv en  th e pow er  to th is cour t, w e
posess it, not otherwise: and if congress has n ot given the power  to  us , o r  t o any
o ther  Cou rt , it  st ill r em ai ns  at  th e le gis la ti ve d isp osa l.”).
We ack nowled ge the la t t er  dimen sion  wh en  we  use  su ch  id iom s
as  “th e comm er ce power ” an d “th e ba nk ru pt cy power.”
Sim ilar ly, one m igh t conceive th e “judicial power” as
compe ten ce to process an d resolve litiga t ion ,  bu t  another
dim ens ion of i t  concerns the  k inds  of d ispu tes  to which  tha t
capaci ty exte nd s. F or exa mp le, s om e cour t s  a r e l imi t ed  to
juven ile or  p roba te or  equ i ty  mat t e r s, even though in these
ma t t e r s th eir power t o resolve litigation m ight be a s  gr e a t a s
tha t  of other court s. In this  dimen sion th e subject ma tt er
sp ecifi ca t ion s in Article III Sect ion  2 limit  the p ower  of our
federal  cour ts. We acknowledge this dimension when we use
such  idioms a s “di ver si ty ju r isdict ion ” an d “fed er a l qu es t ion
jur isdict ion.”
With  r e ga r d to th is  su bject  mat ter  dimen sion , a u tomat ic or
“self-executin g” investit ur e of t h e  “judicial Power of th e Unit ed
Stat es” would be ser iously dys fun ctiona l. Article II I’s vest ing
clause  does  not  distingu ish a mong th e severa l subject ma tt ers
to which  th e feder al ju dicial  power “sha ll ext en d,” an d t her efor e
if the  ves t ing  were au tom a t ic i t would follow that  the sam e
compe ten ce ves t s  in  every “inferior ” feder al cour t. Th at  would
preclude,  for  exa mple, s pe cia lized cour ts  for ad mir alt y,
b a n krup tcy , or other  categories. It a lso would give every
“inferior ” cour t  na t ion wid e ve nue (a t  lea st  in  civil  case s), 32 and
would  pr eclud e des igna tin g som e for tr ial and others for
appellate functions.
It  th erefore sh ou ld not be su rpr ising th at  even before t he
n ine teen th cen tu ry bega n , seve ra l of th e J ust ices had concluded
tha t  Article III is non -se lf execut ing with  regar d to subject
ma tt er  ju r isdict ion .33 Alth ough  ther e was s ome d isagr eemen t  on
the point , it disap pear ed ra th er ea rly, and  th is ha s rem ained
the preva iling view. This, of cou rse , r a ises  se ver a l qu es t ion s
about  how, by whom,  and how fa r  the s ubject -mat ter  dimen sion
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ E N G - F I N A. W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
84 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
34. Occa sion al  a t t empts  hav e b e en  ma de to su mm ar ize wha t I call ju dicial
poten cy. Ju stice Sa mu el F. Miller  in 1891, for exa mple ,  referred to “th e p owe r o f a
cour t  to d ecid e a nd  pr onou nce  a ju dgm en t a nd  carr y it in to  ef fect  between  pe r sons
and pa r t ie s wh o b r in g a  ca se b efor e i t  for  de cision .” S AM U E L F . MI L L E R, ON  T H E
CONSTITUTION  314 (1891). A 1911 Supreme Court opinion referred t o  “the  r igh t  t o
de termine ac tua l con t rovers ies  a r is ing be tween  adverse  l it igan t s, duly in stit ut ed in
cour t s of proper  jur isdiction .” Muskr at  v. Un ited  Sta tes , 219 U. S. 3 46,  361  (191 1).
Such  genera lizations, howev er ,  a r e no t n ea rl y sp ecifi c en ou gh  for  me an in gfu l
d iscuss ion . Neit her  can ju dicial pot ency be  equ at ed wit h m at ter s of process , pr oof, and
procedure; those ar e importan t par ts, but n ot the whole.
of Article III might be im plemen ted. Mu ch of th e rem a i n der  of
this art icle discusses these questions.
But  “subject  mat t e r  ju r isdict ion ”—th e m at ter s t o wh ich
judicia l competence extends—is only on e d im en sion of th e
federal  judicial power. The ot her  concerns wha t  a  t r ibuna l may
do regard ing  mat ter s  with in  i ts  jur isdict ion. For  th is
d imens ion , customa ry us age ha s provided no such concise and
convenien t  labe l. I t he re fore pr opose t o call it “judicia l pote ncy.”
As to federal tribunals, judicia l poten cy is  a  funct ion  of
cons t itu t iona l ter ms like “ju dicial” and “cases” and th e
meanings associated wi t h t hose  wor ds  th rough  cen tur ies  of
Anglo-Amer ica n  pr act ice. A tr ibun al can  ha ve full jud icial
potency de sp it e r es t r ict ion s of s ubject  mat ter  ju r isdict ion  (for
examp le, to adm iralt y cases). However, if a body were
ma ter ially de bil it a t ed  in  a t t r ibu tes  of judicia l poten cy (for
examp le, if it could n ot  conven e h ea r in gs , com pe l wi tnes se s,  or
ad jud ica t e claims ), it would  seem anomalous  to ca l l i t  a
“judicia l” body at all. At least  in th e cont ext  of Ang lo-Am er ica n
lega l t r ad it i ons , some characte r is t ics  and prerogatives are so of
the essence to “judicial” bodies that t h e y a re inelu cta bly
implicated  when one contemplates a  judiciary, what ever th e
scope of its jur isdiction might be. 34
Con sider  not  only t he  form a nd  ma nn er  of process s er vice,
but  also th e length  an d sett ing of cour t t erm s and  sess ions , and
for  mult i judge  t r ib u n als , qu orum requir em en ts a nd p rotocol
among the  judges . Consi de r  t h e pa ramete rs  of causes  of act ion ;
p le a di n g pr act ices, joinder , pa rt y su bst itu ti on , a n d
in ter ven t ion ; con t inuances and  st ays ; supe r sedeas; costs;
qu a lifica t ion , admiss ion , and d iscip lin e of a t torneys ; met hods  of
discover y, an d compu lsion relat ing th ere t o; se lect ion  and
u t iliza t ion  of jur ies; t he  set tin g as ide of verd icts, a nd  t he
gran t ing of new t r i a ls ; admin i st ra t ion  of oa ths ; burdens,  the
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35. S ee, e.g., Kokkonen v. Gua rdian  Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994)
(holding  tha t, absen t  an independ ent jur isdictional basis, a federal court la cks power
to enforce party agreem ents u nderlying a st ipulated  d i smissa l  un less  per formance  was
made  a  cond it ion  o f t he dismissal order); Sheph erd v. American  Broad. Co., 62 F.3d
1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reviewin g “a distr ict court ’s us e of its  in h e r ent power to punish
lit iga tion  miscond uct wit h t he u lt imate sa nct ion of d efa ult ”); In re Allsta te I ns. C o.,
8 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 1993) (considering district court power to rem and a  removed case
sua sponte).
36. The character istics a nd pr erogat ives compr ising ju dicial poten cy are
distin guish able  from a ccoutrem ent s th at  migh t a ssist  court s in pe rform ing t heir
fun ction s but  ar e not  essen tia lly judicial t hem selves. Sa lar ies , offices , a nd  office
supplies; bailiffs, marsha ls, secretaries, and  clerks; librar ies, court rooms, and spaces
for  files, are n o t judicial poten cy mat ter s (even t hough  as a  pra ctical ma tt er it  migh t
be im pos sib le for  cou rt s t o fun cti on  wit ho ut  th em ).
P roviding for  an y or  al l of t he se  is n ot a n e xer cise  of “[t]h e ju dici a l  Power  of  the
United  States.” Indeed, providing these accoutrem ents involves the use and disposal
of fede ra l pr oper ty,  incl ud ing  fede ra l m one y; an d only Congress  has power  in  tha t
regard.  Article IV, Section  3, Clau se 2 of the  U.S. Cons tit ut ion p rov ides  tha t  “The
Congress sha ll ha ve Powe r t o dispose of . . . th e . . . P r o pe r t y b e lo n ging to  the
United  States.” Furthermore, Article I,  Section 9, Clause 7, adds : “No Money sh all
be d rawn  f rom the  Treasu ry , b u t in Consequen ce of Appropriations m ade by
L a w . . . .” See generally David  E. E ngda hl, T he S pen di ng  Pow er, 44 DUKE  L.J . 1
(199 4).
sequence of presen ting pr oof, and ad missibility of evidence; r es
jud ica t a  an d collate ra l est oppel; imp osition  of sa nct ion s for
con t e m pt s of cour t s ; des igna t ion  of ma t t e r s t o cons t it u t e  a
recor d for  appella t e review; issuan ce of writs a nd oth er pr ocess
(to effectua te jur isdiction or oth erwise ); requ is it es  for  pe r son a l
ju r isdict ion ; deciding wheth er appellat e cour ts m ay ent er
judgment th em selves , or r at he r m us t r em an d. Th e list  could go
on an d on. If ther e is disagr eem e n t  over  pr ecis ely  wh ich  of
these a re  so in tegra l tha t  p ow er  over  t hem m ust  inh ere  in a
body in ord er for it  to be called  “judicia l,”3 5  at  lea st  ma ny of
th em su rely ar e.36 As the au thors of a lan dma rk  stu dy observed
for ty years a go:
T h e r e ar e sp he re s of act ivity  so fun da m en ta l a n d  s o n e ce s sa r y
t o a  cour t ,  so  inh e ren t  i n  i t s  ve ry  na tu re  a s  a  co u r t , t h a t  t o
d ives t  i t  o f i t s  abso lu t e  comm and  wi th in  th ese  sphe res  i s  t o
ma ke  m ean in g le s s  the  ve ry  ph r ase  ju d icia l p ow er .
. . . T h r ou g h ou t  a  lon g  h is t or y  dom i n a te d  by  wh a t  P ou n d
h a s  call ed  “th e id ea  of legis la tiv e om n icom pe te n ce,” cour t  a f t e r
cour t  has  n eve r the l e s s  decl a r e d  i n va l id  u n d e r  t h e s e ve r a l
cons t it u t ion s  legisla tive  en act m en ts  sa id t o pa ss “th e lim it
wh ich sepa ra tes  t he legis la t ive from  t h e  ju d i ci a l p o we r ” a n d  t o
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37. A. Leo Levin & Ant hon y G. Amst erd am , Legislative Control Over Jud icial
Ru le-Makin g: A P roblem  in  Con sti tu tion al R evis ion ,  107 U. P A. L. RE V. 1, 3 0 (19 58).
They continued,
We re cogn ize  th at  th e ou te r b ou nd ar ies  of this  spher e of total ju dicial
a u t on om y ha ve b een  difficu lt  to l ocat e wi th  pr ecis ion . Su ffice t ha t s uch  a
pla ce of sanctu ary exists an d tha t when ever courts ha ve felt th ems e lv es  t oo
tigh tly  pr es se d by  legi sla ti ve r egu la ti on t he y h av e fou nd  in  th e do ctr i n e of
judicial ind epe nd en ce a  lar ge r ese rv oir of in te gr al s up re ma cy. . . . S o long
as a const itu tion m ain ta ins the fu ndam enta l separat ion of powers this ar ea
of functional independence of the judiciary will be preserved in t he very
gran t of the judicial power. And within it the court s rema in t he vig i lan t
wat chdogs of th eir  own  fre edom .
Id . at  33 (citat ion omit ted). Th e Levin a nd Amster dam st udy prima rily considered
pr act ice in the several States, with only incidental atten tion to federal courts.
38. S ee Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 15, 1 Stat . 73, 82.
39. S ee id . § 30. 
40. S ee id . § 26. 
41. Id . § 17.  In  cri mi na l ca ses, a  cou rt  cou ld g ra nt  a n ew  tr ia l in  fav or  of th e
p r isone r , but  not  to his  pre judice. S ee Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 826, 921 (C.C.D. Pa .
1799) (No.  5,1 26) (g ra nt in g n ew  tr ia l).
c on s t i t u t e a  “pa lpab le  enc roachm en t  u pon  the  ind ependen ce”
of  the jud iciar y.37
A mom ent ’s r eflect ion  shou ld make  it  obvious  tha t  the
ques t i on  of wheth er Ar ticle III  is self-execut ing in volves quit e
differen t  cons idera t ions  wi th r ega rd  to the  dimens ion  of judicia l
potency than  it  doe s w it h  rega rd t o su bject  mat ter  ju r isdict ion .
Un su rp ris ingly,  th ere fore, th e pr evailin g view from th e very
beginn ing of our  na t iona l  ju r ispr ud ence h as  been  th at , with
rega rd to ju dicia l pot en cy (un lik e sub ject  mat ter  juris dict ion ),
Article III’s vestin g clau se is self-execut ing.
Even  the fir st  Con gr es s t ook t h is  for  gra nt ed. The 1789
J u d iciar y Act  d id  addres s  a  sma ll  handfu l  of jud ici a l potency
issues; in de ed , it  made  som e in nova t ion s,  su ch  as provid in g for
equ i ty discovery t echn ique s in  act ions at  law,38 pr ovid in g for
depos it ions de bene esse,3 9  and p rovid in g for  ju ry a ss es sm en t  of
amoun t s due in some actions where liability was  esta blished by
demu rr er  or  defau lt .40 As  to mos t  such  mat te r s,  however ,  the
1789 Act left t he  judicia ry t o i ts  own de vices. As to a few, it  did
th i s sp ecifi ca lly: for  example , i t  decl a red tha t  new t r ia l s a ft e r
ju ry ver dict s s hould  be  a llow ed  “for reasons for wh ich new
t r ia ls ha ve us ua lly been  gra nt ed in  th e cour ts  of law.”41
Oth erwise,  Section 17 of the Act provided tha t “all t he s aid
cour t s of the  Un ite d St at es s ha ll ha ve power  . . . to make and
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ E N G - F I N A. W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
75] CONGRE SS’ LIMITS AND TH E J UDICIARY 87
42. Act  of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat . 73, 83.
43. S ee DW I GH T F . H ENDERSON , CO U R T S  F OR A NEW NATION 36 (1 971 ).
44. S ee United States v.  Insu rg en ts , 26 F . Ca s. 49 9, 50 0 (C.C. D. P a. 1 795) (N o.
15, 443 ); cf. Ca se  of F ri es , 9 F . Ca s. 8 26 (C .C. D. P a.  179 9) (N o. 5, 126 ). As a n e a r ly
treatise  writer explained:
The words of reference in th e act of September  24th, 17 89, sect. 29, to
t h e law s of th e Sta te wer e held  to be r estr icted t o the  mode of design at ing
the ju ry by lot  or otherwise, and to the qualifications requisite for jurors,
bu t no t  to  r el a t e t o  th e nu mber  of jurors. Th e nu mber , th erefore , not be ing
fixed by the act of Congress, nor any State r ule adopted by it ,  i t  must
depend on th e comm on la w, by w hi ch  the  Cour t  may  di r ec t  any  number  to
be sum mon ed,  on a  cons ide ra ti on of a ll t he  cir cum st an ces  un der  wh ich  t he
venire is issued.
THO MAS  SE R G E AN T , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW  249  (182 2).
45. S ee Un it ed  St at es  v. H ill,  26 F . Ca s. 3 15 (C .C. D. Va . 18 09) (N o. 15 ,36 4).
Alth ough  t h e act of September 24th, 1789, does not expressly invest the
Courts of the U nited Sta tes, sitting a s Courts, with t he power  to com m i t  a
per son  charged with a n offence against t he Un ited Stat es,  ye t  t his power  is
implied in the d u t ies w hich  th e Cou rt s m us t p er form . And  th e Cou rt  ma y
also take ba il in such case.
SE R G E AN T , supra  not e 44, a t 242 . 
46. S ee, e.g., H ur st  v. H ur st , 12  F.  Ca s. 1 028  (C.C .D.  Pa . 17 99) (N o. 6,929);
Symes  v. I rv in e, 2 3 F . Ca s. 5 91 (C .C. D. P a.  179 7) (N o. 13 ,71 4).
47. S ee King of Spa in v. Olive r, 14 F . Cas . 577, 578 (C.C.D. P a. 1 810)  (No.
7,8 14).
establish all necessar y rules  for  the orderly conducting business
in  th e sa id cour t s , p rov ided  such  ru les  a re not  r epugnan t  to the
law s of th e Un ite d St at es.”42
Accordin gly th e sever al d ist rict  court s m ad e ru les of th eir
own  to gover n  su ch  mat ter s a s w ha t  plea s w ould  be  a llow ed  or
disallowed, the t ime wit hin  wh ich ple as  mu st  be su bm itt ed, a nd
th e order in  which cases would be called for  t r i a l.43 About  many
mat ters, howeve r, n o sta nd ing r ule s wer e m ad e, an d when  such
mat t e r s ar ose, the  ea r l ie s t  federa l judges  sim ply pr oceeded like
judges t r ad it iona l ly ha d. For exam ple, no stat ut e addr essed
how many  persons  should be  su mmoned  as a  pa nel fr om wh ich
t r i a l ju ror s shou ld be chosen; Jus t i ce  Pa ter son  a t  C ircu i t
concluded  th at  th e nu mber  was discret ionary wit h t he cou r t  as
it  wa s  a t  th e comm on law.44 No s ta tu tory  au thor iza t ion  was
deemed  requ isi t e for  the composition and use of grand juries, or
for  commi t t ing  accused per sons  an d t ak ing ba il.45 The J ust ices
a t  C ircu i t  never  hesi t a ted  for  l ack  of s t a tu tory  au thor iza t ion  t o
gran t con t inuances  in  thei r  di scre t ion .46 Likewise, t he  r ight  t o
inqu ire  by wha t a ut hority a n a tt orney acted on h is pur ported
client ’s beh alf wa s r egar ded a s “inher ent  in all courts,”47 a s  was
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48. Thomas Sergean t wrote in  1822:
The Sup rem e Cour t posse sses, wit hout  th e provision  o f w r itt en la w, a
power over their own officers, and to protect them selves and th eir mem bers
from  be ing  di stu rbed  in  the exercise of th eir  fun ction s; su ch a s t o fine  for
contempt , imprison for contu macy, and enforce the ob s er v a nce of order.
They could  ha ve e xer cise d t he  powe r t o fine  an d im pr ison  for con tempt s
withou t th e aid  of this a ct of Congr ess; or  in cas es, if su ch sh ould occur , to
wh ich  its pr ovision does n ot exte nd. Th e act is  a legisla tiv e a s s er t ion  of a
r igh t  as in cident al t o a gra nt  of judicial power,  and is to be considered
either  as an  instan ce of abun dant  caution, or as a legislative declar at ion ,
t h a t  the power of punishing for contempt shall not extend beyond its k n own
and acknowledged limits, namely, fine and imprisonm ent.
SE R G E AN T , supra  note 44, at  19-20. And J oseph Story wr ote in 1833:
[T]here  are cert ain incidenta l powers, which are suppos e d t o a t t a ch  t o t h e m ,
in  common w ith  all oth er cour ts, wh en du ly organ ized, with out a ny positiv e
enactmen t of the legisla tu re. Su ch ar e th e power of th e court s over t heir
own officers, and t he power to  pro t ec t  them and  the ir  members  from be ing
distur bed in the exercise of their functions.
3 J O S E P H STORY, CO M M E N TA RI E S  O N T H E  CONSTITUTION  § 1768, at 650  (1s t e d. 1 833 ).
49. The Judiciary Act contemplated Supreme Court jurisdiction of such  s u it s,
sayin g:
[T]h e Su pr em e Co ur t s ha ll h av e e xclu siv e ju ri sd ict ion  of all  cont rov er sie s of
a  civil natu re, where a  stat e is a part y, except bet ween  a  s t a t e and  it s
citizens; and except also between a state an d citiz en s of ot he r s ta te s, or
a liens, in  wh ich  la tt er  cas e it  sh al l h av e or igin al  bu t n ot e xclusiv e
jur isd icti on.
Act  of Sept. 24 , 1789, ch. 2 0, § 13, 1 St at . 73, 80; cf. U.S. C O N S T . ar t. I II,  § 2
(“Controversies . . . between a Stat e and Citizens of another  Stat e . . . .”). Congress
proposed the s ubsequ ent E leventh  Amendm ent t o bar su ch suits on  December 2,
1793, and, following ra tification, the Amen dmen t took effect on Jan uar y 8, 1798.
50. Act  of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21,  §  2,  1  Stat . 93, con t inued  by Act of May 26,
1790, ch. 13, 1 S ta t. 123 , con t inued  by Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. 8, 1 Stat . 191,
repla ced  by Act of May 8, 1792, ch . 36, 1 St at . 275, amended  by Act of M ar ch  2,
1793, ch. 22, 1 Stat. 333.
t h e pre roga t ive to enforce  cour t room decorum and  to pun ish
con tumacy and  con tempt .48 I n  sum, the  ea r liest federal judges
readily concluded they had a mple p ower  to de a l wi th  su ch
mat ters,  n ot w it h s t a n d in g  t h e l ack  of a n y s t a t u t or y
au thor iza t ion .
The ear liest  Su pr eme  Cour t t erm s sign ifican t ly  il lu s t r a t ed
th i s pow er  to act  de sp it e a  la ck of st a tu tory au thor iza t ion .
Severa l of t ha t  Cour t ’s  ve ry fi r st  ca ses  were or iginal  su i ts
against  States by citizens of other States, 49 and th e li t igan t s
confront ed th res hold q u es t ions  abou t  the  form of p rocess and
the mode of it s se rvice u pon d efend an t S ta te s. Alth ough  th e
J ud iciar y Act  and  seve ra l P rocess  Act s50 dealt with process
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51. S ee Act of S ept . 24,  178 9, ch . 20, § 11, 1 Stat . 73, 78-79; Act of Sept. 29,
1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat . 93-94.
52. S ee 1 J U L I U S GO E B E L, J R ., H I S TO R Y O F  T H E  SU P R E M E  CO U R T O F  T H E  UN I T E D
ST AT E S: ANTECEDEN TS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at  725  (197 1).
53. 2 U. S. (2  Da ll.) 4 19 (1 793 ).
54. Id . at  428-29. S ee also New J ers ey v. Ne w York, 30 U .S. (5 Pet .) 284, 289-9 0
(183 1).
Only  Ju stice Ir edell disa greed . In h is disse nt ing opinion  in Chisholm , he said:
I conceive, tha t a ll the  Cour t s o f t he  Un ited  S ta tes  mu st r eceive, not m erely
th eir  organization as to the nu mber of Judges of wh ich  they a re  to cons is t ;
bu t all th eir  a u thor ity , as  to t he  ma nn er  of th eir  pr oceed ing , from  th e
Legi sl a tu re only. . . . [So long as Congr ess a cts consist ent ly with  th e
Const itu tion ,] th e whole bu sines s of organizin g th e Cour ts, a nd dir ecting t he
methods  of th eir  pr oceed in g wh er e n ece ssar y, I conceive to be in  th e
dis cre tion  of Congress.
Chisholm , 2 U.S. at 432-33. Consequen tly,  Iredell in sis te d, “[W]e m us t r eceiv e ou r
d ir ect ions from t he L egisla tu re in  th is pa rt icular  . . . .” Id . at 433.
Bu t despi te  h is  d issen t  regard ing  the  par ticu lar s of pr ocess  form  an d m odes  of
service, even  I r ede ll  agreed tha t  som e p r e rogatives  were inheren t  in  the  jud icia l
power so that  no stat utory au thorization was p rere qu isit e; h e  s imply be lieved  tha t
“[t]h e aut hority contended for [by Randolph] is certainly not one of those necessa rily
inc iden t to all C our ts m ere ly as s uch .” Id . at  433 . Ir ede ll h im se lf r out in ely e xer cised
prerogatives  th at  he de emed  deser ving of tha t des cription : for example ,  wi thou t
s t a tu tory aut hority h e gran ted continu ances a s he found just ice to require. S ee, e.g.,
Hurst  v. H ur st , 12  F.  Ca s. 1 028  (C.C .D.  Pa . 17 99) (N o. 6, 929 ); Sym es v. I rvine, 23
F . Ca s. 5 91 (C .C. D. P a.  179 7) (N o. 13 ,71 4).
form and m odes of s er vice  for  other federal court s,51 no
s t a tu tory provision at a ll rega r din g ei ther  pr oces s or  it s s er vice
in origin al S u prem e Court  proceedings existed.
The Supreme Cour t  ther efor e m ade  orde rs of i t s ow n on
these ma tt er s—at fir st  not  even t rou bling over  whe th er it  ha d
power to do so.52 It s power  was  not  cha llenged  un til 179 3, in
Chisholm  v. Georgia,53 and a ll but one of th e J us tices a gree d in
tha t  ca se with  the a rgumen t  a d va n ced by Attorney Gen era l
Randolph  (the former  Vir gin ia  Gove rnor  who had  p resented  the
Virginia  Resolu t ion s t o the Const it u t ion a l Convention, and also
had served on the Committee of Detail).  Randolph said:
T h e se rv ice of pr ocess  is s olely  for t h e p u rp ose  of not i ce  t o
p r e p a re  for  de fence .  The  m ode , if it  be  no t  o the rwise  p re sc r ibed
by l aw,  o r  long  usage ,  i s  in  t h e  d i scre t i on  o f  t h e  C ou r t ; a n d
h er e t h at  dis cre tion  m u st  ope ra te . . . .
As  to  the  s t eps ,  p r op e r for  com p e llin g an  a ppea r ance ;  t hese
too, n ot b ein g d icta te d b y la w, a re  in  th e br ea st  of th e C ou rt .54
In  short,  at least some elemen ts of judicial potency were
conceived from the  ou t set  t o in her e in  fed er a l cou r t s b y vir tue of
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55. F o r example, while denying a ha beas corpus pet ition beca use  no ap plicable
jur isd icti on  ha d b ee n s ta tu tor ily co nfe rr ed , Ch ief Ju stice Mar sh all , wr iti ng  for t he
Cou rt  cautioned, “[t]his opinion is not to be considered as abridg ing  th e pow er  of
cour t s over  th eir  own  officer s, or  to  p r ote ct t he ms elve s, a nd  th eir  me mb er s, fr om
be ing d is tu rb e d i n  the e xe rcise o f t hei r  fu nct ions.” Ex parte Boll ma n,  8 U .S.  (4
Cranch) 74,  94 (1 807 ).
Likewis e J us tice  J ohn son , wh ile h oldin g th at  circu it cou rt s we re  lim ite d t o t he
su bject  matt er jurisdiction stat utorily conferred, observed:
Cert ain  im plie d p ower s m us t n eces sa ri ly r es ul t t o our  Cou rt s of ju st ice
from  th e na tu re of th eir in stit ut ion. . . . To fine for contem pt—im prison for
cont um acy —in force  [sic] t he obser va nce  of ord er , &c. a re  powe rs  wh ich
canno t be dispensed wit h in a  Court, be cause th ey a re  necessa ry  to the
exercise of all other s: and so far our  Courts  no doubt p ossess powers  not
imm ediat ely der ived from  sta tu te . . . .
United  St at es  v. H ud son , 11  U. S. (7  Cr an ch) 3 2, 3 4 (18 12).
Ju stice  Story in h is Commen tar ies professed a different view:
[I]n  al l ca se s, w he re  th e ju dici al  pow er  of th e Un it ed Sta tes is to be
exercised, it is for congress alone to furnish t he ru les of proceeding, to
dir ect  the pr ocess, to declare the n atur e and effect of the process, and the
mode, in wh ich th e judgm ent s, conse que nt  th ere on, sh all be e xecut ed. . . .
They may auth orize national courts t o  make gen er al r ule s a nd  ord er s, for
the pur pose of a m ore conve nien t exe rcise of th eir ju risd iction . . . .
3 STORY, supra  note 48, at  625-26. But Story’s assertion of dependence upon Congress
was anoma lous to the other wise uniform practice and pr ecedent of his time.
Chief Jus t i ce  Marsha ll  r ea ff irmed  the Supreme Court’s own prescription of process
requ ir emen t s for origina l cases in  N ew  J er sey v. New Y ork, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 284, 287-
90 (1831). On tha t occasion, he tried to buttress t he pra ctice with  a  s t r a ined  r ead ing
of a sta tut e; but  th irt y years lat er th e Court confirmed tha t his at tempt  had been
un necess ar y, sayin g:
[I]t  has  been  the  es t ab li shed doc tr in e u pon  th is s ub ject  eve r s in ce t he  act
of 1789,  t ha t  in  al l  cases wher e origina l juris diction is given  by th e
Cons t it u t ion , this court h as au thority to exercise it  w it hout  any fur ther  ac t
of Congress to regula te it s pr ocess . . . , and  th at  th e court  ma y regu lat e
and mou ld t he p roces s it  us es in  su ch m an ner  as  in it s ju d gm ent will best
p romote the pu rposes of justice.
Kentucky v. Den nison , 65 U.S . (24 How.) 66, 98 (1861 ), over ru led  in other respects by
Puer to Rico v . Br an st ad , 48 3 U .S.  219  (198 7).
th eir  be in g “jud icia l” bodies —notwithst anding t he a bs en ce of
au thor izing legislation, and  no ma tt er w h a t  their s ubject
ma tt er  compe ten ce m igh t  be . E ven  those who believed th ere
was no au tom at ic vestin g of subject  ma t t e r ju r isd ict ion
ma inta ined  nonetheless th a t  as to th e ju d icial  pot ency
dimens ion , Article III is self-exe cut in g, a t  lea st  to a
consider able  (a lbeit un certa in an d debat able) extent . This view
cont in ued  to pr ed omin a te in  su cceeding gener a t ion s. 55
As Par t  II I of t h is  a r t icle  wil l show, n ot  only the n eed for bu t
the per mis sibilit y of legislation regar ding th e judiciary depen ds
in significant part  up on wh eth er t he s ubject  of the legis lat ion is
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56. This  act provided, “the forms of writs,  executions and other process, except
th eir  style a nd t he form s an d modes  of proceeding in  suit s in t hose of common  law
sha ll be the sam e” in federal courts a s were then u sed in the respe ctive S ta t e s where
those cour t s  s a t . Act  of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat . 275-76.
57. Id .
58. Wayman  v. S ou th ar d, 2 3 U .S.  (10 W he at .) 1, 4 5 (18 25).
59. Bank of th e U ni te d S ta te s v.  Ha lst ea d, 2 3 U .S.  (10 W he at .) 51 , 61  (182 5).
a  se lf-execu t in g  or n on-self-execut ing asp ect of th e Unit ed
Stat es’ “judicia l Power.” Wha teve r t he n eed, h owever, it  can not
be me t  by Con gr es s u n les s t o do s o fa lls  wit h in  the s cope  of tha t
body’s lawma king competen ce. And so we r etu rn  to t he q ues tion
of whether—and whence  and to wha t  ex ten t—Congress  has any
such  power .
III. TR A C IN G  CO N G R E S S ’ P O W E R  RE G AR D IN G  T H E  J U D I C I A R Y  T O
I T S  SO U R C E
A. Th e Principle of Enum erated Powers
 The Proces s Act  of 1792 di rect ed  in fer ior  fed er a l cou r t s t o
fol low the forms  and modes  of s t a t e p ract i ce ,56 ad din g,
sub jec t h ow e ve r  to su ch a lte ra tion s a nd  ad dit ions  as  th e sa id
cour ts  re spe ctive ly sh al l in  th eir  dis cre tion  de em  exp ed ien t, or
t o s u c h  r e g u la t i on s  a s  t h e  s u p r e m e  co u r t  o f t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s
s h a ll th ink  pr oper  from  tim e t o tim e  b y  r u le  t o p r e s cr i be  t o a n y
c ir cu i t  o r  d i s t r i c t  cou r t  conce rn ing  the  sa me . 57
Exhibit i n g m ore im agin a t ion  than  discr et ion , in  1825 som e
law yers cha llen ged t his  au th oriza tion  of the  judicia ry,
denouncing it  a s a  de lega t ion  of legislative power. The Su prem e
Cou r t  unsur prisingly rejected this  a rgument ,  wr i t ing , “[a ]
genera l super inten dence over this s ubject seems  to be p r oper ly
with in  th e jud icial pr ovince, and has been always so
conside re d.”58 The Process Act, th erefore, could not be viewed as
a delegat ion of “legislative” power.
However , th e J us tices  ad ded , “Congr ess  migh t r egu la te the
w h ole pra ctice of the Court s, if it wa s deem ed expedient  so to
do: bu t  th is  power  is  ves ted  in  the Cou r t s; a nd it n ever has
occurr ed to any  one th at  it w as  a d elega tion  of legislat ive
power .”59 This  posed (wit hou t d iscus sin g) a differen t qu est ion: if
“th i s subject seems  to be properly with in th e judicial province”
and “th is  power  i s ves t ed in t he cour t s ,” how is  it  poss ib le  tha t
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60. Id .
61. The motion  to re fer to a  commit te e “for th e pur pose of report ing a
cons tit ut ion  conforma bly to th e Pr oceedings a foresaid ,” and an othe r m otion fixing t ha t
committee’s membersh ip a t  f ive , were approved unanim ously on Ju ly 23. 2 MAX
F A R RA N D, TH E  RE C O R D S O F  T H E  F EDERAL CO N VE N T I ON  O F  1787, at  85, 87, 95-96 (rev.
ed. 1937). The mem bers were  selected by ballot  on J uly 24. S ee 2 i d . a t  97,  106.  The
Con ven tion  th en a djour ned  un til Augu st 6  to ab ide t he Com mit tee ’s work . S ee 2 i d .
a t  118, 128.
62. The delegates had previously decided  t h e  n ational legislatu re sh ould be
competent  “to legislate in  all Ca ses for t he ge n e r a l I n terests of the Union, and also
in  those  Cases to  wh ich  the  S tat e s  a r e s epa ra t ely in comp et en t,  or i n w hi ch t he
Harmony of the Unit ed Sta tes m ay be inte rru pted by  t h e  E xe r cise of individual
Legisla tion .” 2 i d . at 131-32. However, as Detail Committee m emb e r  Jam es W ilson
explained lat er  to t he  Pe nn sylv an ia r at ificat ion con ven tion :
[T]hough  th is prin ciple [i.e., the r esolut ion rega rdin g na tiona l legislat ive
competence] be sou nd a nd s at isfactor y, its  application to particular  cases
would  be a ccomp an ied  wit h m uch  difficu lty ; beca us e, in  its  ap plica tion , room
must  be a llowe d for  gr ea t d iscr et iona ry l at it ud e of con st ru cti on  of th e
principle. In  order  to les sen  or r em ove t he  difficu lty  ar isin g from
discre t iona ry cons tr uct ion  on t hi s s ub ject , an  enumera t ion  of  par t i cu la r
instances, in which the application of the principle ought  to t ake  p lace,  has
been att empted with  much indu stry an d care.
S peech  Deliv ered  in  th e Con ven tion  of Pen ns ylv an ia (N ov.  26, 1787), in  2 TH E  WORKS
OF  J A M E S  WILSON  764 (R ober t G . McClos ke y ed ., 196 7). As t o th e legis la ti ve b ra nch ,
see part icularly Article VII, Section 1 of the Comm ittee Repo r t , in  2 F A R RA N D supra
no te 61, at 181-82.
“Congress mig ht  r egu la te t he whole p ract ice of t he cou r t s”? If
the  Process Act  was  not  a delegat ion of “legislative” power ,  why
was its dir ective to generally follow sta te pr act ice n ot  a
congres sional us ur pat ion of “judicial” power?
To answer  th is , one  must  s t a r t  a t t he beginning. If
England’s pa r li amenta ry  t radi t ion  had been a dopt ed in  th is
coun t ry un cha nge d, one  migh t h ave  su pposed  th at  th e re quis ite
power not only to “regulate the whole practice of the Court s”60
but a lso to ves t  t hei r  subject m at ter  jurisdiction res ides
inhe ren t ly in th e legislative bra nch. Our  Constit ut ion, however,
a llow s no such  p r emis e. At t he  Cons tit ut iona l Conven tion , th e
Commi t tee of Detail 61 tra nsla ted  the ge ner a lit ies  of th e
Randolph  Plan  regar ding th e na tional legislat ive power
(generalit ies which th e Delegates  ha d r epea ted ly app roved) in to
a  more  pa r t icu lar i zed l is t ;62 and b y a pp rovin g t h is  in nova t ion
the delegates refined the postula t e of “delega ted  power s” (a
post ula te ch ar act eris tic of Amer ican  political t heor y in gen era l)
in to th e prin ciple of “enu mer at ed powers” (a  concept  pecu l ia r  to
th e federal Con st it u t ion ).
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63. As I have explained in a n ear lier art icle,
Power  to ta x was on e power d enied  by th e Article s of Con fede ra ti on,  wh ich
all  ag r eed th e new  centr al govern men t m ust  ha ve. None th eless, eve n wh ile
specifying tha t federal courts sh ould have jurisdiction to enforce federal
r evenue laws, t he or igin a l  Ra n dolph Res olution s did n ot specify an y ta xing
power for Congress. Similarly, although the resolu t ions  r e fe r r ed to  the
Commi t t ee of Detail cont ain ed sever al r eferen ces to na tiona l ta xes they
art iculated no  t ax ing  power .
This, however , was n ot an omalou s so long as  Congre ss’ power  was
described in am ple generalities—as it was both in th e Sixth Randolph
Resolut ion  a n d  in  its de riva tive r eferr ed to t he Com mit tee of Det ail. On ly
with  th e shift  to enu mer at ion did it  become im pera tive t ha t a ny t axin g
power , in  o r der to exist, be art iculated more specifically. Accordingly, when
it  opted for enum eration, the Committee of Detail inserted a new clause
saying “[t]he Legislatur e of the United Stat es sha l l have  the power  to l ay
and collect ta xes, du ties , impos ts a nd e xcises.”
En gdah l, supra  no te  15,  at  234  (foot no te s om it te d).
64. This  was done, not by the allusions to debts, defense, and welfare in Art icle
I, Sect ion  8, Clause 1,  bu t r at he r b y th e a pt ly t ail ore d la ng ua ge of Ar ticl e IV, S ect ion
3, Clause 2, and as to some applications, by the Necessary and P roper Clause,  Article
I, Section 8, Clause 18. See the discussion and citations En gdah l, supra no te 15 , a t
238-51.
65. Ela bor at ion  and documen tat ion of thes e  e xa m ples is t oo complex t o deta il
here;  i t  is  s et  fo r th  in  i d . at 243-46, 244 n.154.
The delega tes ’ un der st an din g of, an d comm itm ent  to, th is
pr inciple  was evident in ensuing Convention deliberations.
Committ ees and individual delegates alike took pains to ensure
tha t  all the particulars they conceived as embr aced by th e
genera lities emp loyed in t he  Ran dolph Resolutions got included
in  th e enu mer at ion replacing th em. For exa mple, while other
prov is ions clearly assumed tha t t h e r e would be federal
t axa t ion , th e swit ch from  gene ra liza t ion  t o enumera t ion  made
it  necessar y for t he first  t im e t o in se r t  an  exp licit  gr an t  of th e
power  to t ax. 63 Beyon d a ffir min g t he con t in ued  va lid it y of deb t s
incu r red by t he Con federa tion, th e delegates  took care to
empower  the  new governmen t  t o pay them.64 La te in  the
proceedings, Madison, Pin ckney, and  other s proposed specific
clauses  for  va r ious  mat ter s  a rguab ly embraced by the appr oved
genera lities of the Randolph Resolutions, bu t n ot yet specified
in  the enumer a t ion . Some of t hes e (for  exa mple, those
concern ing pa ten t s a nd cop yr igh t s a nd I ndian  affa irs) were
approved, while other s (for examp le, those concern ing a
un iver sit y, pos t  road  s tages , and the charter ing of corporat ions)
appa rent ly were deem ed with in th e scope of other s alr eady
listed, insofar a s th ey were considered a ppr opriat e a t  all. 65 Any
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66. As Ch ief J us tice  Ma rs ha ll wr ote  sev er al y ea rs  lat er , “un der  a con st itu tion
conferrin g specific powers, the power contend ed for must be g r a n t ed, or it cann ot be
exer cised.” Un it ed  St at es  v. F ish er , 6 U .S.  (2 Cr an ch) 3 58,  396  (180 4).
67. As to the experience wi t h  ce n t ral j ud icia l org an s u nd er  th e Ar ticl es of
Con fede ra tion , see 1  GO E B E L, supra  not e 52, a t 182 -95; Clint on, su pra note 2, at  754-
57.
68. The Nint h Res olution  proposed  “that  a Na tiona l judiciar y be est abli shed t o
consist  of one or mor e sup rem e tr ibun als, a nd of inferior  tr ibun als .” 1 F A R RA N D, supra
remnant of doubt as to the funda m e n t al it y  of t h is  enumerated
powers prin ciple was dispelled when  th e Tent h Amen dmen t
ga ve i t  exclamatory punctua t ion .
The enu mer at ion techn ique  is m ost often  discu ssed  with
r ega rd  to Congress’ competence vis-a-vis that of the States, bu t
it  a lso wa s u t ilized  to a lloca te p ower  among br anches of the
na t iona l governm ent it self. It wa s well under s tood  tha t  for
Congress to ha ve an y power a t a ll rega rd ing ju dicial  t r ib una l s
(or r ega rding t he execu t ive  br anch), a  su ffi ci en t  gran t  or  gran t s
of power  must  be included  am ong Con gres s’ enu m era ted  powers.
No pa r li amen ta ry t r a dition  of inhe re nt  or pr esu me d legis lat ive
compe t en ce to pr es cr ibe  the or ga n iza t ion  of governmen t  or  to
provide for government operations could survive this pr inciple
of enumera ted powers.66 Con se qu en t ly,  the s ea rch  for  som e
congr es siona l power to legislate r egard ing th e jud icia ry i s
necessar ily a sear ch for one or m ore enum era ted  powers.
Moreover , iden tifying t he p ar ticu lar  enu mer at ing t ext is
cru cial, not only beca us e th e power  mu st  be en um era ted  in
order to exist at  all, but becau se t o t h e (considera ble) exten t
tha t  usage gives la n g u age re lat ively defin ite  an d objective
meaning , th e fun ction  of any  wr it t en  au thor iza t ion  i s not  on ly
to empower bu t a lso to define an d delimit t he power conferred.
The great  significan ce of the fra mer s’ choice to repla ce the
Randolph  P lan ’s  genera liza tion s a bout  na tion al le gisla tive
power with  a  more  par t i cu la rized  enumera t ion  i s tha t  the
word ing of each particular grant sets intrin sic limits  t o the
power thu s conferred.
B. Th e Necessary and  Proper Clause
 The de lega tes  to the Const it u t ion a l Convent ion agreed  tha t
a  na tional judiciar y should exist,67 but  th ey disagreed wh eth er
it  sh ould cons ist  of one  court  or se ver al. Th ey compromised on
June 5th by amending the ninth Ran dolph Res olu t ion 68 (N in th
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no te 61, at 21.
69. The Jou rn al records  th e vote a s 7-3, wit h on e St at e divide d. S ee 1 id. a t
118. Ma dis on r epor ts  it a s 8-2 , wit h N ew Yor k divid ed. S ee 1 id. at 125. Yates
concu rs  with  th e J our na l. S ee 1 i d . at 127.
The delegat es first  agr eed t o subst itu te la ngu age pr oviding tha t  t he  jud ic ia ry
“consist  of One suprem e tribu nal, an d of one or m ore inferior tr ibuna ls.” 1 i d . at 95
(J our n al ); see also 1 i d . at 104-05 (Madison’s notes). Then they compromised the
phrase  r ega rd in g in fer ior  tr ibu na ls,  as  in dica te d in  th e t ext . As t o th e im por t of t he
change to  “one” f rom “one o r  mo r e s u prem e tr ibun als,” see D avid E . En gdah l, What’s
In  A  Name? The  Constitutionality of  Multiple “Supreme” Courts, 66 IN D . L.J . 457
(199 1).
70. The auth orization for the legisla t u re to esta blish “inferior” courts was set
out  as a  separ ate  resolut ion in th e Commit tee of the  Whole’s  Repor t  t o t he
Con ven tion  on J un e 13, see 1 F A R RA N D, supra  not e 61 , at  231,  an d in  th e bod y of
re solu t ions refer red  to th e Comm itt ee of Deta il, see 2 id . at  133.  Th e Com mi tt ee of
Deta il in clu de d it  se pa ra te ly in  th e e nu me ra ti on  of legislat ive powers  set fort h in
Article  VII, Sect ion 1, of its R eport . S ee 2 i d . at 181-82.
71. The power to constitute “inferior” tribunals is conf erred  up on  Congress by
U.S. Constitution Article I,  Section 8, Clause 9, and also is alluded to in Art icle IV,
Clause 1.
72. F rom th e F re nch  for  “ult im at e” or  “fin a l.” S ee 1 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61,
a t  22.
Resolu t ion ), th e judicia ry p rovision  of the s o-called  “Virginia
P lan ,” to requ ir e on e a nd lea ve t he exis ten ce of ot hers  t o
legisla tive  d iscre t ion .69 That compromise held for the rest  of th e
Con ven t ion 70 an d is twice reflected in  th e Const i tu t ion  as
ultimately approved.71
This  compr omise, however, ent a iled some complications.
The Nint h Resolution h ad been  d r a ft ed  on  the  premise  tha t
severa l federal courts  should exist, a nd wh en t ha t p r e m ise  was
compromised, some ter ms of the N inth  Resolut ion  became
inap t . For example, the Ninth Resolution contemplated that
ce r ta in  cases s h ou ld be heard by a federal court  in the first
insta nce, but  it ga ve th e Su pr eme  Cour t on ly app ella t e
ju r isdict ion , “in t he  der nie r r esor t.”72 Along with som e  ot h er
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73. F o r example,
[T]here  would be only one court  labelled “supreme,” but h o w m a n y judges
should  it ha ve? Should they sit  in separ ate pa nels, or only en ban c? Migh t
(or  must ) any “inferior” courts serve as a uxiliary organs on the model of nisi
p r iu s or as size, or could t hey (or m ust  th ey) be sepa ra te en tit ies in t heir
own right? If the latter, mu st they ha ve judges of their own, or could the
judges appointed to th e one “suprem e” court be d e s ig n ate d t o ser ve on
“in fe r io r” court s as  well? Appointm en t , comp en sa tion , an d t en ur e pr ovisi ons
to in su la t e t he jud iciary from un toward political influence were debat ed
easily,  r epea ted ly , and  a t  length ; b u t  t hese  oth er , m ore  int ri cat e de ta ils of
organ iza t ion , involved complex and inter related considerat ions, less
sus ceptible  to large group debate.
En gdah l, supra  not e 69, a t 477 -78. 
74. The Randolph out line is print ed in 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61,  a t  137.
75. 2 i d . at 144.
76. S ee 2 id .; see als o 2 i d . at 137 n .6.
77. 2 i d . at 147.
ques t ions of judicia l br anch  orga n iza t ion ,73 th ese problems wer e
refer red  to t he Com mit tee  of Detail.
It  was  tha t  Commit tee , a s  a lr e a dy  noted , tha t  in t roduced
enu mer at ion to concretize the Resolutions’ gener a liza t ion s
about  na tion al legis lat ive power ; and in  the p roces s of
enumera t ion , that  Committ ee addressed the judiciary issues,
too. Governor Ra ndolph (a m ember  of th e Committ ee) prepar ed
an  out line 74 that  concluded its list of powe r s for  th e legisla tu re
with  a clau se em power ing t he n at iona l legisla tu re “to organ ize
the govern me nt .”75 Tha t  clause was  crossed  out  in t he or igina l
documen t , ap pa re nt ly by Ra ndolp h  h im se lf;76 bu t  a  simila r
clau se pert ainin g specifically to th e judiciary was n ot. The
lat te r p rovide d t ha t “th e legisla tu re  sh all or gan ize it .”77
Randolph’s “sha ll  organ ize” clause  would have empowered
the leg is la tu re t o res olve  any ot her wise  unres olved i ss ues  of
judicia l s t ructure  and workload allocation. H owever, it s
l anguage imposed no intr insic limitat ion on the power  thus
bestowed. The word “organ ize” import s gener al discret ion over
str uctu re,  funct ion ,  and  opera t ions , and  s ince  Randolph’s clause
con ta ined no qu alifyin g t erms, the discretion given to Congress
over th e jud iciar y could h ave  been fairly described  as  “plen ar y.”
It  is th erefore significan t t ha t Ra ndolph’s proposed
language did not get past th e Committ ee of Detail. Instead,
commi t tee member  James Wilson  p roposed d iffe ren t  l anguage,
no less  ample bu t  im pos in g im por tan t  in t r in si c lim it s.  At  the
end of his list of powers for t he legislatu re Wilson placed a
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78. 2 i d . at 168.
79. 2 i d .
80. S ee 2 i d . at 182.
81. “The Congress shall have Power .  . .  To make all Laws which shall be
necessa ry an d pr oper  for ca rr yin g in to E xecu tion  th e for egoing Powers, and all other
Powers ves te d b y t hi s C on st it ut ion  in  th e Gover nm en t of t h e  U n it ed  Sta t e s , o r  in  any
Depar tmen t or Officer t her eof.” U.S. C O N S T . art . I, § 8, cl. 18.
82. S ee 2 F A R RA N D, supra  not e 61 , at  168; see 2 i d . at 163 n .17.
83. The only recorded discussion of the Necessary an d Proper Clau se occurr ed
on  August 20, when Madison a nd Pinckn ey moved t hat power to “establish all offices”
wh ich  might be necessary and p roper  be ad ded t o th e au th orit y to “mak e La ws.” S ee
2 i d . a t  337, 340, 345. Their concern t hat  power to establish offices migh t  otherwise
be caviled wa s not  sha red b y th e oth er de legat es, seve ral of whom (including thr ee
Commi t t ee of Det ail  me mb er s) poin te d ou t t ha t  t h e l anguage a s  p roposed by the
Commi t t ee wa s a mp le t o au th oriz e cr ea tion  of offices by law. S ee 2 i d . a t  345 . The
addit iona l langua ge proposed was then firmly voted d ow n , and t he clause was a greed
to with out  disse nt . S ee 2 i d . at 337, 340, 345.
84. The Comm itt ee of cour se di d dea l wit h s ome of t he ju ri s d ic t io n  questions,
and it d id s o by m ea ns  of en um er at ion.  Th e r ele van t R esol u t i on  a s it st ood late in
Ju ly sa id  on ly  tha t  the j u r is di ct ion  of t he n at iona l judi cia ry “s h a ll extend to Cases
a r i sing un der t he La ws pa ssed by t he gen era l Legis la t u re, and to such oth er
Quest ions as i n vo lv e t h e nat ional Pea ce and H arm ony,” 2 i d . a t  132-33;  and  the
clau se em power ing it  “to make all Laws that  shall be necessary
a nd pr ope r  for  car ryin g in to . . . E xecu t ion  . . . a ll ot her power s
vested, by th is Cons tit ut ion, in  th e Governmen t  of t he  Un i ted
St at es, or  in a ny D epa rt me nt  or Officer t he re of.”78
At  th e second  ellips is in dicat ed h er e, Wilson had included
the word s, “th e foregoing P owers , an d”79—words , of cour se,
which  rem ained  in th is “necessar y and  proper ” clau se wh en it
was in clu de d in  the Commit tee ’s R ep or t 80 an d u ltim at ely in  the
finished Con st it u t ion .81 B u t  in  Wilson ’s ow n docu men t  those
four  word s wer e st rick en , ap pa ren t ly by Wil son  h im se lf.82 This
migh t  sugges t  tha t  the clause, at its origin, was conceived less
as auxi li a ry  to the  othe r  legislative power s (th e role in  which  it
receives more  a t t en t ion  today) than  as a  g ran t  t o t he  legi sl a tu re
of au th orit y to dir ect s uch  det ails  of govern men t  organ iza t ion
and opera t ion  as  the Cons t itu t ion  i tself might not p rescribe.
These of course  wou ld  in clu de  va r iou s m at ter s  regarding the
judicia ry  which  had b een  refe r red  to the Commit tee , bu t  wh ich
it did n ot more specifically resolve.
This  “necessa ry an d pr oper” claus e ba rely s tir red  a r ipple  of
deba t e when  th e Deta il Comm ittee’s Report cam e before t he
Con ven t ion  for  approva l.83 Mor eove r , a lt hough  the Rep or t
sepa rat ely addr essed r elatively few of the judiciary issu es
referr ed to th e Committ ee,84 the d ele ga tes  pe rceived  no need for
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Commi t t ee of Detail rep laced the la t t e r  phrase  wi th  an  enumera t ion  s imila r  to tha t
wh ich  th e Conve nt ion even tu ally a ppr oved. S ee 2 i d . at 186  (art. XI, § 3 of th e
Commi t t ee Rep or t).
A diversity provision ha d been in clud ed i n t he  orig ina l ni nt h R an dolp h R esol ut ion,
a n d an am endment  to it had been approved on Jun e 12. The Committ ee included a
more elabora te dive rsit y provision e ven t hough  none  ha d been  include d in t he
lan gua ge appr oved by the Convent ion on Ju ne 13, o r  in  t h e  r e solu t ion  a s r e fe r r ed to
the Committee.
The Comm itt ee includ ed ad mir alt y an d ma rit ime cas es even  th ough t he
re solu t ions r e fe r r ed to  them had  not ,  and even  thou g h  t h e p ir acy, high se as felony,
and cap tu re  pr ovisi ons  of th e n int h R an dolp h R esol ut ion h ad  bee n d isa ppr oved  on
June 12. This evidently was adapt ed from the P inckn ey Pla n, see 2 id. at 136,
perhaps  un der t he im petu s of Wilson’s st rong d esire  for na tiona l juris diction in  such
cases.
The Com mi tt ee’s in clus ion of  ca ses  involving diploma tic rep res ent at ives ap par ent ly
was ada pte d from  th e Pa ter son P lan . S ee 1 i d . at  244. P rovision for cases between
States,  an d bet ween  Sta tes a nd s ister  Sta te or  foreign citizen s, was  origin a l  wi t h  the
Committee.  The Committ ee also included jurisdiction over impea c h m en t s  o f na t iona l
officers, even th ough th at h ad been  disappr oved by the Convent ion on Ju ly 18.
85. Chish olm v. G eor gia , 2 U .S.  (2 Da ll.) 4 19,  432  (179 3).
fu r the r Convention att ention to those issues. This r ein forces
the impression  tha t  the  framer s viewed the  Necessa ry  and
Pr oper Cla use  as s ufficie n t ly empow er in g Con gr es s t o en act
leg is la t ion  su ita ble for de ta iling t he  jud icia l b ranch  and  pu t t ing
i t  in to opera t ion .
~~~
Un su rp ris ingly,  t he refore, it was recognized for at least a
cen tu ry that  one of the functions of this felicitous clause was to
empower  Con gr es s t o mak e laws regarding th e judiciary. In
1793, for  exam ple, J us tice I re dell wr ote t ha t p re scrib ing t he
form  of process an d th e mode of service for original cases
a p p e a r s t o  me  to  be  one  o f t hose  cases , w i t h ma ny  o the r s ,  i n
w h ich  a n  a r t i cl e of th e  Cons t i t u t ion  cann o t  be  e ff ectua ted
w it h ou t  t h e  i n t er v e n t io n  of t h e  L eg i s la t ive  au t ho r i ty .  The re
bein g  m a n y s u ch , a t t h e e n d of t h e s pe cia l en u m er a ti on  of th e
p ow e r s of Congress  in  t h e Co n st it u t ion , is  t h is  ge n er a l on e: “ T o
m a k e  all la ws  wh ich s ha ll be n eces sa ry  an d p rop er  for  ca r r yin g
i n t o execu t ion  th e  foreg oing  Powers ,  and  a l l  othe r  powers
ves t ed  by t h is C on s t it u t ion  in  t h e  Gov er n m e n t  of t h e  Un i ted
S ta tes , or in  an y d ep ar tm en t or  officer  th er eof.”85
I r edell’s fellow Ju stices foun d th e Court  compet ent  to prescribe
forms of process and service by it se lf, even  wit hout  st a tu tory
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86. Rhode Island  v. Massachu sett s, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838) (empha sis
ad de d).
87. Tennessee  v. D av is,  100  U. S. 2 57,  263  (187 9).
au thor iza t ion ; only Ir edell consider ed legislation to be
prer equisite.  Other  Jus t i ces  apparen t ly agr eed, h owever , th at
such  legislation could be enacted  by v ir tue of the  Neces sa ry a nd
Pr oper Claus e.
The sa me  point  wa s r ecognized  by  J u st i ce  Ba ldwin  for  the
Court  in 1838:
I t  was  necessa r i ly  left  t o  t he  l eg i s la t ive  power  to  o rgan ize  the
S u pr em e Cour t ,  t o  de f ine  i t s  powers  cons i s t en t ly  w it h  t h e
cons tit ut ion a s t o its  or igi n a l ju r is di ct ion ; a n d t o d i st r i bu t e  t h e
r e sid u e of t h e  j u dicia l pow er  bet we en  th is a n d t h e in fer ior
c ou r t s , .  . .  de fin ing  the i r  r e sp ec t ive  powers ,  whe th e r  or igin al
or  ap pella te , by w hich  an d h ow it  sh ould  be e xer cise d .  I n
obe die n ce  to  the  in junc t ion  o f t he  con s t it u tion , congress
exerci sed  th eir p ow er, so fa r a s th ey th ou g h t  i t  n e c es s a r y a n d
proper , u n d er  the  seventeenth  c lause  o f  the  eighth  sect ion ,  f i rs t
a r ticl e, for  carry ing  in to  execu t ion  th e  powers  ves ted  by  the
cons tit u tion  in  th e judicial ,  a s  well  a s  a l l o t h er  d e p a r t m e n t s
a n d  officer s of t h e gov er n m en t of t h e U n ite d S ta te s. . . . [T]h e
cons t i t u t io n pr ovide d for t he  orga niz at ion of th e legis lat ive
p ow e r , a n d  t h e  m o de of  i ts  exercise ,  but  i t  del inea ted on ly the
g r ea t  ou tlin es  of th e ju dicia l pow er ; . . . l eav ing  the  de ta i l s  to
congress ,  in  w hom  was  v es ted ,  by  express de lega t ion ,  the  p ow er
to pass  a l l  l aws  necessary  a n d  proper  for  carry ing  in to
execu tion  a l l  powers  exce pt  th eir  own . Th e d ist rib u tion  an d
a p p r o p r ia t e  exe rc ise  o f t he  jud ic i a l  power ,  mu s t  t h e re fore  be
m ad e by  la ws  pa ss ed  by con gr es s . . . .86
J ust ice Strong wrote for th e Court  in 1879,
B y the  l a s t  c l ause  o f th e ei gh th  sect ion  of th e fir st  ar ticle  of
t h e  Cons t i t u t ion ,  Congres s  i s  i nves t ed  wi th  power  to  ma ke  a ll
l a w s n eces sa ry  an d p rop er  for  car ry ing  int o execu tion  not  only
a l l the  p owers  p rev ious ly  spec i fied ,  bu t  a l so a l l  othe r  powers
ves t e d  by  the  Cons t i t u t ion  in  the  gove rnm en t  o f  t he  Un i t ed
St at es , or in  an y d ep ar tm en t or  officer  th er eof.  Am ong  th ese  is
t h e  ju d i ci a l p o we r  of t h e  g ov e r n m e n t .87
And th e first  J us tice Har lan  for  the  Cour t  in  1886  wrote  as
follows  to just ify a n  1867 st a tu te con fer r in g fed er a l qu es t ion
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions of state prisoners:
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88. Ex parte Roya ll, 1 17 U .S.  241 , 24 9 (18 86).
89. S ee David  E. E ngda hl, Casebooks and  Constitutiona l Com pet ency , 21
SEATTLE  U. L. RE V. 741 , 77 6 (19 98).
90. S ee, e.g., Sou th er n R y. C o. v. U ni te d S ta te s, 2 22 U .S.  20 (1 911 ).
91. S ee, e.g., Railr oad Com m’n v. Bur lingt on & Qu incy R.R. Co.,  257 U.S. 563
(192 2); Ho us ton , E as t &  Wes t T ex.  Ry.  Co. v . U ni te d S ta te s, 2 34 U .S.  342  (191 4).
92. S ee, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922); Swift and Co. v. United
States,  196  U. S. 3 75 (1 905 ).
93. S ee, e.g.,  Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United Stat es, 175  U. S. 2 11 (1 899 ).
94. 17 U. S. (4  Wh ea t. ) 316  (181 9).
[A]s  the  jud ic i a l  power  o f  t he  na t ion  ex ten ds  t o a ll ca ses
a r is in g u n d e r  t h e  C on s t i t u t io n , t h e  la w s  a n d  t r e a t ie s  of t h e
U n i ted  St at es; . . . an d a s Con gr ess  ha s pow er  to p as s a ll la w s
n e ce s sa r y and  p rope r  t o ca r r y  in t o e xe cu t i on  t h e  p ow e r s ves t ed
by th e C on st itu tion  i n  t h e  G ov e r n m e n t  of t h e  U n ite d S ta te s or
in  an y d ep ar tm en t or  officer  th er eof; no d ou b t  ca n  e x is t  a s  t o
th e p ow er  of Con gr es s [t o en a ct t h e la w]. 88
~~~
This  applicat ion of th e Necessary and Pr oper Clause is so
obvious, once it  i s  not iced, that  the  a lmost  tota l  lack of
refe ren ce to it  i n  t h e federal courts  litera tu re of the tw ent ieth
cen tu ry se em s ver y odd.  For  two genera tions, however,
cons t itu t iona l issu es of feder alis m w er e t re at ed by lega l
educa tor s as ess ent ially political in char acter .89 Addit iona lly,
these issues wer e given far  less at ten tion th an  embellishm ent
of th e noble  epigr ap hs  me mor ializin g individual r ights. La w
teache r s and stu dent s grew ina tt ent ive to the cla ss ic, m ea ns-t o-
enumera ted-end ra t ion a le b y wh ich  fed er a l r egu la t ion  of loca l
rolling s tock,90 local rail rates, 91 local st ockyar d act ivities ,92 and
loca l manufact -u r i n g mon opolies93 had  been  upheld for  years
be fore t he d ua l fed er a lis m  ext r ava ga nce of J u st ices
McReynolds, VanDevan ter , Su ther land,  and Bu t le r  a t t ained  it s
tem porar y dominan ce.
Due to th at  inat ten tion, th e ren aissa nce of 1937-1941
dete r iora t ed into a r evolut ion instea d. The l andmark  New Dea l
cases ap plyin g in comm er cial cont ext s t he  Neces sa ry a nd
Pr oper Clause ra t iona le of M cCulloch v. Maryland 94 were
mist ak en  for expositions of the Commer ce Clause itse lf. This
failur e to ke ep se pa ra te is su es dis t i nct  not  on ly p roduced the
confused  and u nsu st a in able  not ion  of plen ary con gr es siona l
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95. See, for exam ple, th e con fus ed  se con d r at ion al e of Katzenbach v. Morgan ,
384 U. S. 6 41,  656 -58 (1 966 ), h ope fu lly at  last  put  to re st by Cit y of B oern e v. F lores ,
117 S. Ct. 2 157 (1997). S ee gen erally David  E. E ngda hl, Constitutiona lity of the Voting
Age Statute , 39 GE O . WA S H . L. RE V. 1 (1970 ) (sh owing  Con gr ess ’ mi st ak en  re lia nce  on
the se con d r at ion al e of Ka tz enb ach  to s up por t t he  Kenn ed y Am en dm en t).
96. S ee, e.g., Garcia v. San  Antonio Metro. Tra nsit Aut h., 469 U.S. 528, 584-85
(1985) (O’Conn or, J ., d is s en t ing); Lopez v. United St ates , 514 U.S. 549, 584, 588
(1995) (Th om as , J ., con cur ri ng ).
97. In  ad dit ion t o my own t r ea tmen t  o f t he  cl ause  in  DAVID E. E N G D AH L ,
CONS TITU TION AL F E D E R A L I S M  IN A N U T S H ELL (2d ed. 1987), and DAVID E. E N G D AH L ,
CONS TITU TION AL P O W E R, F EDERAL A N D  STATE , IN A NUTSHE LL (197 6),  see, for examp le,
Randy E. Ba rn ett , N ecessa ry a nd  Prop er, 44  UC LA L . RE V. 745 (1997); Stephen
G a r db a u m , R eth in ki ng  Con st itu tion al F ederalism , 74 TE X. L. RE V. 795 (1 996); a nd
Gary Laws on & Pa tr ici a  B. Gra nger , T he “Prop er” Scop e of  Federal  Power: A
Ju risdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE  L.J . 267  (199 3).
In  celebrating the att ention now being given to this clause,  I  ne ith er  en dor se n or
de t ract  f rom any  par t icu la r  sp in  o ther  commenta tors have  pu t upon it. I do note,
however , th at  aft er  ha vin g bee n m ar gin ali zed  to t h e  r ig h t  by most  acade mic
commenta tor s for  more than  th i r ty  yea r s , I  now am amused  to find myself considered
to the left of some. In fact, of course, I have always occupied the center.
98. U.S. CO N S T . art . I, § 8, cl. 18.
power over everythin g “affecting int erst at e commerce,” but also
indu ced lawyers (and J us t ices) to ignore import an t a na logies
between  commerce  and othe r  con text s where  the Necessa ry  and
Pr oper Cla use  mode l of a n a lysis rightly applies.95 Given  su ch
noncha lance toward a s ser t ions of feder al legis lat ive power , it
should  n ot  be surprising that th e Necessary and Pr oper Clause
bas is of Congr ess ’ power  re gar din g  the ju dicia ry fel l fr om
not ice.
Now, however , con st it u t ion a l ju r ispr ude nce is  in  t r ansi t ion .
J ust ices have  begun  to e m p h asize the Necessa ry an d Pr oper
Clause basis of the s o-ca lled “affecting commerce” cases,96 and
schola rs have begun to probe this clause’s independen t
meaning .97 The tim e, th ere fore, is pr opi t iou s for  exa min in g h ow
the Neces sa ry a nd P rope r  Cla use  ope ra tes  in  the con text  of
law s r ega rd ing t he  judicia ry.
~~~
The power  conferr ed by t he N ecessa ry a nd  Pr oper Cla us e is
defined an d circumscribed by these  im por tan t  wor ds : “for
car r y in g in to E xecut ion th e . . . Power s vest ed by t his
Cons tit ut ion.”98 Thu s, while th e clause imp orts a  great  dea l of
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99. Chief J ustice Marshall wrote of this clause in 1804, “Congress must possess
the choice of mean s, . . . and mu st be au thorized to use th e mean s which appear  to
itself  mos t e ligib le t o effect  th at  obje ct. ” U n i t ed  S t ate s v.  Fi sh er , 6 U .S. (2  Cr an ch)
358, 396 (1804). In a bet ter k nown  1 8 19  s t a tement , Marsha ll  e labora ted  tha t
Congress may “exercise its best judgm ent  i n  t he selection  of measu res  to car ry in to
exe cut ion  the constitu tional powers of the governm ent , ” because  “the  sound
cons tr uct ion  of the  const i tu t ion  mus t  a llow to the  na tiona l legi sla tu re  th at  dis cre tion ,
with  r e s pe ct  t o th e mea ns by wh ich th e powers  it confers  ar e to be car ried in to
exe cut ion,  which will en able [th e per forma nce of constit ut ional du ties] in  t h e  m a n ner
most ben eficial to t he p eople.” McCulloch v. Ma ryla nd, 1 7 U.S. (4 Wh eat .) 316, 420-21
(181 9).
See als o th e di sse nt ing  opin ion  of J us t ice Mil le r  in  Hepburn  v. Griswold ,  75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 603, 626 (1870), vindicat ed by t h e  h olding in the Leg al T end er Ca ses , 79
U.S. (12 W al l.) 4 57,  553  (187 1) (“[W]e overr ule so m uch of wha t wa s decided in
Hepburn  v. Griswold  . . . . ”).
100. Gibbons v. O gde n,  22 U .S.  (9 Wh ea t. ) 1, 1 95-9 6 (19 24).
101. U.S. CO N S T . art . I, § 8, cl. 18.
102. F o r example, the Comm erce Clause gives it discretion over the i n t er st a t e
marke t , and if in tha t discretion Congress elects to stabilize in t e r s t a te  commodity
tr adin g, reconcile int ers ta te pr icing, preve nt  str ike in te r r u p t ions o f i n t er s t a t e
t r anspor t a t ion , or facilitate int ersta te tr avel by racial minorities, the Neces s a r y  a nd
Proper  Clause adds d is cre t ion  to r egu la t e even  non- in te r s ta te  m a t t ers lik e farm ing,
pr odu ction  wages and hours, labor relations, and restaur ant discrim ina tion in  ways
discre t ion ,99 t ha t  is  only d iscret ion  “for  car ry in g in to E xecu ti on”
the Cons tit ut ion’s de sign , not  for  alt erin g or count erm an din g it.
Congres s th erefore ha s a different  scope of discretion wh en
it  em ploys t he  Neces sa ry a nd  P roper  C lause to effectua te
powers of another  branch  th an  when  it  employs th is  s ame
clause  to effectua te it s ow n pow er s.  Th ose  other  pow er s of
Congress a lso en ta il  di scre t ion  for  Congress, whereas the
powers confe r r ed  on  othe r  branches en ta il  di scre t ion  for those
other br an ches  ins te ad . Thu s, t he  sum of Congre ss’ discr etion
when  i t  act s  under  the  Necessa ry  and Proper  Clause i s not
always t he sa me.
To ta ke t he e as iest  exam ple, t he Com mer ce Clau se gives
Congress “p lenary” power  over  “commerce  ‘among  the severa l
St at es,’”100 an d it is, t her efore, in Con gress’ d iscre t ion  to
dete rmine whe th er, h ow, an d wh en in ter st at e comme rce sh ould
be facili t a t ed , con st ra ine d, or even destroyed. The Necessary
and Proper  Clau se compou nd s t his  discr etion  by emp owerin g
Congress to mak e what ever laws “sha ll be necessar y and  proper
for  car ryin g in to Execu t ion ”101 its  i nt ers ta te  comme rce p olicy,
includ ing laws a bout t hings t ha t a re not i nt er s t ate commer ce,
insofa r  as t hose  la ws  are m ea ns t o an  in ter st a te com mer ce
pol icy end.102 If this compound ed d iscre tion  seem s “plena ry,”
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ra tiona lly f it  to  accompl ish  such in ters ta te  market sta bility, pr ice equit y, or movement
of goods or pe ople. S ee, e.g., Hear t of Atlanta Mote l, Inc. v. United Sta tes, 379 U .S.
241 (1964); Wickar d v. Filb ur n, 317  U.S. 11 1 (1942); Un ited  Sta tes  v. Dar by, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (193 7).
103. As Chief Just ice Marshall said, Congress may “exercise its best  j udgmen t
in  th e selection  of measu res  to car ry in to execut ion th e constit ut ional powers of t he
govern men t.” McCu lloch  v. M ar yla nd , 17  U. S. (4  Wh ea t. ) 316 , 42 0 (18 19).
104. S ee U.S. C O N S T . art . II, § 2, cl. 1.
105. Id . art . II, § 3.
106. In sofa r  a s “th e La ws” a re  st at ut ory , of cour se,  Con gr ess  mi gh t a me nd  or
however, t ha t  is  on ly because there is  no in t r in sic lim it  on
Congress’ own  di scre t ion  a s  t o the  ends  to be served (in t his
examp le, as t o the policie s Congr es s m ay ch oose  for  in t e r st a t e
commer ce its elf ). Congre ss’ discret ion r ega r ding the ends
derives, not from the Necessary and Proper Clause , but from
some other  power  g ran t  to the  legisla t ive b ranch  (in  th is
exa mple, t he Com mer ce Clause ).
With  r e fe rence  to the  powers of an othe r  branch , however ,
wha tever  discretion inh eres in th em belongs not t o Congres s
bu t to tha t  othe r  branch,  and the Necessary and Proper Clause
only em pow er s C ongr es s t o help effectua te t he d iscret ion
confided to th at  other  bra nch. Although t he decision wheth er
and h ow to render assistance is committ ed to Congress’
d iscre t ion ,103 it is  only ass is tance t ha t  i s a u t h or ized by the
Necessa ry and Pr oper Clause. The words of this  clause are so
per fectly adapted a s  t o seem  sp ecifi ca lly  ta ilor ed  to exclude
laws th at  rest rict or inh ibit th e const itut ionally contem plat ed
pow er  (hen ce d iscret ion ) of another  br anch .
For  examp le, the Const itut ion empowers t he P residen t t o
pardon .104 By virtue of the Necessar y and  Pr oper Claus e,
Congress migh t  enact  l aws to help  effectua t e  tha t  power ,
perhaps  crea tin g offices to conduct  inves tiga tions or screen
clem en cy requ est s . H owever, no law inh ib it ing t he  Presiden t ’s
d iscre t ion—as by prohibiting pa rdons of impeached  chief
executives, or  condi t ion ing p ar dons  on sp ecified ter ms —could
find colorable support in the Necessary and P roper Clause.
Likewise, t he Pr esiden t h as p ower (and  th e dut y) to “ta ke Ca re
tha t  th e La ws be  fait hfu lly execut ed.”105 The Necessa ry  and
Proper Clau se su ppor ts  laws  to en ha nce t he P res iden t’s la w
enforcement  capa city, but  it  cannot  suppor t  laws to cons t ra in  or
inhibit  enforcement .106
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repea l t h e m , a n d to t ha t e xte nt  it m igh t b e sa id t o dim ini sh  th e ex ecu tiv e’s fun ction .
Som e “Laws,” however, su ch as  constit ut ional pr ovisions on in dividua l right s,
Congress is  n ot compet ent  to cha nge. N o legislat ion un dert akin g to res tr ain  th e
Pres iden t in h is u se of h is own  powe rs  in h is own  dis cre tion  to e nfor ce con st itu tion a l
p rotect ions could claim colorable support  in the N ecessary and P roper Clause.
A cavea t  i s necessary regardin g military mea ns for law enforcement. While the
Con st itu tion  makes t he President  comma nder in chief of the armed forces, see i d . a r t .
II, § 2, it gives Congr ess power  “[t]o ma ke Ru les for t he  Gover nm en t a nd  Regu lat ion
of th e lan d an d na val F orces,” i d . ar t. I , § 8, cl. 14, as well as to ma ke laws
n e ce s sa r y a nd pr oper for effectu at ing both of these powers. Ther efore sta tut es like the
“Posse Comita tu s Act,” 18 U.S.C. § 1385, rest rictin g the ex ecu ti ve’s u se  of th e
mi li t a ry for execution of the laws, have ample const i t u t io n a l bas is. See generally
David  E. E ngda hl, Fou nd ati ons  for M ilit ary  In terv ent ion  i n  the U ni ted  S ta tes ,  7  U.
P U G E T SOUND L. RE V. 1 (1983) [her eina fter  En gdah l, Founda tion s]; David E . En gdah l,
The New Civil Disturbance Regulations: The Th reat of Military Intervent ion , 49 IN D .
L.J . 581  (197 4).
In  other  wor ds , in  connect ion  wit h  the p owers of t he ot her
branches, t he  Necessa ry and Pr oper Claus e operat es like a one-
way ra chet : it let s Congr ess m ak e law s facilita tin g the powers
(hen ce discretion) of the other bran ches, but it  gives Congress
n o power , n o discr et ion , over  wh et her , h ow fa r , or  how t hose
other  br anches  sh ould  pe r form the roles contemplated for  th em
by the Const it u t ion . Th e words  “for ca r ry ing into Execu t ion” a re
wholly un su ited  to a ut hor ize laws  which  dim inish, cu r ta il,  or
inter fere. Th is  r ache t  fe a t u re of th e Necessar y and  Pr oper
Clause with  r ega rd  t o t he powers of the other bran ches is a
crucial element of the Constitution’s separat ion of powers.
By vir tue of th is  clause,  then,  Congress  has  power  to make
laws  “necessa ry  and p roper  for  ca r ry ing  in to Execu t ion” the
“judicia l Power  of the U nit ed  St a tes ,” wh ich  Ar t icle III  sa ys
“sha ll be vested” in the federa l judicia ry a nd “sh a ll ext en d t o”
the subject  mat te r s  const i tut iona lly pr escr ibed. Accordin g to
orthodox opinion, however, Congress has fa r  more  power  than
this. Indeed , it is genera lly assum ed th at  Congress’ power
regard ing the judiciary has no intrinsic  lim it s a t  a ll—a s i f the
Det ail  Committ ee had reported, and the Convention approved,
Edmund Ran dolph’s “sha ll organ ize” clau se inst ead of Ja mes
Wilson ’s formula t ion ,  “necessa ry a nd  pr oper for ca rr ying in to
execut ion.” But t he choice to use Wilson’s clause was n ot
inadve r t en t .
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107. U.S. CO N S T . art . I, § 8, cl. 9. Another provision worth  passing notice is  t h at
au thor i zing Congress to provide by law for judicial appointm ents  w it h out  p res iden t ia l
appoin tmen t  an d Sen at e “Advice and C onsen t.” See id.  art . II, § 2, cl. 2.
108. Id . art . III, § 1.
In  order  to sus ta in  the  vi r tua lly unqualified legis lat ive
con t r ol over jurisdiction an d judicial busines s pres um ed by
orthodox commenta tor s , some prem ise other than  t he  Necessa ry
and Pr oper  Clau se m us t b e us ed. Thus,  every single modern
commenta tor  discu ssin g Congr ess ’ power  re gar din g th e
judicia ry  has  employed  othe r  premises; and  a lmos t  none  has
men tioned the  Necessa ry and P rope r  Cla use  a t  a ll.  Two dist in ct
prem ises have been used; but  both  of th em a re dem onstrably
false. Because  they n onet hele ss  dom in a te con ven t ion a l
th inking, however , each  of thes e false prem ises mu st be
exam ined and d iscredited before th e applicat ion of th e tr ue
premise is furt her explored.
C. The Specious  “Necessary  Impl ica t ion” of  the “Tribu nals
Clause”
 T h e Const it ut ion explicitly gives power t o Congress “[t ]o
cons t itu t e Tr ibu na ls in ferior  to t he  su pr em e Cour t.”107 The
power conferred by this Tribunals Clause is alluded to by a
phra se in  Art icle  II I r efe r r in g t o “such  in fer ior  Cou r t s as the
Congress ma y from t ime to t ime orda in  and  es tabl ish .”108 Tha t
Art icle II I a llu sion , h owever , does  not  con fer  t he  power  to
orda in  an d esta blish th em; th e power is inst ead conferred by
th e Article I Tribuna ls Claus e.
The Tribu na ls Cla use encapsu lates  th e J un e 5th
compromise between  t h ose who wa nted  se ver a l n a t ion a l cou r t s
and th ose wh o wanted only one: the clause leaves to Congress’
discr etion  whether  and how many “in fe r ior” cour t s  shou ld exi st .
M or eover, it  was not expected tha t Congress should exercise
th i s discr etion  only on ce for  a ll t im e: t he Ar t icle  II I a llu sion  to
the exercise of th is powe r “from t ime  to t ime ” su ggest s
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109. Pr ofess or  Julius Goebel suggests that  so me  tin ke ri ng  by t he  Com mi tt ee of
Style  re mo ved  th is d iscr et ion  from t he legis la tu re  in  o rder  “to  assure  tha t  federa l
infe ri or  court s mu st b e crea ted .” 1 GO E B E L, supra  note 52, at  247.
Goebel’s t hesis, however, is not credible. Wha t th e Style Commit tee did was
re pla ce som e u nd uly  cum ber som e l a n gu age of t he  Com mi tt ee of D et ai l (wh ich  th e
Con ven tion  had app ro ved ) providing t ha t “[t]he J udicial P ower . . . sh all be ves ted in
one  Supreme  Cour t ,  and in  such  Infer ior Cour ts a s sh all, wh en n ecessa ry, from  tim e
to ti me , be  const it ut ed b y th e Le gisl at ur e.” Pr oceed ing s of Con ven tion  Refer re d t o th e
Commi t t ee of Style an d Arran gement , art . XI, § 1, in  2 F A R RA N D, supra  no te 61 , a t
565, 575. The  Comm itt ee re placed t ha t wit h t his m uch s impler  provision : “The
judicial  power  . . . sh all  be ve st ed i n on e su pr em e cou rt , an d in  su ch in fer ior cou rt s
as the Congress m a y  fr om  t ime to time ordain  and est ablish.” Report of Commit tee
of Style , ar t. II I, § 1, in  2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  590, 600.
Goebel’s at tr ibu tion  of deft sleight-of-hand to subvert the J une 5th compromise
d ishonor s the St yle Commit tee mem ber s and su pposes the other  delegates fools. The
alt er at ion  is e nt ir ely a pt  to s tr ea ml in e t he  la ng ua ge w it h n o su ch ch an ge in  mea nin g,
and th e revis ed word ing won conve nt ion app roval wit h o u t  e ve n  a whisper of criticism
on th is point . S ee 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  621-41.
A sufficient a nswer  to Goebel’s fancy is tha t th e power  (a n d  h e n ce discretion) over
the existe nce of “inferior ” tribun als wa s act ua lly conferre d, not b y th is allu sive
lan gua ge in t he  jud icia ry  ar ticl e, bu t r at he r b y exp licit  powe r -g r a ntin g lan gua ge in
a  differ en t a rt icle d ea lin g wit h t he  legis lat ive b ra nch , wh ich,  as  eve n G oebel him self
acknowledged, th e St yle Comm itt ee left com plet ely un chan ged. S ee 1  GO E B E L, supra
no te 52, at 246.
110. Sena te Select Comm. on Pr esident ial Campa ign  Activities v. Nixon, 366 F.
Supp. 51,  55 (D .D. C. 1 973 ).
con t inu in g discretion in Congress 109 t o recons ider  and
red ete rm ine w ha t “inferior ” court s (if any) sh ould exis t.
But  conven t ion a l opinion ta kes t he Tr ibuna ls Claus e to
mean mu ch more t ha n t his. It is t ak en  to sus ta in a ll  manner  of
judicia ry  legisla tion , from p re scrib ing a nd circum scribin g
subject ma tt er  jur isdiction to dicta ting det ails of procedur e,
evidence, an d r em edies . It  is t hou ght  to give Congr ess  “plen ar y”
power (i.e., with  no int rins ic limit a t ion s) t o di rect  and con t rol
wha tever  “in fe r ior” fede ra l cou r t s  a r e perm itted  to exi st . As one
federal  district judge put it ,  “to paraphr ase the  scr iptu re , the
Congr ess  giveth , an d t he  Congr ess  ta ket h a wa y.”110
One might try to support t his view by citing the broadest
dict ion ary me an ing of th e word  “const itu te ”; aft er  all, t he
inst rument that  not only creates but a lso sets the opera t ing
pa ram eter s for our  govern men t a s a wh ole is called a
“con s t it u t i on .” This ar g u m en t ,  h ow ev er ,  wou l d h a ng
cons t it u t i on a l doct r in e by t oo fra il a  ver ba l t h rea d.  Ma dison ,
who cosponsored wit h  J ames  Wilson  the  mot ion  from which  the
Tr ibuna ls Clause derives, reports t hat  the  m ot ion  used  the
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111. S ee 1 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  125.
112. S ee 1 i d .
113. S ee 1 i d . at 118, 127.
114. S ee 1 i d . at 125.
115. S ee 2 id . at 38-39, 46.
116. Se iz ing up on t his  wor d “ap poin t,” P rofe ssor  J u l i us  Goebel  specu la ted tha t
delegates  who opposed a ny b u t  one  na tion al t ri bu na l su ppor te d t he  Ma dis on-Wi lson
compromise on  June 5 th  because  they  be li eved  tha t  state courts would be “appointed”
for  national purposes (as sometimes had bee n d one  un der  th e Ar ticl es of
Con fed er at ion ). S ee 1 GO E B E L, supra  no te 52, at  211-1 2 & n .76. T his  spe cula tion ,
however , seems unwa rran tably strained.
117. 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  133.
118. S ee 2 i d . at 144.
119. S ee 2 i d . at 168.
120. S ee 2 i d . at 182.
121. S ee 2 i d . at 315, 313.
122. S ee U.S. C O N S T . a r t . II I, § 1  (se con d h al f of fir st  se nt en ce).
word “inst i t ut e ,” not  “cons t it u t e .”1 1 1  “Ins t itu te” a l so was  the
word Dick in son  us ed in  the  ea r l ie r  comment  tha t  prompted the
Wilson -Ma dison  mot ion .112 Accounts  of the  same mot ion  in  the
Journa l and in Yates’s notes use the word “appoint” inst ead.113
Moreover, Ma dison  rep or t s t ha t  discu ss ion  of the m ot ion  took
pla ce in t e rms  of “es tabl ish ing” such  court s.114 Both  the  Journa l
and Madison  show the word  “appoint” being us ed when  th e
pr oposition  was  rea ffirmed  on J uly 18th ;115 and “appoin t”116 was
the word employed in the resolution as referred  to the
Comm itt ee of Deta il.117
In  Committ ee proceedings th e outline pr epar ed by Randolph
also used  “appoin t”;118 bu t  the d ra ft  pr ep ared  by J ames  Wilson
used  “constitut e” instead,119 and  th at  was the  word  the
Committ ee’s Report employed.120 Even  though  “const i tu te” may
be su sce pt ibl e t o a  br oade r  mea nin g, n o r ecor d s ugges t s tha t
either  Wilson or t he Comm ittee m ean t a nyth ing significan t by
th i s word change. The Convention approved the provis ion
conta in ing Wilson ’s w ord n ot  only w it hout  object ion , bu t , so fa r
as ap pea rs , with  no discu ssion  at  all;121 given the delegates’
adamant an d r epea te d r ejection  of legisla tive  contr ol over
ju r isdict ion  (to be detailed below), it seem s h ighly un l ike ly  tha t
the Conven tion  would  ha ve quie t ly a pp roved  th is  cla use  if a ny
delega te  had  conce ived  the w or d “cons t itu te” to ca r ry  such
meaning . Moreover, in the Ar ticle III phr ase alluding to t he
Tr ibuna ls Clau se122 the word “cons t it u te” does  not  app ea r ; tha t
ph ra se in st ea d u ses  th e word s “orda in” an d “esta blish .”
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P e r h aps for  thes e r ea son s,  those  wh o hold  the con ven t ion a l
view ha ve not tr ied t o de fen d i t  by con st ru in g t he word
“const itut e.” Instead th ey have relied on a “necessary
im pl ica t ion ”: The pur portedly “great er” power  to creat e or
abolish in fe r ior  cour t s  is  t aken  a fortiori to include th e “lesser”
powers to creat e or abolish th em in pa rt  by vest ing or d ivest ing
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123. Most comm e n t a tors discu ssin g proposa ls for jur isdictiona l divest men t h ave
endorsed  some  var iat ion of th e “necessa ry im plicat ion” view. S ee, e.g., RE D I S H , s u pra
no te 2, at  29; Raou l Ber ger, Congression al C ont ract ion  of Fed eral  J ur isd icti on , 1980
WIS . L. RE V. 801, 804; He nr y M. Ha rt , J r., The  Power  of  Congress  to  L imi t  t he
Ju risd icti on  of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. RE V. 1362 (1953);
Kenneth  R. Kay, Lim iting Federal Cou rt J ur isd icti on: T he U nf oreseen  Im pact  on
Courts and  Congress, 65 J UDICATURE  185, 186 (1981 ); Robert W . Meser ve, Limi t ing
J ur isd icti on  and R emedies of Federal Courts , 68 A.B.A. J. 159, 160 (1982); Ratner ,
supra  note 9, at  158; Rat ner , supra  no te 12 , a t  955;  Mar t in  H. Redish  & Cur t is  E .
Woods, Congression al  Power  to Con tro l t he J uri sd ic tion  of  Low er  Federal  Court s: A
Critical Review and  a New S ynth esis, 124 U. P A. L. RE V. 45, 46-48, 106 (1975); Rice,
supra  not e 8, at  192; Sa ger, supra  note  9, at  25; Telford T aylor , Lim iting Federal
Court Ju risdiction: The Unconstitu tionality of Current L egislative Proposals, 65
J UDICATURE  199 (1981); Michael Vitiello, Con gress ion al W ith dr aw al of  J ur isd icti on
from  Federal Courts: A Reply to Professor Udd o, 28 LOY. L. RE V. 61 (1982); Herber t
Wechs le r , Th e Cou rts  an d t he C ons tit ut ion , 65 CO L U M. L. RE V. 100 1, 1 005  (196 5).
Som e have conceded the inference as hist orically defensible but ar gued against
i t s app lication  in m odern  circum sta nces. S ee, e.g., The odore E isen ber g, Congressional
Authority to Restrict  Low er Fed eral  Cou rt J ur isd icti on , 83 YALE L.J . 498, 501, 502-04,
510-13, 532-3 3 (197 4); see als o Sage r, supra  note 9, at  36.
Som e have said t he co n st i t u tiona lit y of dive st me nt  sh ould  tu rn  on con gr ess iona l
motive. S ee, e.g., J ohn  H. E ly, Legislative and Adm inistrative Motivation in
Con stitutio nal Law , 79 YALE L.J . 1205, 130 7-08 (1970); Vitiello, supra ,  a t  75 . Bu t
o ther s say t his t hes is su ffers “fata l flaws.” S ee, e.g., Ger ald G un th er, Congressional
Pow er to Cu rta il Fed eral  Cou rt J ur isd icti on: An  Opi ni ona ted Guide to the Ongoing
Debate, in  ROS C O E  P O U N D-AM E R I CA N  TRIAL LA W YE R S  F OUNDATION , F INAL REPORT OF
T H E 1983 CH I E F  J U S T IC E  E ARL WAR R E N  CO N F ER E N C E  O N  AD V OC AC Y I N  T H E  UN I T E D
ST AT E S, TH E  COURTS : SE P A RA TI O N  OF  P O W E R S  15, 29-30 (1983), revi sed  vers ion
repr in ted  in  36 STAN . L. RE V. 895  (198 4).
A few have insisted at  least th at st ate judgm ents in cases dives t e d  fr om lower
federa l court s mu st r ema in su bject t o Supr eme  Cour t r eview. S ee, e.g.,  Ba to r,
supra  note 11, at  1034, 1037, 1039. If  congressional  discret ion over  su bjec t  m at t er
jur isd icti on  we re  re al ly a  “ne ces sa ry  im pli cat ion ” of t he Tribuna ls Clause, however,
such  at te mp ts  at  qu ali ficat ion cou ld d ra w n o cre dibl e su ppor t fr om a ny  cons t i tu t iona l
langua ge. They all amoun t, as Pr ofessor Redish ha s s ai d, t o “cons ti tu ti on al  wis hfu l
th ink ing.” Mar tin  H. Red ish, Congressional Power to Regulate Suprem e Court
Appellate J ur isd icti on U nd er t he E xcep tion s Clause: An Internal and E xternal
Ex am in ati on , 27 VILL . L. RE V. 900, 911 (1982 ) [here ina fter  Redish , Congressional
Pow er]. As Professor Gunther  observed, “much of the debat e tur ns on w heth er
a rgumen t s ab out  se ns ible  an d d es ir ab le ju dici a l  st r uc tu re s  can  be conver t ed  in to
constit ut ionally  ma nda ted  ones.” Gu nt her , supra , at 908.
Redish and some others have posited “due process” limits on divestment, at least
as to const itu tion al claim s. S ee, e.g., Bat or, supra  note 11,  a t  1033-34;  Red ish ,
Constitutional L imi tat ions, supra  note 11, at 158-59; Redish, Text ,  S t ruc ture,  and
Com m on  S ense, supra  note 11, at 1648. See also the equa l protection argum ent  of
Pr ofess or  Rat ner , supra  note 12, at  954.
less than a ll t he con tem pla ted  ju r isdict ion ,123 and  to d ict a t e how
these crea tu res  sha ll pr oceed in performing their judicial tasks.
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124. Livin gst on  v. Va n I ng en , 15  F.  Ca s. 6 97,  698  (C.C .D. N. Y. 18 11) (N o. 8, 420 ).
125. Ju stice  Washington wr ote:
[T]h e res iduu m of th e judicial p ower is ves ted in  such  infer ior  cour t s ,  a s
congress ma y, from t ime t o tim e, orda in a nd e sta blish . Now, it  follows, tha t
when  congress  ha s est ablish ed su ch infer ior court s, it lies w ith  th at  body,
to parcel out th e judicial powers amongst them, in su ch manner ,  as may
seem  to  them mos t  p rope r .
Ex parte Ca br er a,  4 F . Ca s. 9 64,  965  (C.C .D.  Pa . 18 05) (N o. 2, 278 ).
126. United  St at es  v. H ud son , 11  U. S. (7  Cr an ch) 3 2, 3 3 (18 12).
The first t o asser t t ha t Congr e s s  a ctu al ly cou ld d ives t ju ri sd ict ion  aft er  it  once
had been ve sted  was J ust ice Story. H e said  at  Circuit  in  1812, “I am well satisfied,
t h a t  th e legislat ur e ma y at  will give or ta ke a way t he ju risdict ion of the cir cuit a nd
dis tr ict  court s.” Ex parte Unit ed Sta tes, 24 F. Cas . 737, 738 (C.C.D.R. I. 18 12) (N o.
14, 411 ). At th e da te of th is dictu m, h owever , d ives tmen t  (as  dis tin gu ish ed fr om
incomplete i nves tmen t) was only a th eoretical possibility; as of 1812, Congress never
had un der ta ken  to t ota lly dives t a ny fr agm ent  of jur isdiction once vested somewhere
in  the federal judicial system. Not even t he controversial 1802 meas ure r epea l ing  the
1801 Ju diciary Act wa s su ch a dive stm ent ; see th e ext ensive discussion of that  1802
measure infra  notes 235-39.
127. An  opinion for the Su preme Cour t in 1850 art iculated the “necess a ry
impli ca t ion” ra tion ale a gain . S ee Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-49 (1850).
J ust ice Sut her lan d cited J ohns on’s 1812 opin ion in Un ited  S tat es v. H ud son , 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), when h e wrote for th e Court in  1922 th at  Congress  “may
give, wit hh old,  or r es tr ict  su ch ju ri sd ict ion  at  it s d iscr etion  .  . .  . And  the  ju r i sd ic t ion ,
References to t his  specious  “neces sa ry im plica t ion”
app ear ed at  least  as e a r ly a s 1 811, w hen  J ust ice L ivings ton
wrote  a t  Ci r cu i t,
[T h e infer ior  court s]  have  h i t h e r t o b ee n  r eg a r de d  as  d ep e n de n t
on  th at  body  [Con gr ess ] for all  th e pow er s t he y pos ses s. Ow ing
a s  th ey d o th eir  exis te n ce t o cong re ss , from  t h em  m u s t
ne cessa rily  fl ow  t h a t  p o r t ion  o f t he  gen e ra l  j ud ic ia l  power
w h ich , by t h e con st itu tion , th ey h av e a  rig h t t o div ide  am on g
t h e  i n f er i or  c ou r t s  t h a t  m a y  b e  e s t a b l is h e d .124
Jus t i ce Wash ington  a t  C ircu i t  had  wr it t en  someth ing  simila r
six yea rs b efor e, b u t  Wa sh in gt on’s s t a tem en t  wa s m ore
ambiguous an d it  is u nclea r wh eth er h e wa s esp ousin g th is
“necessa ry implication” view or instead was ap plying  the
Necessa ry an d Pr oper Claus e.125 The re  is n o am bigui ty,
however, in  J ust ice J ohnson ’s 1 812 s ta tem en t  for  the Supreme
Cour t , th at  “th e power  which  congres s  posses s  t o crea t e Cour t s
of infer ior jur isdict ion, ne cessa rily im plies t he p ower t o limit
th e jur isdict ion of th ose cour ts  to pa rt icula r object s.”126
There is, h owever , no r ea son t o believe that  these occasiona l
espou sa ls127 repr esent  th e predomin an t ea rly view. In ear lier
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hav ing been conferred m ay, at  th e will of Congress , be ta ken  awa y in wh ole or in
pa r t . . . .” Kline v. Bur ke Con str . Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922). Sutherland also
cited T ur ner  v. B an k of  N ort h A m erica , 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799), but  the J ust ices  in
Turner had n ot art iculated a “necessary implication” rat ionale.
128. S ee, e.g., Ban k of th e Un ited  Sta tes  v. Devea ux, 9 U .S. (5  Cr a n ch ) 61, 85
(180 9); Str awbr idge v. Cur tis, 7 U .S. (3 Cran ch) 267 (1806); Livingst on v. J effer son ,
15 F .  Cas. 660, 665 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411); Wescott v. Fair field TP., 29 F. Cas.
709 (C.C.D .N .J . 18 11 ) (N o. 1 7,4 18 ); Th e L it t le  An n , 15  F . Ca s.  62 2, 6 23  (C.C.D .N .Y.
1810) (No.  8,3 97).
129. See Ju stice Ire dell’s  op in ion  in  Chisholm  v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,
432-33 (179 3).
130. Ex parte Boll ma n,  8 U .S.  (4 Cr an ch) 7 4, 9 3 (18 07).
131. S ee, e.g., United S tat es v. Fisher , 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 3 96 (1 804).  For
e x a mple, see th e extra judicial debate on Congr ess’ power to incorporat e a ba n k ,
event ua lly r e fl ec t ed  in  McCul loch  v . Maryland, 17  U. S. (4  Wh ea t. ) 316  (181 9).
cases, the J ust ices  had r es pe cted  st a tu tory paramete rs  withou t
a r t i cu lat i n g an y rat ionale;128 an d th e Necessar y and  Pr oper
Claus e, wh ich  from the ou t se t  had b een  unde rst ood to au thor i ze
laws effectua ting Art icle III,129 is  cer t a in ly a mple t o sust a in
laws vesting jurisdiction even if th ey vest only par t of what  is
con templa ted by Art icle III. (The N ecessa ry a nd  Pr oper Cla us e
cannot  suppor t  d ives tmen t , bu t  no ea r ly  case involved tha t .)
Chief Ju stice Marsha ll in 1807, obser v ing tha t  “cour t s
which  ar e crea ted  by writ t e n  law, a nd  whose  jur isdict ion is
defined by writt en law , cann ot t ra ns cend  th at  jur isdict ion,”
declared, “It  is unnecessa ry  to s t a te the rea sonin g on wh ich t his
opinion is  founde d, becau se it  ha s been r epeat edly given by th i s
cour t ; and with th e decisions heretofore rendered on this point ,
no member  of the  bench  has, even for an  inst an t, been
dissatisfied.”1 3 0  However, as of that dat e the “necessary
im pl ica t ion ” view not only had not been “repeat edly given by
t h i s cour t , ” bu t  had never been  give n  a t  a ll—n ot  in  any opin ion
for  th e Court , nor even in a  separ at e opinion or st at emen t by
any J ust ice thereof. The Necessa ry a nd  Pr oper Cla us e, in
con t r a s t , was  well un der st ood, and  ha d been  pr omin ent ly
employed in other  conte xts .131 If it is  not  abs olut ely cert ain  th at
Mar sh all’s 1807 allusion was t o t h e Necessar y and  Pr oper
Claus e, a t  l eas t  there  is  no reason wh at soever t o cons ider  it a n
endorsement  of th e “necessar y implicat ion” notion, which  no
one seems ever  to ha ve art iculated u nt il some years la ter .
In  an y event, no ma tt er h ow early th e mistake first
appeared, this so-called “necessary implication” is an
im pl ica t ion  which  the  frame r s  a ctu ally h ad  tr ied de libera tely
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132. S ee Clint on, supra  note 2, at  764, 773, 776, 791.
133. S ee 1 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  211-12, 220.
134. S ee 1 i d . at 220.
and r epea ted ly  to foreclose. The delegat es at  th e 1787
Con ven t ion  specifica l ly a nd r ep ea ted ly r efu se d t o a llow
Congress th e discr etion  th is fa u lty r eas oning in fers. Th e Det ail
Committ ee’s reject ion  of Randolph’s  unqua l ifi ed  “sha ll
organize” clause (already dis cu ssed) is only the weakest
examp le. Pr ofessor Robert Clint on docum ent ed severa l others
fifteen  yea rs a go.132 Bu t  the re a re  even more  examples  than
Professor  Clint on sh owed, a nd th ey all s hou ld be br iefly
reviewed.
As a lr ea dy  obs er ved , t he com pl ica t ion s ent ailed by the  June
5th  compr omise in cluded some per ta ining to su bject m at ter
ju r isdict ion . For  exa mple, w it h  the ve ry ex is ten ce of “in fer ior ”
cour t s left  to leg is la t ive  discr et ion , t he “su pr em e” one cou ld  not
be limited t o “th e dern ier res ort,” because some cat egories
embr aced by t he n in th  Ra ndolp h  Res olu t ion  (for  e xam ple,
“i m pe a ch m e n t s of an y N a t ion a l office r s”) wou ld be
inappropr ia t e for state court  adjudication even “in the first
ins ta nce.” Th er e a lso were m isgivin gs  abou t  som e of t he
ca tegor ies  of su bject  mat ter  lis t ed  in  tha t  Resolu t ion .
These ju ris diction  issu es ca me  up  for discu ssion  th e ne xt
week, l a te in  the day on  Jun e 12t h. T ha t t his  discu ssion
occurr ed at  all is some ind icat ion that  the delegates did not
per ceive th e Tr ibun als  Clause,  ap pr oved a  week  ea rlie r, a s
leavin g the  prob lems of ju r is d ict ion  to leg is la t ive  discr et ion .
The ser ies of ensu ing Conve nt ion act ions, h owever, m ak es t his
un mist ak able.
F i rs t , th e delegates  deleted  t he “first insta nce” phrase
regarding t h e infe r ior  cour t s  and amended the  Nin th
Resolu t ion  to provide “[t ]ha t  t he ju r isd ict ion  of t he  sup reme
Tribun a l sh a ll be t o hea r  and d et er min e in  the d er n ier  res or t
all” cases in  the categories listed; then they proceeded to tink er
with  the  ca tegory list.133 As  they  did so,  however ,  it  mus t  have
become appa ren t t ha t m ore extens ive altera tions wer e needed
in order to accommodate the Ju ne 5th compromise, for  soon  the
delegates  postponed the  ent ire  ma tt er  to t he  next  mor nin g.134
Then  the whole p rovis ion  rega rding t he ju r isdict ion  of th e
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135. 1 i d . at 232.
136. 1 i d . at 223-24. Only Yates reported tha t the approval was unanimous.
The three categories included in this motion correspond to the last th re e of t he
six categor ies in th e origin all y pr opose d N int h R esol ut ion.  Th e m otion  took  accou nt
of vote s t ak en  th e pr eviou s day de letin g juris diction over  pira cies, felonies on t he h igh
seas, and capt ures from en emies. It also omitted all referen ce to suits between
citizens of different States.
This  mot ion,  how ever , was n ot int ende d as a  final det erm ina tion: According t o
Yates’s notes,
Gov. Randolph observed t he d ifficu lt y in  es ta bli sh in g t he  pow er s of t he
jud icia ry —th e object however at pr esen t is  to est ablish  th is prin ciple, to wit,
t he se cur it y of for eig ne rs  wh er e t re at ies  ar e in  th eir  fav or,  an d to pr eser ve
the ha rmony o f s t a t e s and  tha t  of the cit izen s t he re of. Th is b ein g on ce
established, it will be  th e bu sine ss of a su b-commit tee  to det ail it  . . . .
1 i d . at 238.
137. S ee Clint on, supra note 2, at  764.
cour t s “was  st ruck  ou t  nem. con  in  or d er  to lea ve fu ll r oom for
th eir  orga niza tion .”135
Once hav ing  t h u s de fer red  the com pl ica t in g is su es  of
s t ructu ra l orga niza tion  (e.g., single or plural tr ibunals; “first
inst an ce” versus “dern ier” roles ),  the delega tes  were  able to
concen t r a te on the s cope  of ju r isdict ion  for  t h e  ju dicia l br anch
as a wh ole.  They then  unan imous ly  ap p r oved a m otion by
Randolph  and M adison  pr ovid in g “[t]h a t  the ju r isdict ion  of th e
na t iona l J udicia ry sha ll ext en d t o case s w hich  res pe ct  the
collect ion  of the  na t iona l  r evenue , impeachments of any
na t iona l officers, a nd q ues t ion s w hich  in volve  the n a t ion a l
pea ce an d h ar mon y.”136
Professor  Clin ton  conside red  it  sign ifica n t  tha t  these  act ions
more or  les s con formed  the ju dicia ry’s com p et e n ce to the scope
proposed for th e na tion al legis lat u r e’s  power .137 However ,  a t
tha t  ea rly s ta ge th e pr ocess of det ailin g na tion al le gisla tive
compe ten ce had scarcely even  begu n, a nd  th e ver y rou gh
sim ilar ity be tw een  th e gen er aliza tion s r ega rd ing t he  re spe ctive
bra nches  at th at st age is fa r  less significant tha n the m anifest
det erm ina tion  (wh ich  Clin ton  noted, t oo) t ha t  t he Cons t it u t ion
it se lf m ust  govern  the s cope  of bot h .
This  June  13 th  de t ermi n at i on  tha t ,  while the  si ze  and
configu ra t ion  of the ju dicia l br anch  migh t  be  left  to t he
legislatu re’s discr etion , its subject  ma t t e r competence  must  be
cons t itu t iona l ly an d n ot legisla tively p res cribed, was soon
followed by ot h e r  actions confirm ing th at  resolve. Together ,
th ese a ctions r ender  complet ely unt ena ble any inferen ce tha t
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138. An o ther  was wh eth er a nd t o what  exten t in ferior feder al cour ts (if an y wer e
created) shou ld review  sta te cour t jud gmen ts in  cases w ith in  federa l judicia l
competence.
Those del ega te s wa nt ing  only  one  na tion al cou rt  obviou sly e xpe cte d t ha t n at ion a l
laws an d tr eat ies sh ould r outin ely be consider ed in t he f ir s t  in s t ance  by s t a t e
tribunals. Tha t  is why Pr oposition 6 t he P at ers on plan  provided  “that  th e J udiciar y
of the several Sta tes shall be bound th e r e by  in  t h eir decision s, an y th ing in t he
res pective  la ws of t he  In div idu al  St at es  to t he  con t r a r y  n otw ith st an din g.” Mad ison ’s
Notes  (Jun e 15, 1787),  in  1 F ARRAN D , supra  note 61, at  242, 245. This of course was
the prototype of the s u prem acy clau se, U .S. CO N S T . art. VI, § 2, first incorporated
in to th e Conve nt ion’s work pr oduct  on J uly 17t h. S ee 2 F A R RA N D, supra  no te 61 , a t
22, 28-29.
This  origin of tha t clause indicates  t ha t t he ot her  delegat es, too, consist ent ly
assum ed th at  in m ost feder al law  cases t he st at e court s would h ave  c on c u r r en t
competence. (Incidentally, it  also explains w h y t h e se cond  pa rt  of th e S up re ma cy
Clause specifies “the J udges in every State” inconsequen tia lly failing to sp ecify federal
judge s.) S ee U.S. CO N S T . art . VI, § 2.
T h e Ju ne 5t h compr omise a ccordingly pres um ed  th at  sta te cour ts wou ld h a ve
concur ren t  juris diction, su bject to feder al cour t r eview. H owever ,  the  t erms  of tha t
compromise did not address which  federal court should do the r eviewing, should there
be more t han  one. With  re sp ect  to this issue, Ran dolph’s outline for the Committ ee
specified th at  inferior  federa l court s sh ould oper at e only “as origin al t ribu n als,” 2
F A R RA N D, supra  not e 61, a t 147 . Howeve r, t he Wils on docum ent , see 2 id .  a t  173,  and
the Committee R e p or t , see 2 i d . at  186, gave t he legis lat ur e discre tion t o assign
infe ri or  courts appellate roles, with regard both to state  c ou r t s  and  oth er  infe ri or
federa l t r ibuna ls , sayi n g, “[t]he Legislatu re ma y assign any pa rt of the [Suprem e
Cour t ’s appe llate ] Ju risdict ion, . . . in th e Man ner , an d un der t he Lim ita t i on s wh ich
it  sh all  th ink  pr oper , to s uch  infe ri or C our ts , as it  sha ll constitute from Time t o
Time .” 2 id . at  186-8 7; see als o 2 i d . at 173.
Ultim at ely this was displaced by differen t la ngu age ,  bu t  in  th is  respect  the  fina l
text  ha s th e sam e effect: The fra mer s delibe r ate ly left  it t o Con gr ess ’ dis cre tion
wheth er  and  how fa r  any  “in fe r io r” f ede ral cou rt s m igh t h av e a pp ella te  comp et en ce
even  over  st at e courts with in the subject mat ter par ameter s described.
139. One juris dictiona l ques tion wa s how cas es deem ed ina ppr opria te for
ad jud icat ion  by s ta te  cour ts  sh ould  be a ssu re d a  na tion al for um .  Randolph’s  ou t l ine
in  th e Com mi tt ee p rov ide d t ha t t he  “sup re me ” court ’s ju ri sdi ction  “s h a ll  be  appe ll a t e
only, except  . . . in t hose in sta nces, in  which  th e legisla tu re s ha ll ma ke it  origin al.”
2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  147. However, if the legislatu re wa s not  obliged  to
c rea t e other fede ra l cou rt s, t o ma ke  th e “su pr em e” one  st ri ct ly appel la t e  un le s s and
un til  the legislature ma de it otherwise would have left cases deemed inappropr ia t e
Congress should have d iscret ion  over  the s cope  of ju r isdict ion
ent ru sted  to th e judicial bran ch as a  whole.
As alrea dy noted, th e problems of deta iling t he
ju r isdict ion a l t e rms to accommodate the uncer ta in ty  as to wha t
cour t s might  exist,  and to designat e original or appellate roles,
were  among t he s eve ra l qu es t ion s138 regardin g  the  jud ici a ry
referr ed to th e Committ ee of Det ail. Alth ough in  cert ain
re spect s the Committee’s proposals respected the delegates’
r esolve aga in st  leg is la t ive  cont rol of ju r isdict ion ,139 in m a jor
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for  adju dication  in st at e court s to origin at e in t hose st at e court s an yway.
The other m embers of the Commit tee declined t o leave t ha t m uch t o legislat ive
d iscre t ion . In st ea d, t o gu ar an te e a  na ti on al  forum  for  s u ch  c a ses,  wh et he r or  not
“infer ior” court s wer e crea ted, t he Com mit tee followed Wilson in  borrowin g an  idea
from  the  defunc t  Pa te r son  P lan : Pa t e r son  had  contempla ted  jus t  one  na t iona l
t r ibun al,  but pr ovided that  cases inap propriat e for state  court decision should be
hea rd by tha t  na t iona l cou rt  “in t he  fir st  in st an ce.” Ma dis on ’s Not es  (J un e 15 , 17 87),
in  1 F A R RA N D, supra  not e 61 , at  242,  244 (d iscu ssi ng  Pr oposi tion  5 of th e P at er son
P lan ); see als o 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  173, 186.
Tha t the idea of an “original” jurisdiction for the “supreme ” C ou r t  der ived  from
the Pa te r son  P lan sugges ts it was designed, n ot to prevent t hose cases being heard
by in ferior  federa l courts in the event any were established, but rather t o ensure
access to  som e federal forum  in the first in stan ce regardless.  If so—con t rary  to the
mu tu ally exclusive view of origina l and appe llate jurisdiction articulat ed by Chief
Ju stice  Marshal l for  t he  Cour t  in  Marbury  v. M ad ison , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174-75
(1803)—not h ing forecloses concurren t jurisdiction for inferior federal courts in cases
with in  th e Su pr em e Cou rt ’s “orig ina l” jur isd icti on.
140. 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  147.  Pr ofess or C lin ton  not ed t his  fea tu re  of
Rando lph’s dra ft. S ee Clint on, supra  note 2, at  773-74.
In  add it ion  to  viola t ing  the  de lega tes ’ i n str uct ion a gai ns t le gisl at ive con tr ol of
jur isd icti on , t h i s  a lso a ffron te d t he  exp ect at ion t ha t t he  decis ions  of infe ri or cou rt s
shou ld be fina l in m an y cases . S ee En gdah l, supra  note 69, at  472.
Randolph hi ms elf h ad  ma de t he  mot ion  ap pr oved  on J un e 13 , bu t h is com m e n ts
a t  th at  ti me  su gge st  he  ha d d one  so s im ply  to fa cilit at e t he  cons ide ra ti on of s ub ject
mat ter  par am ete rs b y postp onin g th e pr oblem of alloca tin g roles . S ee 1 F A R RA N D,
supra  note 61, at 238. Apparent ly Randolph rema ined u n h a ppy with the Comm ittee’s
( an d t h e Conven tion’s) hand ling of jurisd iction issu es, for he  lat er in cluded a mong t he
changes he t hough t n ecessa ry before h e could sign  th e finish ed Cons tit ut ion,  “l imi t ing
and defining the judicial power.” Letter of E. Randolph to the Speak er  of the Virgin ia
House of Delegat es (Oct. 10 , 1787), i n  3 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  123, 127.
141. S ee 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  172-73.
r e spect s th ey did n ot. Ra nd olph’s out line  for  t he  Commi t tee had
complet ely ign ored  tha t  res olve : it  ca lled for giving t he
“sup rem e” court  jurisdiction over all cases arising under
na t iona l laws  an d “such ot her  cases , as  th e na tion al legis lat ur e
may assign,” and th en added  t h at “th e wh ole or a p ar t” of th is
jur isdict ion , “accordin g to the discret ion of th e legislatur e m ay
be ass ign ed  to the in fer ior  t r ibu na ls , a s or igina l tr ibu na ls.”140
This  made the  ju r i sd ict ion  of t h e  en t i re jud icia l b ranch
depe nd ent  on legisla tive will.
J ames Wilson’s dr aft  for th e Det ail  Commit tee corrected
th i s only in par t. For t he Su prem e Court , Wilson pres cribed
categories of jur isdict ion  wit hout  leg is la t ive  discr et ion  to pick
and choose;141 bu t for  the in fer ior  cour t s,  Wilson (like Randolph)
proposed that  the legislature be free to ass ign a s  much  or  as
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142. S ee 2 id. at  173. P rofessor  Clint on n oted t his fea tu re of Wilson ’s dr aft. S ee
Clin ton , supra  not e 2, a t 7 75-76 . How eve r, C lin ton  conce nt ra te d h is a tt en tion  on a
different  fea tu re  of Wilson ’s dr aft: it s “exception s an d re gula tion s clau se.” Id . at 776.
143. S ee 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  176, 177, 190.
144. The Comm itt ee R epor t pr ovided, “ Th e Le gisl at ur e m ay a ssi gn  an y pa rt  of
the juris diction above mentioned (except the tr ial of the P resident  of the U nited
States) in t he m an ner , an d un der  th e limit at ions wh ich it s ha ll th ink  prope r, t o  such
In fer ior  Courts , as it sh all constitut e from time t o time.” 2 i d . at 186-87.
145. On  August 17th  the delegat es approved the Det ail Committee ’s decision  to
pla ce in the legislative Article the langua ge (resulting from the J une 5t h compromise)
g iv ing Congr ess d iscret ion t o “const itu te” infer ior t ribu na ls. 2  i d . at 313 , 315 . The
d iscuss ions about discretion over jurisdiction had referen ce to a different  Article,
however , and took place on the later dates.
The firs t s eve ra l act ions  on Augus t 2 7t h r ega rd ing  jur isd icti on a re  not  of
par t i cu la r i n t ere s t  t o u s  he re.   In  one of th ose  act ions  language  was added  to the
su bject  mat ter d escriptions to en sur e tha t th ey included ma tter s of equi ty as  well  as
law.  In a noth er t he pr ovisions giving t he ju diciary ju risdict ion over cas es ar ising
under  th e t re at ies  an d t he  Con st it ut ion  an d con tr over sie s “to w hi ch t h e  U n ited Sta tes
sha ll be a pa rt y” were add ed.  And t he de cision concern ing t h e  p r ovisi on for
jur isd icti on  over im pea chm ent s wa s post poned . S ee 2 i d . at 422-24, 428, 430-31.
146. T h e plur al is u sed in  th e J ourn al a s pr int ed by F ar ra nd. It  th us is  possible
tha t  th e mot ion contem plat ed except ions a nd r egula tions  by state l eg is la tur es, as w ell
as by Congre ss. If so, ha d it b e e n  approved  th is  migh t  have pe rmit t ed  st a t e
legislatures  to exer cise th eir r espect ive powers  so as t o preclud e a ppellate recourse
to the federal courts.
147. 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  424.
litt le with in t he pr escr ibed s ub ject m at te r lim its  as  it m ight
choose.142
Because  th e Deta il Comm ittee’s Augu st  6 Rep or t 143 followed
Wilson ’s d ra ft  in  th is re gar d,144 dur ing  the five  weeks  spen t
consider ing th at  Repor t, t he  delega te s foun d it  neces sa ry t o
r e visit  the ques t ion  of leg is la t ive  discr et ion  over  ju r isdict ion .
The ir  r e levan t  d iscuss ions  took  p lace  on  August  27 and 28,145
and the ir  s t a lwar t  reject ion  of su ch  leg is la t ive  discr et ion  wa s
th e domina nt , and  very promin ent , them e.
It  was  first  moved a nd  seconded  to r epla ce th e Det ail
Committ ee’s language regarding supreme court appellat e
jur isdict ion with language providing that in all cases except
those where the suprem e court could act in the first in s t a n ce,
“origina l ju r isdict ion  sh a ll be in  the Cour t s of th e severa l Sta tes
bu t wit h  app ea l bot h  as t o La w a nd fa ct  to th e cour t s  of the
Unit ed States, with such  exce pt ion s a nd u nde r  su ch
regulations, as t he Legislat ur es146 sh all m ak e.” 147 For  one
th ing, th is would  ha ve limit ed t he in ferior cour ts  (should
Congress crea t e any) to s t r ict l y app ell a te r oles ; bu t  tha t  is  not
the mos t  in teresting featur e of this motion. Its “exceptions and
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148. The d i ff eren t  “excep t ions and  r egu la t ions” claus e  actua l ly  inc luded in  the
Cons t it u t ion , un like t his on e, count ena nces ju risdict ion a l exclu sion s on ly a s t o th e
“supreme” court. Under  this m otion instead, however, even legislation that  excluded
som e Article III jurisdiction from the whole judiciary could have pa ssed mu ster  unde r
the Ne ces sa ry  an d P rop er  Cla us e a s “car ry in g in to E xecu t ion” t h e  “judicia l Power” as
so prescribed.
149. Indeed, it might h ave been deem ed u nd ese rv ing  eve n of s er ious  dis cus sion ,
for  Ma dis on (wh o gen er all y took  pa ins  to a bst ra ct p oint s of de ba te  wh et he r m otion s
succeeded or failed) did  n o t even  not e th e mot ion bein g ma de. S ee 2 F A R RA N D, supra
no te 61, at  431; cf. 2 id . at  424.  Lik e Ma dis on, P rofe ssor  Clin ton  over looke d or
disr e ga r ded th is un successfu l motion , an d th e nom ina l adde d su pport  its failu re
provides for his thesis.
150. A motion  was m ade t o give the  legislatur e discretion to add to the cases
eligible for origina l “suprem e” cour t cognizan ce those  in w h ic h  th e Un ited S ta tes is
a  pa r ty.  Th i s was  amended to  give  the  legi sl a ture dis cre ti on on ly ove r w he th er  su ch
cases could be appealed; but  as  so amen ded, the motion m eant  nothing m ore tha n
was contem plat ed alr eady by t he  comb ina tion  of Nece ssa ry  an d P rop er  an d E xcep tion s
Clauses  in the Comm ittee’s Report; and th e motion as  t hus  rendered  super fluous  was
voted down . S ee 2 i d . at 424-25.
Mad ison’s not es m en tion  ne ith er  th is m otion  nor  the  act ion s  taken upon i t .  Like
Madison , Clin ton  see ms  to h ave  mi sse d it , too.
151. 2 i d . at  186-87. 
152. 2 i d . at 425, 431. The delegates also reworded th e clause tha t distinguish ed
the “origin al” a nd  “app ella te ” jur isd icti on of t he  “sup re me ” court , con formin g i t  wi th
the foregoing chan ge. 2 i d . at 424-25 (Journ al). Madison did n o t  re por t t his  mi nor
verba l ad jus tmen t .
regulations” phrase app lied  not  ju s t  t o t he  “supreme” cour t , bu t
to all “t h e court s of the United Sta tes,” and th us it
con templa ted tha t  the  legi sla tu re mig ht  exclude cert ain cas es
with in  the li st ed  ca tegor ies  from the r ea ch  of any federal
cour t .148 Th is  par t icu l ar  indu lgence of le gis la t ive  discr et ion
at tr acted  so l it t le s upp or t  t ha t t he  mot ion, even  th ough
seconded, wa s dropped wit hout  being put  to a vote.149
Apparen t ly , however , t he d iscussion  of tha t  and  another
unsuccessfu l mot ion 150 ele va ted  consciousn es s on  t he is su e, for
the de lega tes  unde r took next  to posit ively rea sser t t heir
rep ud iat ion of legisla tive cont rol. On e sect ion of the D eta il
Com mit t ee’s Rep or t , a fter  sa yin g, “[t]h e J ur isdict ion  of th e
Supreme Court  shall extend t o” th e listed su bject m at ter
categories, continued by providing (as had Wilson’s  d ra ft ) tha t
“The Legisla tu re  ma y as sign  any p ar t of th e jur isdict ion a bove
mentioned” to inferior federal court s.151 The delegat es th en
changed th e first of these sen ten ces to provide tha t  “The
J ud icial Power” (ra the r  than  “The jur isdiction of the Su p r eme
Cour t ”) “shall extend t o” t he categories listed.152 They had just
p reviou sly ap pr oved lan gua ge pr oviding t ha t “th e judicia l
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153. S ee 2 i d . at 186.
154. Pr ofess or  Clinton does not mention this.
155. 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  425, 431.
156. S ee 2 i d . at 425, 431. Pr ofessor Clinton did note t his. S ee Clint on, supra
no te 2, at 791.
157. 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  186-87.
158. S ee 2 i d . at  425,  431.  Pr ofess or Clinton also not ed t his. S ee Clint on, supra
no te 2, 791.
Power” sha ll be vest ed a like (or collective ly) in th e supr eme and
inferi or  cour t s  (sh ou ld  Con gr es s cr ea t e a ny),1 5 3  a nd
consequ en tly,  by t hus  descr ibing t he e xten t of th e th e wh ole
“judicia l Power” (as  dist in gu ished  from the r ea ch of the on e
supreme t r ibu n a l ), t hey a ffir med  tha t  the ju r isdict ion  of all
federal  court s, a t le as t collectively, m us t b e const itu tion ally a nd
not  legisla tively  pr escrib ed. Th is a gain  confirmed  th e J un e 13th
r eje ct ion  of leg is la t ive  di scr et ion  over  in fer ior  cour t
ju r isdict ion .154
There  did,  however , r em ain  som e s upp or t  for  s u ch
legisla tive  discretion; its p r oponent s next  moved to replace th e
en t ir e sen ten ce about  ap pella te ju ris diction w ith  one sa ying
t ha t  in a ll cases  except t hose w ith in s up rem e court  origina l
ju r isdict ion , “the  jud icia l power  sha ll  be  exercised in  such
ma nn er  as the Legislatu re shall dir ect.”155 Tha t  mot ion ,
howeve r, w as  defea te d by a  th re e-fourt hs  ma jorit y.156
St ill ther e r em ain ed  in  the Det a il Commit tee ’s R ep or t  the
separ a t e sen te nce p rovidin g, “Th e Legis lat ur e m ay a ssign  an y
pa r t of th e jurisdiction above men t ioned  . . . t o su ch  In fer ior
Cour t s , as  it s ha ll const itu te  from t ime  to t ime .”157 Tha t
sent ence th erefore was st ricken, with out a n opposing vote.158
Thus, by a  su cces sion  of consi st en t  act ion s a nd by
overwh elming vot es , t he d ele ga tes  a t  the Const it u t ion a l
Con ven t ion  specifically r efus ed t o coun te na nce legis lat ive
discr etion  over  wha t  fract ion  of the  cons t itu t iona l ly  au thor ized
ju r isdict ion  th e inferior  cour t s  shou ld actua l ly  have . For  the
d ra ft e r s of the U nit ed  St a tes  Con st it u t ion , d iscret ion  over the
exi st en ce of in fer ior  cour t s  m anifestly carr ied no “necessary
im pl ica t ion ”—nor  eve n  any poss ibl e im pl ica t ion —of discr et ion
over t hose  cour ts’ collective jurisdiction! The framer s tr eat ed
these as  separa te and indepen den t is su es a nd  expr essly
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159. S ee 1 GO E B E L, supra  note 52, at  241-43 & 243 n.228.
160. S ee 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  337, 340, 344-45.
161. The Conven t ion  had  me t  i n  closed sessions. When it was over, the secret ary
destroyed the pa pers he deem ed unim portan t an d delivered t he  othe r s , a long  wi th  the
official Journ al of proceedings, to the Convention’s pres id e n t , Geor ge Wa sh ing ton .
Wa sh ing ton  sequester ed them  unt il 1796, when h e delivered them t o  t h e Depa r tmen t
of Sta te. S ee MAX F A R RA N D, TH E  F R AM I N G  OF  T H E  CON S T I T U TION  194 (1913)
[hereinafter  F A R RA N D, F R A MI N G]; 1 F A R RA N D, supra  note  61, at  xi. There the  Journa l
conferr ed legislative discretion as  to th e one, while repea tedly
disallowing discretion as  to th e other .159
~~~
At  th e sa me t ime, it  cert ain ly was  not  supposed tha t  the
en t ir e range of auth orized subject ma tter competence must
exist  i n each  and  every  cour t  t ha t  Congress  might  creat e. Tha t
would  pr eclude s pecializa tion  an d a ny d ifferent ia t ion  of roles.
The Necessar y and  Pr oper Claus e, conceived in pa rt  specifically
to em power  Congr ess to de ta il ju dicia l br anch  orga n iza t ion  for
effect u a t ing the ju dicia l power , wa s a pp roved  just  da ys  before
the de lega tes ’ fin a lized  their  de cis ion s r ega rding ju r isdict ion ,160
and it mu st h ave been obvious t ha t if inferior  t r ibuna ls  were
crea t ed a t  a l l th i s fe li ci tous clause  would enable Congress to
distribute t he  con templa ted ju r isdict ion  withou t  d imin ish ing
the subject ma tt er  scop e con tem pla ted  for  the ju dicia l br anch  as
a  whole. Although  th ey were dete rmined to deny  the legisla tu re
any discr et ion t o curt ail or  delim it t he  ext e n t  of t he federal
jud iciar y’s power, th e fram ers did wa nt  th e legislat ur e to be
able  to help effectuate t ha t  jud icia l power .  Language bet t e r
suit ed to t his  compoun d pu rp ose t ha n t he  Neces sa ry a nd
P roper Clau se could h ar dly ha ve been  devised  with out  losing
th e conciseness for which car eful dra ftsmen  str ive.
Had it been genera lly known among  ea r ly Amer ican  lawyers
and J ust ices t h a t  leg is la t ive  discr et ion  over  in fer ior  cour t
jurisdiction ha d been sp ecifically consider ed and re jected  a t  the
Con st it u t ion a l Con ven t ion , the “necessary implication” premise
un der  the Tr ibu na ls  Cla use  could  neve r  have ca ugh t  on.
However , the  Convent ion records so readily accessible today
were  st ill  h idde n  wh en  tha t  misconst ruct ion  took h old. The
scan t  official J our na l an d a  few other papers were first
published in 1819,161 a ft e r  th ir ty  years  of p ract i ce  under  the
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and other pa pers lay un studied u ntil 1818, when a  joint r esolution of Congress
ordered  tha t th ey be printed. The sizeable ta sk of arran ging the disordered  docu me n t s
fell to then Secretar y of State J ohn Quincy Adams . He r eceived s ome  ra nd om
addit iona l docu me nt s a nd  secu re d h elp  from  J am es M ad ison  in com ple tin g th e r ecor d
of th e Conven tion’s final four da ys. The  produ ct of Quincy Adam s’s la bors  was
published  in 181 9. S ee 1 F A R RA N D, supra  not e 61 , at  xii; F A R RA N D, F R A MI N G supra ,
a t  59.
162. S ee 1 F A R RA N D, supra  note  61, at  xiv.
163. Desp it e ur gings  t h a t  he  pu blis h t he m s oone r, M ad ison  ha d r esol ved  up on
pos thumous publica t ion .  He  assembl ed  and ed it ed  the no tes  du r ing  h is  r e t ir emen t ,
and they ultimately were published in 1840, four years af t e r  his d eat h. S ee 1 i d . a t
xv.
164. S ee 1 i d . at  xix-xx. 
165. S ee 1 i d . at  xxi-xxii.
166. S ee 1 i d . at  xx-xxii.
167. S ee 1 i d . at  xxii-xx iii; F A R RA N D, F R A MI N G, supra  note 161, at  124.
168. This  probably is why the F E D E R A L I S T P A P E RS  cam e to be so r elied u pon in
const ru in g the Constit ution. While they were documen ts of advocacy rath er th an
exposition , at  lea st  th ey h ad  bee n w ri tt en  for t he  mos t p ar t b y t wo si gn ifica n t
pa r t ic ipan t s in C onve nt ion d elib er at ions , Ma dis on a nd  Ha mi lton .
Con st it u t ion ; but  th ey p rov ided  a t bes t  a  sk ele ta l a ccoun t  of th e
pr oceedings  and  con ta ined some significan t ina ccur acies. The
notes  Rob er t  Yate s  h ad m ad e before lea ving t he Con vent ion in
ear ly J uly were pu blished in 1821, 16 2  yet t he  vas t ly  more
in forma t ive notes of James Madison remained closeted almost
two decades m ore.163 Rufu s Kin g organ ized a nd  revis ed h is
notes  somet ime a fter  1818, bu t t hey w ere  not  pu blish ed u nt il
1894.164 A spar se sca t t e r ing of fr agmen ta ry account s by a few
other delegates were found,165 but  other s were es sen t ia lly  los t
un t il l a t e in  the nin et een th  or ea rly in  th e t wen tie th  cent ur y.166
In  pa r t icu la r , seve ra l documen ts indisp en sa ble  to an  accura te
unders tand ing of th e Con ven t ion ’s a ct ion s concern ing Congress’
power re gar din g th e jud iciar y (includ ing very impor tan t
docum ent s from  th e Comm itt ee of Deta il) lay bur ied among the
p r ivat e pa per s of Ja mes  Wilson  in  the Libr a ry of t he H is tor ica l
Society of Pen n sylvania un til Max Farr and accessed and
publish ed th em for th e first t ime in 1911.167
Consequen t ly , la wye rs for  gen er a t ion s w er e con sign ed  to a
sor t  of foren sic “blind m an ’s blu ff.”168 Those  much  nearer  the
forma t ive per iod  were  fa r  less fa v or a bly situat ed th an  we, two
cen tur ies  l a ter ,  to unders tand  the s t ra teg ies , compromises , and
firm  res olves eviden t, bu t n ot a lways  obvious, in t he
Cons t it u t ion ’s  t erms .
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169. U.S. CO N S T . art . III, § 2, cl. 2.
170. F o r exa mp le, J us tice  Dou gla s wr ote  i n  1968,  “As respec t s our  appe lla te
jur isd icti on,  Congress may lar gely fashion it as  Congress  des ir es  by r ea son  of th e
express prov ision s of § 2, Ar t. I II. ” Fla st  v. Coh en , 392  U.S . 83, 1 09 (19 68) (Dou gl a s,
J ., concur r ing ).  L ikewi se c it in g t he E xcep t ions Cl ause,  ot her s have  sa id  “the
Con st itu tion  spe cifical ly gr an ts  to C ongr ess  th e pow er  to d et er mi ne  th e Cou rt ’s
appel la t e jurisdiction,” C. H ERM AN  P RITCHETT , CO N G R E S S  VE R S U S  TH E  SU P R E M E  COURT
The an alys is of the  Conven tion  pr oceedings pres en ted  here
is not  a s caven ging of “legisla tive  his tor y” t o con t rad ict  p la in
meaning , or even to clarify ambiguous t ext. The r ecords  of the
framing simply illuminat e wha t  the  words  of the  document
seem  pla in ly t o mea n  wh en  they a re r ea d w it hout  conven t ion a l
preconcept ions and ar e th oughtfully consider ed as  a  whole.  The
“necessa ry implication” premise for congres siona l con t rol of
in fer ior  cour t s h as a lways  been  a  sl ipsh od con st ruct ion  of the
Tr i bu n a ls  Clau se; it s sp ur iousn ess  is sim ply m ad e
incont est able  by th e r ecords  of the  fra min g. When  good
govern men t  an d t he  bless ing of judicial indepen dence ar e
enh an ced by fres h r ecour se t o th e t ext , the fact that lawyers for
gen er a t ion s have misunderstood its plain meaning is a lousy
excuse for per pet ua tin g mis ta kes . If it is  foolish to bind the
living to the  “fr aming int en t” of dead m en, it  is m ore foolish  to
persist in grave dist or t ion s of t he Const it u t ion ’s d es ign  for  no
bett er  r eason  than  tha t  m iscon cep t ion s h ave p reva ile d a  lon g
t ime.
D. T he “Excep ti ons” Clau se A llusion
The second false premise of Congress’ power  regard ing  the
judiciary is th e so-called Except ions Cla use  of Art icle  II I,  wh ich
provides, “[T]he supreme Court  shall have appellat e
Jur i sdict ion , bot h  as t o La w a nd F act , wi th  su ch  Excep t ion s,
a n d un der  su ch Regu lat ions a s t he  Congr ess  sh all m ak e.”1 6 9
This  clau se p er ta ins  only t o th e “supr em e Cour t,” not  to the
“inferior” ones. It  exp lici t ly con tem pla tes  more th an  th e subject
ma tt er  scope of appellate jurisdict ion ; however , as  with  th e
“tribunals” claus e its  app lica t ion  to ju r isdict ion  is  pa radigm at ic,
an d so tha t is t he pr incipal focus of th e discussion her e.
Vi r tua lly every modern  comm ent at or on th e law of federa l
cour t s assu mes  tha t  the  power  of Congress  to a l t er  and r egu lat e
Supreme Cour t  ju r isdiction a nd  pr act ice derives  from t his
Except ions Claus e;170 that  is why it  is comm only called t he
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1957-1960, at  122 (1 961),  or “t he  p ow e r  to mak e exception s to t he a ppella te
jur isd icti on  of this court is given by express  words ,” Ex parte McCa rd le,  74 U .S.  (7
Wall.) 506, 514 (1869). S ee also, e.g., RE D I S H , supra  not e 2, at  25; Gun th er, supra
no te 123, at 899-901.
Even  Professor Clinton mistakes the Exceptions Clause as th e pre mi se of
Congress’ power rega rdin g Sup rem e Cour t a ppella te ju risd iction. S ee Clint on, supra
no te 2, at  776-86 (1984). So a lso does J ohn  Ha rr ison, wh ose ar ticle, The Power of
Congress to L im it t he J ur isd ict ion of Federal Courts and th e Text of Article III, supra
no te 2, is an excellent at tem pt t o defend t he t ra ditiona l an d ort hodox (but  ha rdly
origina l o r  accu rat e ) unde r st and ing .
171. S ee, e.g., Rice, supra  note 8, at  195.
172. S ee, e.g., Fr an k W. Gr inn ell, Pr op osed  Am en dm en ts t o t he Con st it u tion: A
Reply to Former Justice Roberts, 35 A.B.A. J. 648, 650 (1949); Ratn er ,  supra  note 12,
a t  938, 957; C omment ,  R em oval  of S up rem e Cou rt A ppel lat e J ur isd icti on: A W eapon
Against  Obscenity?, 1969 DUKE  L.J . 291, 305-06, 309.
173. Eisen berg,  supra  not e 12 3, a t 5 16; see also id.  at 520-21.
174. S ee Ber ger, supra  note  123, at  806 (confessing t ha t “my r esea rch  me t  w ith
little  en th us ias m i n a cad em e”); see also RA O U L BE R G E R, CO N G R E S S  V. TH E  SU P R E M E
COURT  285-95 (1969). Berger  was n ot th e firs t  t o  a dv a nce th is th esis. S ee Hen ry J .
Merr y, Scope of the Supreme Court’s Appellate Ju risdiction: Historical Basis , 47 MI N N .
L. RE V. 53,  68 (1 962 ).
This  view  is d iscr edi te d, h owev er , by t he  fact  th at  th e Conve nt ion’s work ing t ext
included the E xceptions Clause even  before the words “bot h  a s  t o l aw and  fac t” were
added  to the a ppellate jur isdiction clause on August  27.
175. S ee, e.g., Tribe , supra  note 12, at  135.
176. Sym posium  Proceedi ngs , 27 VILL . L. RE V. 1042 , 104 3 (198 2) (Pr ofess or
Char les E.  Rice  com me nt in g).
“exception s power .”171 However, that clause is not the source of
th i s power; and t he source of a power, of cour se, is cr ucia l to
ascertaining its intrinsic  l imits.
Commenta tor s ha ve spun  th rea ds  of a rgumen t  for  extrinsic
lim it a t ion s to t ra mm el t his  “excep t ions p ower .” Som e, for
examp le, ha ve claim ed t ha t t he E xception s Cla us e only
au th orizes “procedura l” regulations,172 or “pru den t s tep s wh ich
help  avoid ca se over loads .”173 Some have  sugges ted  tha t  the
clause  wa s inclu de d on ly t o add res s con ce r n s over t he p ossible
d isp lacement  of jur y findin gs of fact ,  and  tha t  the refore  it
permi ts r e st r ict ing Supreme Cour t  r eview on ly of fact s , not  of
law.174
Som e h ave ar gued  th at  th e Except ions Cla us e imp licitly
requ ires  tha t  a  res iduum of app ell a te ju r isdict ion  be left in  th e
Supreme Cour t .175 One commentat or said, for exam ple, “I  th ink
it  i s a rguable tha t  if Congress a tt empt ed to wholly oblitera te
Supr eme C ou r t  app ellate jur isdiction tha t it would ceas e to be
an  exception to jurisdict ion  with in  the mean ing  of the
clau se.”176 Th is , h owever , is  no ba si s for  ch a l lenging any
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177. S ee J ess e H . Ch oper , The S upreme Court and  the Political Branches:
Democratic T heor y an d P ract ice,  122 U. P A. L. RE V. 810, 853 (1974); Sage r ,  s u pra no t e
9, at 32.
178. Wil li am Van Alst yne, A Cr iti cal G ui de t o Ex pa r t e McCardle, 15 AR I Z. L.
RE V. 229 , 25 8-59  n. 95 (1 973 ).
179. Ra tner , supra not e 9, a t 2 02; see also id.  at 172.
Atto rney Gene ra l William F ren ch Sm ith  in 1982 e nd or sed a  compar able t hes is
under  ye t  anot her  rubr ic: “co re c on st it u t iona l funct ions.” See Hear ings Be fore  the
Subcommittee on Separation  of Pow ers of the Senate Comm ittee on the J udiciary,  90 th
Cong.,  2d  Se ss . (19 68).
F o r judicial applications of one or another  such th eory, see Ba rt lett  v. B owen , 816
F.2d 695, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254,
257 (2d Cir. 1 948). S ee also Chope r, supra  not e 177, a t 852 -53; Van Alst yne, supra
no te 178, at 258-59 n.95.
180. Com pa re, e.g., Rat ner , supra  not e 9, at  160-61, 173, 201; Ra tner , supra  no t e
12, at  935-3 6; and  Trib e, supra  no te 12, at 13 5 (“ess en tia l rol e”); with  Eisen berg,
supra  not e 12 3, a t 5 05-07 , 513 , 532 -33 (“cent ra l” role s a nd  “vita l” fun ction s); Mor ri s
D. Forkosch , T h e  Except ion s an d R egul ati ons  Cla us e of Ar ticl e III  an d a  Pers on’s
Constitutional Rights: Can the Latter be Limited by Congressional Power Under the
Former?, 72 W. VA. L. RE V. 238 , 24 5, 2 55-5 6 (19 70) (“irr educible  min imu m su bsta nt ive
pow er ”); and Sage r, supra  n o t e 9 , a t  42-43, 70, 82. Professors Ratner a nd Redish
agreed  tha t Sager’s thesis is “sort of a modification of Professor Rat ner’s theory. It
is like a  floa t in g e ssen t ia l funct ions thes is .” S ym posium  Proceedings , 27 VILL . L. RE V.
1042, 106 8-69  (198 2).
Som e have tried to avoid the embarrassm ents of specificity by opining sim ply th at
excep tion s or re gula tions  migh t a t som e un certa in point  c r os s  a  forbidde n lin e. S ee,
e.g., J am es J . Len oir, Congressional Control Over the Ap pel late Jurisdiction of the
S uprem e Court, 5 KAN . L. RE V. 16, 41 (1956); Mese rve, supra  note 123, at  160;
Taylor , supra  note 123, at  200.
181. S ee 1 WILLI AM  W. CR O S SK E Y, P O L IT I CS  A ND  T H E  CONSTITUTION  610-18 (19 53);
Choper , supra  not e 17 7, a t 8 53; see also Van Alst yne, supra  note 178, at  258-59 n.95.
par t icu la r exce pt ion  or  any par t icu la r  combin a t ion  of exce pt ion s
shor t  of a total divestment . Others have suggested tha t
exce pt ion s to the  Su preme Court’s appellate ju r isdict ion  are
valid  on ly insofa r  a s  t ha t  Cour t ’s  original jur isdict ion is
enlarged;177 but  as P rofessor Wil lia m Van Als tyn e p oin ted  out ,
“the  en t i re h i story  of the  clause” con t ravenes th i s sugges t ion .178
There ar e varia tions on t he t h eme tha t  except ions  may not
“nega te the essential functions of the Supreme  Cour t ,”179 bu t
those playing th is th eme e m ba r r ass t hem selves by small, yet
significan t disa greemen ts over  what t hose “essential functions”
might  be.180
Som e a r gue tha t exceptions ma y not operate so as to
preclude any  federal question case bein g hea rd  by som e federal
t r ibuna l or  to p reven t  any  par t icu la r  federa l question  from
bein g ad dr ess ed a t a ll by th e Supreme  Cour t .181 Ye t  tha t
pres um es a  dis tinction between federal question cases and
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182. S ee Clint on, supra  note 2, at  749-50, 793.
183. Clin ton  emphasi zes  the comma sepa ra t ing the phrases “such exceptions” and
“such  regulat ions” and a rgues t hat  “such exceptions” refers back to the cases
designated  in the preceding  sen te nce  for S up re me  Cou rt  original juris diction. On ly
the “such ” con join ed  to t he w or d “r eg u la t ions,” h e c la im s, r efer s to a nyt h in g “t he
Congress sha ll ma ke.” See id.  at  779-80. This r eason ing, howeve r, is  too casu i st i c t o
persua de.
184. Redi sh , Congressional Power, supra  note 123, at  907.
185. Yakus v . Uni t ed  S t a t es, 321 U.S . 414, 472-73 (1944) (Rutledge , J., dis sen tin g
on  oth er  gr ou nd s) (e mp ha sis  ad de d).
186. S ee, e.g., Ca rl  A. An der son, T he Gover nm ent  of Cou rts : Th e Pow er of
Congress Under Article III, 68 A.B.A. J. 686, 686 -88, 690; Ba tor , supra  no te 11 , a t
1032, 1034-35; Gu nt her , supra  note 123, a t 908-09, 920; Christopher T. Han dman,
The Doctrine of Political Accountability and S uprem e Court J urisd iction: Applyin g a
N ew External Constraint to Congress’ Exceptions Cla us e Pow er, 106 YALE L.J . 197,
200 (1996); Redish , Con gres sion al P ower , supra  not e 123, at 90 2-03; Rice, supra  no t e
8, at  195-96; Owen  J . Robert s, N ow I s t he T im e: Fort ify in g th e S up rem e Cou rt’s
Independence, 35 A.B.A. J. 1, 4  (1949); Wechsler , supra  note 123, at  1005-06.
A few of t he se,  how eve r, h ave  ven tu re d ca vea ts  aga ins t a rb itr ar y dis crim ina tion .
S ee, e.g., Bat or, supra  not e 11, a t 103 4; Gun th er, supra  not e 123, a t  916; Rice, supra
no te 8, a t 1 96; see als o Taylor , supra  note 123, at  201.
ot h e r s on  the Ar t icle  II I m en u—a dist in ct ion  tha t  the
Except ions Clau se does  not  int ima te a t a ll. P rofessor  C lin ton
avoided  th i s fl aw by saying tha t  no Article III case (federa l
que st ion or  other ) can  be  “excep ted ” from  Su pr em e Cour t
review un less provision is mad e for det er m i n in g  it  in  som e
other feder al t ribu na l.182 However , wh ile  tha t  conclusion is
cor rect  for  di ffer en t  rea son s exp la in ed  below,  Profes sor  Clin ton
based  h i s conclusion  on  a  redund a n t , ungrammat ica l , and
un pers ua sive const ru ction of th e Exceptions Clau se.183
It  rea lly  se em s q u it e r em arkable  tha t  so m any for ens ic
filam ent s have b een  dr awn  from wh at  has b een  ca lled “a
r e la t ively un am biguou s . . . pr ovision.”184 By fa r  the
predominan t view, however, is that “Congress has plenary
power to con fer  or w it hh old a pp ella te ju r is d ict ion.”185 Because
the Exceptions Clau se cont ains  no qualifying term s wha tever,
most commenta tor s  have  concluded tha t  Congress ’ power  to
govern  Su pr eme  Cour t a ppea ls is s ubject  to no in tr ins ic
cons t itu t iona l cons t r a in t .186 This st a tem en t  by Will ia m Van
Alstyn e is t ypical:
T h e p o we r  t o m a k e  e x ce p t io n s  t o S u p r e m e  C ou r t  a p p e llat e
ju ris dict ion  i s  a  p l e n a r y  p o w e r .  I t i s  g iven  in  expres s  t e r ms  a nd
w it h ou t  l im ita t i on ,  r e ga r d l es s  of t h e  m o r e  m od e s t  u s es  t h a t
migh t  have  been  an t i cipa t ed  an d ,  hope fu l ly ,  gene ra l ly  to  be
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187. Van  Alstyn e, supra  note 178, at  260.
188. S ee, e.g., Bat or, supra  not e 11, a t 103 4; Gun th er, supra  note 123, a t 916;
Rice, supra  not e 8, at  196; Ta ylor, supra  note 123, at  201.
r e spec ted  by C ong re ss a s a  m at te r of en ligh te ne d p olicy on ce
the  power  w as  g ra n ted ,  a s  i t  wa s ,  t o  t he  fu l le s t  ex t en t . 187
The pr edomin a n t  view, in other words, is that  the bounds are
political,  not  cons t it u t iona l; a t  mos t , t he re migh t  be some
nebulous in h ibi t ion  aga in st  a rbit r a ry d iscr im in a t ion ,188 bu t
even  that  i s extrinsic to the purpor ted  power  it se lf.
~~~
In  a l l the  decades  of redundan t  deba te over Congres s’ power
regard ing Sup rem e Cou r t  ju risdiction no one seems  ever to
have n ot iced th at  th e Except ions Cla us e re ally is  not  a  gran t  of
power at  all! Cert ainly th ere  a re “express  ter ms ” in t he
Con st it u t ion  tha t  g ive Congress  power  to make laws regard ing
t he Cour t’s app ella te  jur isdict ion. H owever , th ose expr ess
t e rms ar e not  to be foun d in  t he Exceptions Clau se; they
app ear , rat her , in th e Necessar y and  Pr oper Claus e.
For  pe rson s com mit ted  bot h  to the s ep ara t ion  of powers  and
to the pr inciple of enum era ted powers , it would ha ve been
rem ar ka bly offhanded  to g ran t  to one  branch  hegemony  over
an other  by two words placed as s ubordin at e te r m s in
prepos it iona l phr ases . The fram ers wer e oth erw ise car eful t o
a r t icu l at e gr an t s of p ower in  s t ra igh t forward , unequ ivoca l
terms; for  them  to best ow by s uch  in di rect ion  a  power  su ffi cien t
to cr ipp le  a  coord ina te  branch  would have been  very p eculia r.  It
must  be r eme mbe red  th at  whe th er a ny in ferior  fede ra l cou r t s
sh ould exis t is  discr etion ar y un der  th e Tr ibun als  Clau se; an d if
in fer ior  cour t s  did not  exi st ,  no case “excepted” from Supreme
Cou r t  appella te r eview could ever be hea rd in  any federal
t r ibuna l at  all! Thu s, if the Exceptions Clau se rea lly were a
gran t of power , it  wou ld  lie  in  Con gr es s’ discret ion  to for eclos e
all access t o any fed er a l cou r t , excep t  in  the t in y h andfu l of
cases within  th e Supr eme Cour t’s “original” jurisdiction. The
combin a t ion  of the Tr ibun als  a nd  Except ions  Clauses  thus
wou ld  en able  Con gr es s t o a ll bu t  aboli sh  the ju dicia l br anch!
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189. U.S. CO N S T . a rt . II I, § 2 , cl. 2  (em ph as is a dd ed ).
190. S ee id . art. II I, § 1; cf. Art. XI, § 1, of th e Comm itt ee Rep ort , i n  2 F A R RA N D,
supra  no te  61,  at  177 , 18 6-87 ; Art . 14  of th e Wilson docu men t, in  2 i d . at 129, 172
(the first para graph of Art. 14). The judicial section of Wilson’s document a lluded t o
“such  inferior  Court s as  sha ll, when  necess ar y, from tim e to time,  be constitut ed by
the Legislature”; but the power t o creat e th ose court s was  conferre d elsewh ere in
appropr ia t e rh et orica l form : “The  Legi sl a tu re . . . shall ha ve the power . . . To
cons t it u t e tribun als inferior to the Supr eme Cour t . . .  .” Art. VII , § 1 of t he
Commi t t ee Repor t, in  2 F A R RA N D, supra  no te 61 , a t  177, 181-82 (following the first
paragra ph  of Art. IX, § 8 of the  Wilson d ocume nt , see 2 i d . a t  129, 168.) This
rhe tor ica l structure, of course, survives in the Constitut ion as  adopt ed. S ee U.S.
CO N S T . art . III, § 1, & art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
191. S ee U.S. C O N S T . art . I, § 8, cl. 9.
192. S ee, e.g., Lea di ng  Cas es, supra note 8, at  277.
This  biza r re p oss ibi lit y im pe ls  a  closer  look  a t  the clause ’s
conte xt  and  rhetor icica l form. The E xceptions Clause a ppear s
in  a  sect ion  that d ea ls, not  with  the  powers  of Congress  bu t
with  th e jud iciar y; a nd it  ad joins la ngu age  wh ich sa ys
imp era tively  tha t  exce pt  wh er e it  has or igina l ju r isdict ion  “the
[S]upreme Cour t  shall have appellat e [j]uris diction .”189
Cer ta in ly the  con joined  clause—“with  such  Except ions , and
un der  such Regula tions a s th e Congres s sha ll mak e”—does
tem per  th at  imp er at ive. H owever , t o vi t ia t e  a  manda tory
dir ective  by conjoining lan guage conferring u nqu alified
discr etion  to flout t he directive would, at the very least,
cons t itu te  ve ry cur ious  d ra ft ing.
Ther efore,  it is enlight ening t o compar e t h e  E xcep t ion s
Clause with another  clause in Article III w h ich r esem bles it  in
rhe tor ica l form; the similarity provides an  impor t an t  clue to
meaning . Tha t oth er claus e ma kes  r efe ren ce t o “such  In fer ior
Cour t s” as t he Congr es s m ay “from  t im e t o t im e” ord a in  and
es tabl ish .190 No one ever has  imagin ed th at  th is clause is the
source of Con gr es s’ power  to cons t it u te in fer ior  t ribunals; it
obviously only alludes  to tha t  power ,  which  is  conferr ed by a
differen t  claus e, l ocat ed in  Art icle I an d wr itt en in
s t r a ight forward power, granting terms. 191 I t  wou ld ce r t ainly b e
odd  i f the  same rhetor ica l  form employed  in  tha t  ins tance
mer ely to allude, were used in the Exceptions Clause to actua l ly
confer  a power .  I t  is  thus e sp ecia lly  ir onic t ha t  pr opon en ts of
the convent iona l misconception describe their s as a  “litera l
inter pret at ion” or “litera l read ing” of th e Exceptions Clau se.192
As I have explained a bove, before t he Det ail Commit tee set
to work, the Delegates ha d already resolved that  t he s ubject
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193. F o r an equivalent conclusion, reached by a less s t r e a ml ined  a rgumen t  and
stat ed less blu nt ly, see Clint on, supra  note 2, at  741.
194. 3 U. S. (3  Da ll.) 3 21 (1 796 ).
195. The quest ion  in  Wiscart was whether th e Court could review issues of fact
a s well as is sue s of law. Id . at  324. Sect ion 22 of th e J udicia ry Act, see Act of Sept .
24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.  73, provided that federal circuit court judgments a nd decrees
could be r evie wed  onl y “up on a  wr it  of er ror ,” a p roce ss  of com mon  la w or igin  wh ich
ma tt er  compet ence of th e feder al ju diciar y m u s t  be
cons t itu t iona l ly defined; an d th ey afterwa rds rea ffi rmed  tha t
res olut ion by lopsided  votes s pecifically aga ins t  legisla tive
con t rol of ju r isdiction. It therefore seems likely that, had t he
delegates  eve n  conceived  it  pos sible  to con st rue  the Except ions
Clause as  emp owerin g Congre ss t o block  from the  cour t s  any
cases em br aced  by t he s ubject  ma tt er  list , at  leas t s ome pa ssin g
comm ent  would ha ve been ma de. There is n o hint, h owever,
tha t even a whisper was stirred.
For  th e Convention delegat es to casua lly empower Congress
to ren de r  a lm ost  use les s t he on ly fede ra l cou r t  the Const it u t ion
actually  req uir es, wh ile rep eat edly a nd  emp ha tica lly rejectin g
pr oposals  for  comparable au thor i ty over  in fe r ior  cour t s  tha t
might  never even exist, would have requ ired of th em somewha t
g rea t e r ina t t en t ion  or  incompet ence t ha n ca n be  credibly
supposed. It  wou ld  have b een  foolis h  for  them t o labor over
se lect ion , salary, and t enu re pr ovisions t o briga de jud icial
“indepen dence” if Congres s could su bjuga te t he ju dicial b r a n ch
anyway by wh at ever  combin at ion of “except ions” migh t s u it  its
fancy. One n eed not a tt ribut e genius t o the fra mer s to doubt
th ey were so st up id a s t o give Congres s, by m ere  words  of allu-
sion , a license to avulse t he r am par ts of judicial indep e n de n ce
they had so carefully built up.193
~~~
The mistake of regard ing  the Except ions  Clause  as a  sou rce
of congre ssion al p ower a rose  ea rly.  Any in fer en ce of le git im acy
from age,  however , is  rebuffed  by t he fa ct  tha t  th ere were two
versions of the err or, each cont ra dicting th e other .
One is repr esent ed by Chief Ju stice Ellsworth ’s 1796
response to J us tice Wilson’s sugges tion  in  Wiscar t v . Da uchy194
tha t  app ell a te ju r isdict ion  ves t s in  the S upr em e Cour t
au tomat ica l ly , withou t  need for  st at ut ory conferr al. 195 E ll swor th
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gener ally pr ec lu de d r ev ie w o f fa ct s. 1  Sta t . 7 3,  85 -86.  Th e w or d “a pp ea l” a t  tha t  t ime ,
on  th e oth er h an d, was  frequ ent ly used  in its  techn ical se n s e,  co n t emplatin g a review
process of civil l aw  ra th er  th an  comm on l aw  ori gin  wh ich  involved review of facts and
law alike. As an ear ly commenta tor explained,
The wr it  of error s ubm its t o the  revision  of the Su prem e Cour t only t he
law; bu t  t he r emed y by a pp ea l br in gs b efor e t he  Su pr em e Cou rt  th e fa cts
a s well as t he la w. It m ay corr ect on a n a ppea l, not only wr ong conclu sion s
of law from the facts, but wr ong conclusions of fact from the evidence.
SE R G E AN T , supra  note 44, at  43.
A d i st inct ion  be tween  fac t  and law  for r eview purposes  had been  made  in  the
Paterson  P lan , which cont emp lat ed only a  single n at ional cour t wit h vir tu ally all
lit iga tion  commen cing in st at e court s. It p rovide d  t h at in  re view ing  st at e cou rt
proceedings  to e nfor ce n at iona l re gu lat ions  of re ven ue  an d com me rce , th e n at iona l
cour t  sh ould  ha ve p ower  “for th e cor re ction  of all e rr ors, both in  law & fact in
render ing judgment,” but that in a ll other pr oceedings the n ational court’s review
should  rea ch er ror s of law only, n ot er ror s of fact. Ma dison ’s Not es, i n  1 F A R RA N D,
supra  note 61, at 242, 243-44 (discussing Pr opositions 2 and 5 of the Pa te r s on  P lan ).
The Comm it t ee of Detail Report, in contrast , had used t he word “appellate”
withou t elaboration. However, to confirm wha t J ames  Wilson (himself a Committee
Member ) said was in tend ed, the delega tes on Augus t 27 ad d e d t h e  p h rase  “both  as
to Law an d fact.” 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  424, 431.
Opponen t s of  ra t i fica tion  then  cl a imed  tha t t he  ph rase  “both  a s  t o l aw and  fac t”
portended  appe llate  judge r eview of jury-tr ied issu es of fact, abr idging the r igh t  t o
ju ry tr ia l. Th e fir st  Con gr es s a pp rov ed t wo r es pon se s t o th at  conce rn. One w as  the
Seven th Amendm ent clau se regar ding reexa mina tion of facts “tried by a jur y”; but
tha t  was ir releva n t  i n  Wiscart, beca us e it  wa s a n e qu ity  cas e, of cou rs e t ri ed w ith out
a  jury. The other was section 22 of the Judiciary Act, which simply omitted t o
provide for a ny  ap pel lat e pr ocess  excep t w ri t of e rr or.
Wils on  conce ded  th at  th e Se ven th  Ame nd me nt  ma de t he  ru le d iffer en t for
comm on law cases; but for equity (like Wiscart)  and  othe r  non-comm on law matters,
he ar gu ed t ha t t re at ing  th e J ud icia ry  Act a s con fini ng  Su pr em e Cou rt  re view  to t he
writ  of error p rocess wou ld be un constit ut ional.
While  Wiscart was in equity, Wilson was most concern ed for  a d iffer en t cla ss of
non-ju ry cases, insisting, “it is of momen t  t o our d omest ic tra nqu ility, an d foreign
relations, th at  cau se s of Adm ir al ty  an d Ma ri ti me  jur isd ict ion , sh oul d, in  poin t of fa ct
as well  as  of law , ha ve a ll t he  au th orit y of th e de cision  of our  high est  tr ibun al.” 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327. Dist r i ct  court  adm ira lty an d ma rit ime cau ses wer e revie wable
in  the circuit cou rt s b y “ap pe al ” ra th er  th an  “wri t of e rr or ” (secs . 9,  21 of t he
Jud ici a ry Act), but tha t Act did not mention Su preme Cour t review of such causes
specifically. It did say th e Su p r eme Court could review circuit court judgments and
decrees in “civil actions” (as well as in equity) by “writ of error,” but Wilson claimed
“civil ac tions” was “in cont ra distin ction t o causes  of Marit ime a nd Adm ira lty
jur isdiction .” Id . at 325.  On  this view, the Act said nothing a t all about Su preme
Cou rt  r eview of  admira l ty and m a r iti me  ma tt er s; bu t W ilson —an  ad vocat e of n at iona l
au thor i ty in th at r ealm sin ce his own a d m ira l ty l aw p ract i ce  du r ing  the
Confederation—refused to find the Supreme Court th erefore powerless.
This  is th e rea son wh y Wilson m ain ta i n ed  in  Wiscart th at  th e Co ns ti tu ti on  is s elf-
execut ing with respect to the Supr eme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. He argued:
It  is tr ue, t he a ct of Congress  ma kes n o provision  o n  the su bject; but , it is
equa lly tru e, that  the constitu tion (which we must su ppose to be alwa ys in
the view of the Le gislat ur e) had  previou sly declar ed th at  in cert ain
enum erat ed cases, including admiralty an d ma r i t im e c as e s,  “t h e  Su p r em e
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ E N G - F I N A. W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
75] CONGRE SS’ LIMITS AND TH E J UDICIARY 129
Cou rt  shall h ave appella te jur isdiction, both as to law a nd  fact , wit h s uch
exceptions, and u nder su ch regulations a s the Congress s hall ma ke.” The
appel la t e jur isd icti on, t he re fore , flowed , as  a con seq ue nce , from  this  source;
no r had t he Leg is la t u re  an y occas ion t o do, wh at  th e Con st itu tion  ha d
already  done.
Id . at 326. And with regard to the Exceptions Clause, Wilson said:
Th e Legislature m ight, indeed, have ma de exceptions, and introduced
regu la t ions up on t he  su bject ; bu t a s it  ha s n ot d one  so,  the case  r ema ins
upon  th e st ron g gr oun d of t he  Con st itu tion , wh ich i n g en er al t er ms , an d on
genera l prin ciples, provides  an d au th orises [sic] an  appe al; t he  p rocess  tha t ,
in  its ver y na tu re, (as  I ha ve before re ma rk ed) im plie s a  re -exa mi na tion  of
the fact, as well as th e law.
Id . at 326-27.
Wilson  even  su gges te d t ha t a tt em pt ed s ta tu tor y cur ta ilm en ts  of Su pr em e Cou rt
appel la t e jur isd ict ion w oul d be  void, s ayi ng , “Even , in dee d, if a  posi tiv e r est ri ction
existed by law, it would, in my judgmen t, be superseded  by th e su per ior a ut hor ity  of
the con st it u t iona l p rovis ion .” Id . at  325. Althou gh Wilson  d id  not  fu r the r  el abora te
th is sugges t ion , a s  t o any  a t t empt  to pr eclud e S up re me  Cou rt  ap pe lla te  re vie w of a n
Article  III  ma tt er  for wh ich n o alt er na te  fede ra l foru m is provided, th is s ug ges tion
is consis tent  with  th e Necess ar y an d Pr oper Cla use  prem ise of Congres s’ releva nt
powe r—for  ins ofar  as  th ey cu rt ail ed,  ra th er  th an  “carr yin g in to E xecu tion ,” the scope
of jud icial  powe r con te mp lat ed b y Art icle I II,  pu rp ort ed “exce pt ions ” or “reg ula tion s”
could not be  sup port ed un der t ha t clau se. (Wilson, of course, h ad figur ed prom inen tly
in  the i nven tion of th e Necess ar y an d Pr oper Cla use , an d su rely u nder stood its
mea nin g.)
196. While  Ell swor th  did  not  spe ll ou t in  so m an y wor ds t ha t C ongr ess ’ power
to ma ke  ru les  ab out  Su pr em e Cou rt  ap pel lat e ju ri sdi ction  d e rives  from  t he  Excep t ions
Clause,  th at  seem s to h ave bee n h is pre mise . At least  he did  not a ssociate  it wit h  the
Necessa ry and Proper Clause; that is m a n ifest from  his st at emen t t ha t confinin g
review to th e writ  of error p rocess “ma y, inde ed, be im prope r a nd in conven ient ,”
Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 328. The national ban k controversy five years ea rlier ha d
prom inen tly  and per man ently associated th e words “convenient” and  “p rope r” with  the
Necessa ry an d Pr oper C lau se. S ee Alexan der  Ha milt on, Fina l Ver sion  of an  Opi ni on
on  the Constitut ionality of an Act to Establi s h  a  B an k , in  8 TH E  P APERS OF
AL E XA N DE R H AMILTON 97 (Haro ld C. S yr et t e d.,  196 5); T ho ma s J effe r s on , Opi ni on on
the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank, in  19 TH E  P A P E RS
OF  TH O M A S  J EFFE RSON  225  (J .P . Boy d e d.,  197 4).
ar gued to th e cont r a r y,  say ing  tha t  i f Congress  had not
exe r cised th e power he a tt ribut ed to th e Exceptions Clau se,196
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197. E l lswor th  first exploded Wilson’s premise t hat  the J udiciary Act was silent
abou t  Supreme Cour t  rev iew of  adm ira lty an d ma rit ime cas es. Th e ter m “civil
actions” in t he  ap plica ble s ect ion  of th e Act, Ellswort h sa id, “was us ed by th e
Legislature,  not to distinguish bet ween Admiralty caus es, and oth er civil actions, but
t o excl ud e t he  ide a of r em ovin g ju dgm en ts  in  cri mi na l pr ose cut ion s, fr om  an  in ferior
to a su perior  tr ibun al.” Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 328. Indeed, th e Act au thorized
S u p re m e Cour t  wr it  of e r ror  r ev ie w s pe cifica ll y of ju dg men ts in  “civi l a ct ions” th a t
had r eached  ci r cu i t  co u r ts “by a pp ea l fr om a  dis tr ict  cour t, ” Act of Se pt . 24,  178 9, ch .
20, § 22, 1 Stat . 73, 84, and t he onl y  dis tr ict  cour t p roce edi ng s t ha t cou ld r ea ch
circuit  cour ts  by “ap pea l,” ra th er  th an  by “wr it of e rr or, ” w e r e admira l ty and
m a r i ti m e proceed ings. See id.  § 21. Ellsworth  rea soned  that  t he  ru le  fo r  admi ra lty
and mar itime cases mu st be th e same a s for equity sui ts  because  the same  st a tu tory
t e r m s dealt with both types of cases.
198. Wiscart, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 327. Furth er,
It  is o bs e r ved,  th at  a w ri t of e rr or i s a  pr oces s m ore  lim it ed i n i ts  effect s
than  an  appe al: but  . . . if a n  a p p el la t e jurisdiction can only be exercised
by th is cou rt  confor ma bly t o su ch r egu lat ion s as  a re made by the Congress,
and if Congre ss h as p res cribed  a wr it of err or, and no ot he r m ode , by w hi ch
it  can  be e xer cise d, s til l, I s ay,  we a re  bou nd  to p u r s u e  t h at  mode ,  and can
neither  ma ke, n or a dopt, a not her . The  law m ay, in deed , be im prope r  and
inconvenient; but  it is of more  impor ta nce, for a ju dicial det erm ina t ion, to
ascer ta in  what  the law is, th an t o speculate upon wha t it ought t o be.
Id . at 328.
199. Fac t an d law a like wer e tr iable  i n  th e dist rict cour ts; m oreover, bot h a like
were reviewable in the circuit courts on “appeal.” Ellsworth reasoned tha t,
sur ely, i t  cannot be deemed a denia l of justice, tha t a m an sh all not be
permit ted  t o  try  his  cau se t wo or  th re e t im es ov er . If h e h as  one
opport un ity  for  th e t ri al  of al l pa rt s of h is case, justice is satisfied; and even
if th e de cision  of th e Cir cuit  Cou rt  ha d be en  ma de fin al,  no d e n ia l  of  ju sti ce
could be im put ed t o our gover nm ent  . . . .
Id . at 329.
t h e Cour t wou ld h ave h ad  no ap pella te ju ris diction a t a ll.197  H e
noted  tha t
t h e ap pella te  jur isdict ion  is  .  . .  g iven  “with  su ch  excep t ions ,
a n d  un de r  such  r egu la t ions , as  th e Con gr ess  sh all  m a k e .” H e r e
t h e n , i s  t h e  gr o u n d ,  a n d  t h e  o n l y g r o u n d , on  w h ich  w e  ca n
su st ain  an  ap pea l. If Con gr ess  ha s pr ovide d n o ru le  t o  r eg u la t e
ou r  p roceed ings ,  we  canno t  exe rc i se a n  a pp ella te  ju ris dict ion ;
a n d  if t h e  r u l e  is  p r o v id e d ,  w e  ca n n o t  d e p a r t  f r o m  i t .  T h e
q u es tion , th er efore , on t he  const itu tion al p oint  of an  ap pella te
ju ris dict ion , is s im ply , w h e th e r  C o n g r e s s h a s  e s t a b l is h e d  a n y
ru le  fo r  r egu la t ing  i t s  exe rc i se?198
Ell swor th  was  sa t is fi ed  in  Wiscart t ha t  “no d en ia l of ju st ice”
resu lted  from the  sta tu tory  lacun a h e found , for  the  resu lt ing
gap  in Supreme Court competence did not leave the part ies
wit hou t  a  fede ra l forum.199 He so firmly rejected Ju st ice
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If i t  were  to appear ,  E ll swor th  added,  tha t  the  sta tut e failed  to a fford  even  one
federa l cour t  hear ing in  a  case  contem plated  by the Constitu tion for the federal
judiciar y, so that  it “would amoun t to a den ial of justice, wou ld be  oppres sively
in ju r ious to individuals, or would be productive of any genera l mischief, I should then
be dispos ed t o re sor t t o an y oth er  ra tion al e xpos iti on of t he  law , wh ich w oul d n o t  be
att ended  with  th ese d epr ecat ed conse que nces.” Id. But  even t ha t would  drive h im
only to a reint erpret ation of the stat ute.
200. S ee Tu rn er  v. B an k of N or th  Ame ri ca,  4 U .S.  (4 Da ll.) 8 , 11  (179 8).
201. S ee Un it ed  St at es  v. M or e, 7  U. S. (3  Cr an ch) 1 59,  171  (180 5).
202. As a Congress man  in 1800, John  Marsh all h ad t ake n t he view t ha t Art icle
III is se lf-ex ecu ti ng  re ga rd in g t he  ju ri sd ict ion  eve n o f in ferior  court s, sugge stin g t h a t
infe ri or  federal courts would have had jurisdiction in admiralty and m ari t i m e m a t t e r s
even if no sta tu te h ad con ferr ed it . S ee 10 ANNALS  O F  CO N G. 614  (180 0).
203. F rom the  op in i on  Jus t i ce  Chase  wro te th ree  yea r s  la t e r  in  Turner  v . Bank
of N orth  Am erica , 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799), one might  infer tha t he sh ared
El lswor th ’s rat ionale.
On  the  othe r  han d , J u s t ice Cu sh ing  pr oba bly d id n ot. E ven  befor e E llsw ort h h ad
joined  the Court, Cush ing had agreed w it h  Wilson th at t he judicial power is “given
by th e con st it ut ion ” (i.e., v es ts  by s elf-e xecu t ing force) at  least  sufficiently t ha t t he
Cou rt  could pr escrib e ru les for se rvice of pr ocess wit hou t st at ut ory a ut hor ity. S ee
Chish olm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466, 469 (1793). If he th u s  d is a greed with
E l lswor th  an d ye t s ha re d E lls wor th ’s con clusion in Wiscart,  it  seems  l ike ly  tha t
Cush ing held a view like that  which John  Marsh all articulat ed six years later .
We k n ow  fr om  J enn in gs v . T he B rig  Pers ever ence , 3 U.S. (3 Da ll.) 3 36,  337  (179 7),
tha t  Ju stice P at ers on ha d agr eed wit h Wilson  in Wiscart, b u t  a ft erwa rds  chan ged his
view. We do not k now, howeve r, wh eth er h e chan ged his  view  b y a dopt ing E l lswor th ’s
rat ionale, or by endorsing instead t he rat ionale articulated b y M a r sha l l i n  More,
whe re Pa te r son  joined  s il en t ly aga in .
204.
Wilson ’s not ion of a  se lf-execu t in g Art icle I II  jur isdict ion ,
however, th at  th ree year s lat er h e adh ered  to his  view in t he
face of a  s t a tu tory  gap  tha t left  some Ar t i cle I I I cases  with  no
feder al foru m a t a ll.200
The second ea rly ver sion of th e er ror  took a s it s st ar tin g
point, by con t r a s t , t he  ve ry not ion  tha t  E ll swor th  so adaman t ly
rejected: Ju stice Wilson’s self-executing view of Article III.
Chief Jus t i ce Ma rsh a ll a r t icu la ted  th is  ver sion  in  an  opin ion  for
the Court  in 1805;201 bu t  there  is  no reason  to th ink i t  was new
at  t hat  tim e, eith er t o Mar sh all h ims elf 202 or to others . While a
ma jor i ty had sha red  Chief Ju stice Ellsworth ’s conclu sion  in
Wiscart nin e years b efor e, t he r ep or t  of tha t  case  doe s n ot
in dica te which  Ju s t ices  (if a ny) h ad e ndor se d E lls wor th’s
rationale;203 and  some of the sam e J ust ices who supp orted Ch ief
Jus t i ce Ellsworth ’s conclusion, lat er  join ed  the 1805 op in ion  of
Mar sh all  with  its  irr econcilably differen t r at iona le. Mar sh all’s
consider able  talent was n ot  a t  or igina l th inking,204 and  the
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[Marshall’s] pecu l ia r  foren sic skill was excellence not at origina l, but at
compre hen sive an d sy st em at ic ar gu me nt at ion.  A collea gu e [J oseph St or y],
twen ty year s int ima tely fam iliar w ith  his wor k, wr ote th at  Mar sha ll’s
“expos it i ons of const itu tion al la w . . . rem ind u s of some m ight y river  . . .
wh ich , gat her ing in it s cours e th e contr ibut ions of man y tr ibut ar y streams,
pour s at last its o wn  c u r rent  int o th e ocean , deep, clea r, a nd ir res ista ble.”
Hence one can find in Marshall’s Marbury  opinion [for exa mple ]  the ideas
and eve n  th e ph ra ses  of oth er s: n ot on ly of H am ilt on, b ut  als o of Mad ison ,
St . George Tucker, an d other Virginians, like Roane an d—yes—even
J effer son .
David  E. E ngda hl, John  Marsh all’s ‘J effer son ian ’ Con cept  of J ud icia l R eview , 42 DUKE
L.J . 279 , 33 0-31  (199 2).
205.
[W]h en  th e con st itu tion  ha s giv en  congr ess  powe r t o lim it t he  exe rcis e of
our  jurisdiction, and to make regulations respecting its exercis e ; and
congress, under  tha t  power , .  . .  has  sa id  in  w h a t  cas es a  wr it of e rr or or
appea l sh all  lie, a n e xcep tion  of all ot he r ca ses  is im plie d. An d t his  cour t
is as  mu ch b oun d by a n im plie d a s a n e xpr ess  excep tion .
United  St at es  v. M or e, 7  U. S. (3  Cr an ch) 1 59,  171  (180 5).
206. Johnson  said the Supr eme Court’s appellate “powers a re  subjec t ed  to the
will of the l egislat ur e of the u nion, a nd it  can exe rcise a ppella te ju risdict ion in n o
case, unless expressly auth orised [sic] to do so by th e laws  of congr ess.” Ex parte
Bol lman , 8 U .S.  (4 Cr an ch) 7 4, 1 03 (1 807 ) (dis se nt in g on ly on  st at ut or y gr ou nd s).
207. In  1830, when a ppellate r eview of crimina l cases was n ot yet au thorized by
stat ute,  the Supr eme Court held th at no writ of habeas corpus could be issued  if  it s
effect  would be t o allow review of a cir cuit cour t conviction .  S ee Ex  parte Watkins,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830). In one earlier case th e  C ou r t  had  a l lowed  a  habeas
pet iti on  with  res pect t o a commit men t by ord er of th e Circu it  C ou r t  fo r  t he Di st ri ct
of Colum bia. S ee Ex  pa rt e Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cran ch) 74 (1807). But i n  t ha t  ca se , t he
ma jor i ty ha d fou nd  a s ta tu tor y au th oriz at ion.
Pr obably the sa me ra tionale also under lay the Court ’s compliance wi t h  t he rat her
s t r ingen t  st at ut ory  re qu isi te s u nd er  th e 17 89 J ud icia ry  Act fo r  a ppella te  re view  of
s t a t e cour t ju dgm en ts , al th ough  in t ha t con te xt n o opin ion h as  ever  full y se t ou t a
ra t iona le he a r t icu lated in  1805 could well be the sa me as  was
used by t hose other s in 1796.
Und er  Ma rs ha ll’s r at iona le, if Congr ess  ma de n o releva nt
laws  a t a ll, the Su prem e Court  would ha ve all the a ppellat e
ju r isdict ion  const itu tion ally a llowed, becau se a s h e (like
Wilson ) supposed, Article III was self-executing. However,
Congress un der t he E xceptions Clause cou ld l imi t  tha t
ju r isdict ion , an d Ma rs ha ll reasoned  tha t  leg is la t ion  wh ich
confirms  th e jur isdict ion in p art  limits it  to the part s so
confirmed , imp licitly denyin g a ny ju r isdict ion  tha t  is  not
s t a tu tor i ly confirmed .2 0 5  Par tial confirmat ion, in other words,
car rie d a  “ne gat ive pr egn an t.”
J ust ice Wil lia m J ohnson  in  1807 reit er a ted  Ells wor th’s
ver sion;206 bu t  other wise , a t  lea st  th rough 1830,207 t he  Cour t
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rat ionale. S ee Act of Se pt . 24, 1 789,  ch. 2 0, § 25 , 1 St at . 73, 8 5; see also Williams  v.
Norris, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 117 (1827); Miller v. Nicholls, 17 U.S. (4 Wh e a t.) 312
(181 9).
208. Mar sha ll elabor at ed his  view in 1810 , sayin g:
H a d the j udicial a ct crea ted t he su prem e court , with out d efining or  limitin g
i t s jurisdiction, it must h ave been cons ide red  a s  possess ing  a ll  t he
jur isd icti on  wh ich  the  const i t u t ion a ssigns to it. . . . The appellate powers
of t h i s cou r t ar e not given  by th e judicial a ct. The y ar e given by t he
cons tit ut ion.  But th ey are l imited  and r egulat ed by the ju dicial act, and by
such  oth er a cts a s ha ve been  pas sed on  th e su bject . . . .
. .  .  [Congress has] not, indeed, made these exceptions in express
terms.  . . . [B]ut th ey ha ve described a ffirmat ively its ju risdict ion, an d th is
affirma tive  descri pt ion h as  bee n u nd er st ood t o im ply a  ne gat ive on  th e
exercise of such ap pellat e power a s is not  compre hen ded wit hin  it.
. . . .
It  is upon  th is prin ciple th at  th e court  implies  a legis lative except ion
from  its const itu tiona l appe llate  power in  th e legislat ive affirm at ive
des crip tion  of those powers.
Dourousseau v. U ni te d S ta te s, 1 0 U .S.  (6 Cr an ch) 3 07,  313 -14 (1 810 ).
209. Ju stice  Joh nson  wrote  in 1812, for exa mple, “Of a l l t he  cour t s wh ich  the
United  S ta t e s may , unde r  th e ir  g en eral powers, constitute, one only, the Su preme
Cour t , possess es jur isdiction d eriv ed immediat ely fr om t he  cons ti tu ti on,  an d of wh ich
the legislative power cannot depriv e i t .” Un i t ed  S ta t es  v . Hudson ,  11  U .S . (7 Cranch)
32, 33 (1 812 ).
210. In  1847 , for e xam ple , th e Cou rt  ruled tha t “the Supr eme Court  possesses
no appellate p ower  in  an y ca se , u nl es s con fer re d u pon  it  by a ct of C ong re ss ; nor  can
i t , when conferred be exercised in  an y other  form, or by a ny oth er m ode of proceeding
than  th at  which t he la w pre scribes.” Bar ry v. Mer cein, 46  U .S. (5 How.) 103, 119
(184 7).  And in 1866 the Court sa id,
[I]t  is for Congr ess t o deter min e how far , with in t he lim it s of the ca pacity
of t h i s cou r t  to ta ke, appellate jur isdiction sha ll be given, and when
conferred, it ca n b e ex er cise d on ly to the extent a nd in th e man ner
pres cribed by law. In  th ese  re spe cts  it i s wh olly t he  cre at ur e of leg isla tion .
Dan iels v. C hi cag o & Roc k I sla nd  R.R . Co. , 70  U. S. (3  Wa ll.) 2 50,  254  (186 6).
In  1869, Chief Ju stice Chase, in ret rospect, telescoped the doctrina l development
and char acter ized as  logical inferen ce wha t in  fact ha d been  a chr onological t ra ns iti on
of views:
The principle that t he affirmat ion of appellate jurisdiction implies the
ne gat ion  of all such ju risdict ion not  affirme d [i.e., the “nega tive pr egna nt ”
prin ciple a r t i cu la ted by Mar sha ll] havin g been t hu s est ablish ed [alt hough
the premise of se lf-execu tin g effect  pr esu me d by t ha t p ri ncip le wa s n ot
ut ilized Ma rsh a ll’s “nega t ive  pr egn ant” ver sion of th e
Except ions Cl a u se prem ise.208 This  “ne gat ive pr egn an t”
ra t ionale, however, logically depends on Wilson’s view that
Art icle III is  self-executin g with  r egard to jurisdiction; and as
t h e debilitat ing implications of tha t view came t o be better
perceived, it wa s gr ad ua lly aba nd oned, fir st  a s t o inferior
t r ibuna l s209 and th en also as to Supreme  Cour t  appe ll a te
ju r isdict ion .210 The only remnant  of it  surviving today is the
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established  at  all], it wa s an  alm ost n ecessa ry consequ ence [neces sar y only
to pr ese rv e E llsw ort h’s cont ra ry  view ] th at  act s of Con gr ess , pr ovidin g for
the exercise of jur isdiction, sh ould come to be spoken  of as acts  gra nt ing
jurisdiction , an d not  as a cts m akin g exceptions  to th e constit ut ional gr an t
of i t .
Ex parte McCa rd le,  74 U .S.  (7 Wa ll.) 5 06,  513  (186 9).
The Eva rt s Act (Circuit  Cou r t of Appeals Act) of March 3, 1891, 26 Sta t. 826,
established  a n ew set  of exclusively appel l a t e t r i buna l s and  d is t r ibu ted  the  appe ll a t e
cas eloa d between th e Suprem e Court an d those new circuit courts of appeals. Cases
from  s t a t e  cour t s r ema ined revie wa ble b y th e Su pr em e Cou rt  as  befor e, bu t a mon g
cases originating in th e federal t ria l  cou r t s,  mos t  were  rou ted  through  the  new
in termed ia t e court s. Moreover, as to most cases originating in federal tribunals,
i ncluding all in  which  diver sit y was  th e only s ubje ct ma tt er  ba se,  th e Act d id n ot
pr ovide for S up re me  Cou rt  re view  of cour t of a ppe als  decis ions  as  a m at te r of cou rs e:
The Su pr em e Cou rt  in  it s d iscr et ion  coul d r equ ir e cer ti ficat ion of pa rt icul ar  cas es for
decis ion  ther e instead of by a circuit court  of appeals, an d the lat ter  cou ld ce rt ify
par t i cu la r questions to th e Suprem e Court for instru ctions; but the broader  avenues
of Suprem e Cou rt  access previously open for ma ny cases were cut off. Because the
not ion  of self-executing jurisdiction had been a bandoned, th e Sup re me  Cou r t  had  no
difficulty sustaining the validity of these stat ut ory curt ailm ent s of its own a ppella te
jur isd icti on.  S ee Ayers v. Polsdorfer, 187 U.S. 5 85 (19 03); see als o Stevenson  v . Fa in ,
195 U. S. 1 65 (1 904 ).
Although  the E var ts  Act el im ina te d t he  ap pel lat e r ole of t he  old cir cuit  cour ts
with  respect to district court decisions, those courts persisted a long with  th e di st ri ct
cour t s as trial tr ibunals unt il 1911, when the old circuit courts were abolished and
th eir  jur isd icti on a ssi gn ed i ns te ad  to t he  dis tr ict cou rt s. S ee Act of March 3, 1911, 36
S ta t . 1087.
211. In  1807, Jus tice John son wr ote, “The origi na l ju ris di ction  of this cou rt  . . .
it  possesses independent ly of the will of any other  constituent  bran ch of the gener al
government . With out a  violation of th e constit ut ion, th at  division of our ju risdic t ion
can  neit her  be re str icted n or ext end ed.” Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cran ch) 74, 103
(1807) (J ohn son , J ., di ss en ti ng ). Tw o yea rs  ea rl ier  J us ti ce W a s hi n gt on  had  wr it t en  a t
circuit,  “The only court,  by name, whose jurisdiction is defined by the  const i t u t ion ,
is th e su pre me cou rt ; and , t herefore, congress has no power to restrain it  in those
cases wher e it is  de fined .” Ex parte Cabrer a, 4 F. Cas. 964, 965 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805)
(No.  2,2 78).
Ju stice  Stor y, in h is 1833 Com m ent ari es on  th e Con sti tu tion , observed  quit e
accur at ely th at  th er e is  no l ogica l or exege t ica l  bas i s for  d i st inguish ing  in  th i s  regard
between  origina l an d app ellate  Su prem e Cour t jur isdiction. St ory’s way of escap ing
the logical problem, however, was to conclude (like Wilson  an d Mar sha ll before him )
tha t  t he  Const i t u t ion  is sel f-execu tin g as  to both.  He said,
The re is certainly very strong grounds t o m a in ta in , t ha t t he  la ng ua ge of t he
cons tit ut ion  mea nt  to confer t he a ppella te ju ris diction  ab solu te ly on  th e
S u p re m e Court , indep ende nt  of any act ion by congres s; an d to r equir e th is
act ion  to dive st  or r egu lat e it . Th e la ngu age , as  to t he or igina l ju risdic tion
of th e Sup rem e Cour t, ad mit s of no doubt . It confer s it wit ho u t  a n y a ction
of congress . Why sh ould n ot th e sam e lan gua ge, as t o the  appe llate
jur isd icti on,  have th e same int erpret ation? It leaves th e powe r o f congress
un an alyzed assum ption tha t  Article III  is  somehow
anomalously self-executing as  to th e Supr em e  Cour t’s origin al
ju r isdict ion  (to which  the  Excep t ion s C la use  does n ot  app ly).211
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complete to m ak e ex cept ions  an d r egu lat ions ; bu t it  lea ves  not hin g to t he ir
inact ion .
3 STORY, supra  not e 48, a t 648 -49. Howeve r, S t or y ’s  a r gumen t proved insufficient to
pe rpe tua t e the Wilson-Mar sha ll view.
Nevertheless, wit hou t a ny  ser ious  effort  to b ut tr ess  it w ith  re as on, t he  an oma lous
pr oposi tion  that t he Supreme Court’s original juris diction does a ut omat ically v es t  h as
been contin uou sly m ain ta ined . S ee, e.g.,  Daniels v. Chicago & Rock Is lan d R.R. Co.,
80 U.S. (3 Wa ll.) 250, 254 (1866); Redis h, Congressional  Pow er, supra  no te 123,  a t
901; Sage r, supra  not e 9, at  23-24; Trib e, supra  note 12, at  134-35.
While  this proposition is anomalous, seemin gly inexplicable , an d cert ain ly
unexplained, however, it also is of little consequence: The 1789 Judiciary Act vested
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction anyway, with no substa nt ial sh ort fall. S ee
David  E. En gdah l, Fed eral  Qu est ion  J ur isd icti on U nd er t he 1 789  J ud iciary  Act , 14
OKLA. CITY U. L. RE V. 521 , 52 3-25  (198 9).
Once deprived of its indispensable foundat ion  in  Wilson ’s
not ion  of self-execut ing ju ris diction , Mar sh all’s “ne gat ive
p regnan t” ra tionale s imp ly ceased  to a ppea r in  judicia l
opin ion s.
The pr eviously d iscarde d E lls wor th  ra t iona le,  however ,  was
not  revived to replace t ha t  of Ma rsh a ll.  In st ea d,  the h abit  of
t rea t ing the  Except ions  Clause  as the source of Congress’ power
pers isted  (as  habi t s commonly do) with  no ra t iona le suppor t ing
it  a t  all, both  ra tion ales  th at  wer e us ed t o esta blish  it h aving
been disca rd ed a s u nfit , an d n o ar gum ent  ever h avin g been  pu t
in th eir place.
The m ischief is th at  th is persist ing an d un rea soned hab it  of
a t t r ibu t ion  has helped obscure th e true basis of Congress’
power rega rd ing t he ju dicial br an ch, an d t hu s it s in tr ins ic
limitat ions. Tha t ba sis i s t he N eces sa ry a nd P rope r  Cla use ; and
the l imi t at ions  inhe ren t  in  t ha t  cl ause have  ex t remely
impor tan t  consequences , to some of which  we now tu rn .
IV. LA W S  “CA R R YI N G  I N T O  E X E C U T I O N” T H E  J U D I C I A L  P O W E R
 Recognizing th e Necessar y and  Pr oper Claus e as  t he
premise of Con gress’ power  rega rd ing t he ju diciar y ent ails
consequ ences rega rd ing su bject m at ter  jur isdict ion, judicia l
system  s t ructu re , and  jud icia l potency. Because  the p oten cy
issues  require consideration of certain add it iona l  ana ly t ica l
refinements,  it  is simpler to discuss jur i sd ict ion  and  st ructu re
first.
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212. See, for example, the references to the Presid e n t’s r ecom me nd at ion  of “such
Measur es as  h e sh all ju dge n ecessa ry a nd e xpedie nt ,” U.S. CO N S T . a r t . II,  § 3; to
t ria ls “whe re t he s aid Cr imes  sha ll ha ve been  commit ted ,” Id . ar t. I II,  § 2, cl. 3 ; to
supremacy for laws an d tr eat ies wh ich “sha ll be m ade ,” Id . a r t . VI, cl. 2; and to
su ccess ion  whe n “th e Pr eside nt  elect s ha ll ha ve died ,” Id . amend.  XX, § 3.
213. Id . a r t . III, § 1.
214. Id . a r t . III, § 2, cl. 3.
215. “The Pr ivil ege  of th e Wr it  of Ha beas  Corpu s sh all n ot be s usp end ed . . . .”
Id . a r t . I, § 9,  cl. 2; see also id.  a r t . III, § I (providin g th at  ju d ge s ’ c om p e n sa t ion  “sha l l
no t be d im in ish ed  du ri ng  th eir  Con ti nu an ce in  Office ”).
216. “No State sh all . . . pass any . . . ex pos t  fa c to Law . . . .” Id . a r t . I, § 10,
cl. 1. “No State shall .  .  . deny to any person  w it h i n  it s  ju r i sdict ion  the  equa l
pr ote ction  of the la ws.” Id . amen d. XIV, § 1.
217. “Congress sha ll ma ke n o law r espe cting  an  est ablis hm ent  of religion . . . .”
Id . amend. I.
218. S ee, e.g., i d . a r t . I, § 5,  cl. 2 (“Ea ch H ous e m ay .  . . exp el a  Mem ber .”); i d .
a r t . IV, § 3, cl. 1 (“New Sta tes m ay be a dmit ted b y th e Congr ess in t o  th is
Un ion  . . . .”); i d . a r t . III, § 1 (inclu ding in the cons ti tu ti ona l ju dicia l st ru ctu re  “such
A. Th e Duty to Vest and In capacity to Divest
 Even  if it is  not  self-execu t in g in  the d im en sion  of subject
ma tt er  ju r isdict ion , Ar t icle  II I ce r t a i n ly is imperat ive in mood.
T h e only ca nd id r ea din g of the  te xt im port s a  ma nd at ory du ty
to ves t . “Sh a ll” is  an  auxil ia ry verb t ha t  normally  denotes  more
than  mere fu tur i ty or prediction; in the second or third person
it  ord ina r ily exp res se s s ome d egr ee  of compu ls ion  by t he will  of
the spe ak er  (her e, “We th e Pe ople”), ra th er  t han  mere
preferen ce, wis h , or  r ecomm end at ion. The  word u su ally is
ind icat ive of comm an d, convert ing wha t oth erwise would be a
declara tive sta tem ent  into an  imper at ive one.
By my count, “shall” appea rs 191 t imes in t he origin a l
Unit ed St at es Cons tit ut ion an d 115 m ore in  the am en dm en ts . A
small nu mber  of th ese ar e inst an ces of the fut ur e or  fu tu re
perfect tense,212 but  in th e overwhelming m ajority it is evident
tha t  “sha ll” import s compu lsion or obligation. Several oth er
clauses  in Art icle III it self pr ovide illus t r a t ion : judges “sha ll
hold their  Office s d ur in g good Behaviour”;213 th e “Tria l of all
Crim e s . . . sha ll be by J ur y; and  su ch Tr ial s ha ll be he ld in t he
S ta t e where the said Crimes”214 were  commit ted . “Sh all” with  a
ne gat ive (e.g., “sh all n ot,”2 1 5  “no St at e sh all,”216 or  “shal l make
no law”217) is  the s t anda rd for m of const it u t ion a l  r i gh t s
guar an tees. Car e seems  to ha ve been ta ken  to u se “ma y” ra th er
tha n  “sha ll” wherever p erm ission without obligat ion was
con templa ted.218
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infe ri or  Cou rt s a s t he  Con gr es s m ay  from t im e t o ti me  or da in  an d e st ab lis h”).
219. Mar tin  v. H un te r’s L es se e, 1 4 U .S.  (1 Wh ea t. ) 304 , 33 0 (18 16).
However , only by piling some very unsound pr opositions on top of t his va lid
“manda tory du ty” pr em ise , coul d St ory  su ppor t h is u nt en ab le con clus ion  “t h a t
Congr ess are b ou nd t o cr ea te s om e i nfe r ior  cou r t s.” Id . a t  331.  Jus t ice Wil li am
Johnson  found S tory’s  dictum objectionable enough t hat  he wrote a r esponse, even
th ough  acquies cing in t he Cou rt ’s act ua l holding.  See id.  at 362.
S tory repeated his m a n datory duty thesis in his Commentaries on the
Con sti tu tion . S ee 3 STORY, supra  not e 48 , §§ 1584 -90. I t w as  en dor sed  by Ch an cellor
Ken t . S ee 1 J . KE N T , CO M M E N T A R I E S  O N  AM E R I CA N  LAW  290 (3d ed. 1836). It  was also
supported  in  Ma yor of  N ash vil le v.  Cooper , 73  U. S. (6  Wa ll.) 2 47,  251 -52 (1 868 ).
220. Occasiona lly a  w r iter  seem s to h ave m issed  th is point . S ee, e.g.,  Pau l
Howland, Sh all Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between C iti zen s of D iff eren t
S ta tes  Be P reser ved , 18  A.B.A.  J . 49 9, 5 03 (1 932 ).
221. He did maint ain th at t he S u pr em e Court  could proceed in  th e ab se nce  of
l eg is la t ion , but  th at  was be caus e he s ha red t he fad ing view tha t even  the  appel la t e
jur isd icti on  of that  court  was  self-execut ing. S ee 3 STORY, supra  n ote 48, at  648-49,
also quoted supra  note 211.
Moreover , it  is  too incongruous  to suppose  tha t  the fr amers,
who repeatedly refused to let Congress decide th e subject
ma tt er  scope, non eth eless  left it  to Congress’ discretion wh eth er
jur isdict ion  as t o some or a ll of those subject ma tt ers ever
shou ld be vest ed. F or t hes e re as ons, t he on ly credible
conclu sion  i s tha t  Ar t i cle I I I imposes a  man d a t or y  dut y: To
wha tever  exte nt  it is  not  self-execut ing,  Article III r equ i res  tha t
Congress vest  ju r isdiction (wheth er original or a ppellat e), over
each  subject ma tt er listed  in Article III, in one or anoth er  (or
sever al) of wha tever  t r ibun als  migh t cons tit ut e th e judicia l
b ranch . To th is ext ent , J us tice St ory wa s corr ect in  declar ing
tha t  Article III is a ma nda te “to vest t he whole judicial
power.”219
Of course,  th is does not  mean  tha t  Congress  must  ves t  the
full r ange of con templa ted subject  m a t te r  ju r i sd ict ion  in  each
federal  cour t, if more t han  one exis t s.  Sh ould  Con gr es s e lect  to
have more than t he one federal court constitut ionally required,
Art icle I II ’s  manda te  could be s at isfied by d ist rib ut ing t he
subject ma tt er competen ce—so long as  every fr a ct ion of th e
cons t itu t iona l ly prescribed jur isdiction was vest ed somewher e
in  the ju dicia l br anch .
Even  a  mandat ory duty, however, can be disobeyed,220
wha tever  repr obation th e dere liction might in cur. Not even
S tory believed t ha t in ferior fede ra l court s could exer cise
ju r isdict ion  notwithst anding con gr es siona l d isobedien ce or
defau lt .221 In an 1818 case at Circuit,  Story lamented:
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222. Whit e v. F en ne r,  29 F . Ca s. 1 015 , 10 15-1 6 (C. C.D .R. I. 1 818 ) (No.  17, 547 ).
223. Section  11 of the J udiciar y Act requ ired t ha t civil suit s be br ought  in t he
dis tr ict  where t he defendant  re sid ed or  wa s se rv ed,  an d t he  pla ce or  re sid en ce or
se rv ice was not of record in  White v. Fenner. The ca se could h ave bee n br ought  in
som e other circuit court—or even in Story’s  own —if th at  wer e s how n t o be t he  pla ce
of residence or service.
Stor y’s comp lai nt  th at  jur isd icti on u n d e r  t h e 1789 Act  was  “very  limit ed” and
“stopped . . . far sh ort of th e constit ut ional ext en t” was also inaccurate in other
respects. See generally En gdah l, supra  note 211, at  521.
224. See, for examp le, the sta temen t s i n  Mer rell D ow P ha rm ., In c. v. T hom pson ,
478 U.S . 804 , 807  (1986 ); S kel ly O il Co.  v. P hi llip s Pet roleu m  Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673
(195 0); P A U L BATOR, ET AL ., H ART AND WE C H S L E R’S  TH E  F EDERAL CO U R TS  AN D  T H E
F ED ERAL  SY ST E M 34 (2d  ed.  1973 ); FELIX F R AN K F U R TE R & J A M E S  LAN D I S , TH E
BU S I N E S S  O F  TH E  SU P R E M E  COURT  12, 25, 30 & 65 (1928); and CH A R LE S ALAN  WR I GH T ,
TH E  LA W  OF  F EDERAL COURTS  90 (4 th  ed . 19 83).
225. S ee En gdah l, supra  note 211, at  522-38.
T h e con st itu tion  de clar es , th at  it is  m an da tor y t o th e
l eg is l a tu r e , th at  th e ju dicia l pow er  of th e U nit ed S ta te s sh all
e xt e n d to  con t r ove r s i e s  “be tween  c i t i zens  o f d i ff e ren t  s t a t e s ”;
a n d  it is s om ew ha t s ing ula r, t ha t t he  jur isdic tion  a ct u a ll y
confe r red  on  t h e  cour t s  of  the U nite d St at es  sh ould h ave
s topped  so  fa r  sh o r t  o f t he  cons t i t u t iona l  ex ten t . T h a t  ser iou s
m isch iefs  h av e a lre ad y a ris en , an d m u st  cont in u al ly a ris e fr om
t h e pr es en t v er y lim ite d ju ris dict ion  of th es e cou rt s, i s  mos t
m a n ife s t  t o a ll t h os e, w h o a r e  con v er s a n t w it h  t h e
a d m i n i st r a t i on  of jus tice . B u t  w e  ca n n ot  h e lp  t h em .  Th e
l a n gu a g e o f t he  a c t  i s  so c lea r ,  t ha t  t h e re  i s  not h in g  on  w h ich
t o  h a n g  a  d ou b t .222
Story ’s comment  was actua lly inap t  in  th at  case,223 but  it ma kes
the point t ha t n ot even he supposed  the manda tory  cha ract e r  of
th e vest ing du ty s ufficient  to overr ide st at ut ory sh ort falls.
However , although Congress at th e outset could have
frus t r a t ed the Constitution’s design by defian t  r e fusa l (or
simp le failur e) to vest s ome or all of th e cont empla ted
ju r isdict ion , it  did not. Instead, th e 1789 J ud iciar y Act ves ted  in
one or  m or e federal courts  virtu ally all th at  Article III provides
for . One p romi n en t  e r ror  of or thodox  op in ion  i s the  not ion  tha t
Congress (for rea sons which n o one h as been  able t o explain )
init ially withh eld from th e judiciary th e great  bulk  of federal
que st ion ju r isdict ion ,224 bestowing it only some eighty-five years
later , in 1875. I  have els ewher e d em onst ra ted  the in accuracy of
tha t  view wit h gr ea ter  det ail a nd  docum ent at ion th an  is
necessar y here, 225 but  a s hor t s um ma ry is  ap pr opria te . 
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226. S ee Os bor n v . U ni te d S ta te s, 2 2 U .S.  (9 Wh ea t. ) 738  (192 4).
227. The ext r avagan t  “a r i sing und e r ” t h esis em ployed by th e ma jority in  Osborn
h a d been advan ced by the first bank , i n  Bank  of  Un it ed  S ta t es  v . Deveaux, 9 U .S.  (5
Cranch) 61, 71-72 (1809), but the  C ou r t  i n  t h at  case  d is regarded  it  and  he ld  tha t
jur isd icti on  must  rest on diversity instead.
So fa r  as  my  re sea rch  ha s di sclos ed,  pr ior t o Osborn i t s  “a r i s ing  under” thes is  had
only been u sed su ccessfully once: in a  very ea rly crim ina l prosecu tion a t circu it,
where a ma n was sen tenced to pillory and prison and fined  for cou nt er feit ing  bills  of
the bank. There was no statut e prohibiting or prescribing punishmen t  fo r  such
coun te r feiting,  but  th e cir cuit  cour t d eem ed i t a  “comm on la w offen se. ” But  th at  of
course  could not gi ve the federal court jurisdiction, so for the jurisdictional purpose
the c ir cu it  cou r t  he ld  tha t  because “the act incorporating the Bank . .  .  was a
cons t i tu t iona l act,” and its “bills wer e ma de in vir tu e th ereof,” the coun ter feiting
pr osecu tion  ma de out  “a case ar ising u nder ” the law s of the U nit ed Stat es. United
Stat es v. S mi th , 27  F.  Ca s. 1 147 , 11 47-4 8 (C. C.D . Ma ss . 17 92) (N o. 16 ,32 3).
Because criminal cases were n ot reviewable under  the  179 8 Act ,  t h is  ext r avagan t
view of “ari sin g u nd er ” was  te st ed n o fur th er  on  th at  1792  occas ion,  an d I h ave  foun d
no evidence tha t it wa s given an y furth er creden ce until 1824.
228. S ee En gdah l, supra  note 211, at  530-31.
229. Sup r em e Cou rt wr it of error review of stat e court judgment s was au thorized
where i s d rawn  in  ques t io n  t he  val idit y of a t re at y or s ta tu te  of, or a n
a u t hority  exercised  un der t he U nit ed St at es, an d th e decision is a ga i n st
th eir  val idit y; or w her e is  dr aw n in  qu est ion t he  val idit y of a s ta tu te  of, or
an  au th orit y exer cised u nde r a ny St at e, on the  ground o f t he ir  be ing
repugnan t  to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United Stat es, and the
decision  is in favou r of such t heir  validit y, or whe re is d ra wn in  ques tion
the cons tr uct ion of a ny  clau se of t he  cons ti t ution, or of a treaty, or statu te
of, or com mission held under th e United States, and the decision is against
the title, right, privilege or exemption specially set u p  or  claimed by either
par ty,  under  such  c lause  of  the sa id Constitu tion , tr ea ty,  st at ut e or
comm iss ion  . . . .
Act  of Se pt . 24 , 17 89,  ch.  20,  § 25,  1 S ta t.  73,  85-8 6 (foot no te  om it te d).
While the 1789 Act did not contain the familiar words used
s ince 1875 to embra ce federa l ques tion s in  gener al, it
accomplish ed the s a me t h in g in  ter ms t ha t  were s u it ed  to the
ci rcumstances of t ha t  t ime . Before 1824 , th e ext ra vaga nt
cons t ruct ion  of “a r i sing under” adop ted in  the Osborn ca se to
pr eser ve th e Ban k of the Un ited St at es226 ha d been  only ra rely
conceived; 227 and  on  the  more credible, well establish ed
cons t ruct ion  explained  in Ju stice Johnson’s Osborn d is sen t ,  the
1789 Act  qu it e  amply p rovided  for  cases  “a r i sing under” the
federal  Constitut ion, laws, or  t r ea t ies . Th e or igina l Con st it u t ion
did not pr ovide bases  for pla intiffs’ claims, but  cons t itu t iona l  or
feder a l st a tu tory is su es  ra ised  unsu cces sfu lly  in  de fen se  or
jus t ifica t ion  would ren der a  case eligible for Su prem e Cour t
r eview unde r  se ct ion  25 of the 1789 Act .228 So would tr e a ty
issues, even wher e par ty-based  ju ris diction  did n ot a pply. 229 As
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230. F o r exa mp le, for feit ur e t o th e in jur ed p ar ty r ecover ab le in  act ion of debt  was
the remedy for patent  infringement un der the Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat.
109, 111 ; an d for  copyr igh t i nfr in gem en t u nd er  th e Act  of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 2,
1 Stat . 124, 125.
231. Act  of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat . 73, 77.
232. S ee H ENDERSON , supra  note 43, at  61.
233. S ee Tu rn er  v. Ba nk  of Nor th  Ame ri ca,  4 U .S. (4  Da ll.) 8  (179 9). I n e ss en ce
the assignee clause precluded jur isdiction based on diver sity between  the  deb tor  and
the credit or’s assign ee a bsen t dive rsit y bet ween  th e debt or a nd t he a ssign ee. S ee also
Sh eld on  v. S ill,  49 U .S.  (8 H ow.) 4 41 (1 850 ).
234. F o r ex ampl e,  the C ou r t ’s b ifu rca t ion  of “o r ig in a l” a nd “a ppellate” in  Marbury
v. Ma di son , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), vitiated t he 1789 Act’s on ly pr ovisi on for
mandamus of feder al officers; the  “forfeitu re” device fell ou t  o f u se for re dres sing
pr iva t e injury r esultin g from violations of federal laws ; some Ju stices a t Cir cuit
m isconstrued  sta tu tes a s failing t o aut horize e quit y enforcem ent  of feder al la w  r ig h t s;
and the  ma jo r ity  in  Osborn took its extr avagan t, un ant icipated view of “a r i sing unde r”
in  Article I II. S ee En gdah l, supra  note 211, at  538-43.
t o private claims for damages caused by violations of feder a l
s t a t u tes, the remedy tra ditionally and routinely prescribed at
tha t  t im e was “forfeiture” recoverable by an  action of debt, 230
and the 1789 Act  ga ve ju r isdict ion  to the d is t r ict  cour t s over “all
su it s for . . . forfeitures  incurr ed, und er  th e laws of the Un ited
St at es.”231 (Indeed , for fe itu re  cases  compr ised  nea r ly  as  la rge a
pr oport ion as a dm ir a lt y in  the bu sines s of d is t r ict  cour t s  in  the
earliest years.232) Overa ll, a par t fr om t he  su bcat egory of
diver sit y case s a ffected by t he  “as sign ee clau se,”233 th e only
cases within  Article III tha t wer e afforded  no federal forum by
the 1789 Act  were  civil suit s below cert ain  modes t a mou nt s in
cont rovers y, su its  bet ween  St at es a nd  th eir  own cit izen s, a nd
suits brought against the Un ited States.
A gulf between  cons t it u t iona l and  st a tu tory  pa ramete r s d id
de velop over th e ne xt  se ver a l deca de s; a nd t h is  fed er a l qu es t ion
shor t fa l l did, indeed, r ema in  un t il 1875. The short fall, however,
w a s not a  resu lt of delibera te congressional choice; it res ulted ,
instead, from fa ilu res  to modi fy t he ju r isdict ion a l  st a tu t e s t o
accommoda te int er ven ing d evelopm en ts , most  of the m ve r y
su btle  and  not  of Congress ’ own making.2 34 The a bsence for
decades  of any adequa te s t a tu tory  gran t  of genera l federa l
que st ion ju r isdict ion  illust ra tes  tha t  congr es siona l n egl ect  of its
ves t ing du ty will lea ve th e ma nd at ed vest ing u nd one; but  it
does not  cons t it u t e  an h is tor ica l  a rgument  for  d iscre t ion  in
Congr ess t o with hold ju ris diction a t will.
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235. S ee Act of Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
236. S ee Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89.
237. The 1801 Act gave t he n ew circuit  court s jur isdiction over  “all cases in  law
or  equity, arising under th e constitut ion and laws of the Un ited States,  an d trea ties
made,  or  wh ich  sh al l be  ma de , u nd er  th eir  au th or it y.” Act  of F eb. 13, 180 1, ch. 4,
§ 11, 2 Stat . 89, 92.
~~~
In any  even t , howeve r , d iscret ion  to give  or  wit hhold  is  one
ques t ion , wh ile  discr et ion  to take  awa y is  another . If t he  t rue
premise of Congr ess ’ power  re gar ding t he  jud icia ry i s the
Necessa ry an d Pr oper Claus e, it seem s im possible t o uph old
s t a tu tory dives tment. With  rega rd to the other branches,
Congress’ power  unde r  the N eces sa ry a nd P rope r  Cla use  (as
already noted) work s like  a one -way r ach et. I t h ar dly is cred ible
to cha ract e r ize divestm ent a s  “ca r ry ing  in to Execu t ion” the
“judicia l Power” when  th e Const itu tion  sa ys “[t]h e judicia l
Power  sha ll  ex tend  to” the mat te r  thus t aken  away . For  reasons
to be fur th er e labor at ed below, Congr ess m ay s hu ffle
ju r isdict ion a l assignments a m on g wh ateve r  fed er a l cou r t s
migh t  exi st ; bu t  the Const it u t ion  gives it  no power to divest
en tir ely, from th e judiciary as a  w h ole, a ny fr act ion  of th e
subject ma tt er competen ce contem plat ed by Article III  once
th at  fraction ha s been vest ed somew her e in t he ju dicial  b ranch .
One very prominent early episode might seem at first to
demons t r a t e th e contr ar y; but  it d oes not . Amidst  grea t p ublic
con t roversy in 1802, Congress r epealed 235 a r eformin g judiciar y
act  it ha d pas sed th e previous year .236 Among other  th ings, the
1801 Jud icia ry Act  included a  genera l g rant of federa l ques tion
ju r isdict ion  which mirrored th e fed er a l qu es t ion  la ngu age of
Art icle III,237 ju s t  li ke  the modern st at ut es in force since 1875.
If this gener al federa l quest ion langua ge in th e 1801 Act vest ed
some ju r isdiction omitt ed when  th e federal courts  were crea ted
in  1789, then  th e 1802 repe a l, reinst itut ing th e 1789 regime,
was a ju ris dictiona l divest men t; a nd  judicia l acqu iescen ce in
such  a divest men t ba rely a decade a fter t he  Cons t itu t ion  was
adopted  would ar gue for  cons t ru ing the  Cons t it u t ion  to
countenance  dives tment  even  today.
In  fact, however, as already expla in ed , t he 1789 Act  had
fully vested federa l quest ion jurisdiction, albeit in different
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238. S ee generally En gdah l, supra  note 211, at  521.
239. S ee id . at 535-37.
240. S ee Young,  supra  note 2, at  156-65.
241. 80 U. S. (1 3 Wa ll.) 1 54 (1 872 ).
242. 7 Ct . Cl . 39 3 (18 72).
243. S ee David  E. E ngda hl, Imm unity and Accountability for Positive
Governm ental Wrongs , 44 U. C OLO . L. RE V. 1, 49-51 (1972); David E. E ngda hl,
Soldiers, R iots , an d R evolu tion : Th e Law and  History Of Military T roops in Civil
Disorders, 57 IOWA L. RE V. 1, 59-60 (1971) [her eina fter  En gdah l, S oldier s , R iot s , and
R evolu tion ].
244. Even  th oug h ci vilia n a ut hor it y—fed er al  as  wel l a s s ta te —ha d be en  in  pla ce
and function ing for som e tim e, th e Civil Right s Act of 1866 aut horized  mili ta ry act ion
to enforce its  ter ms . S ee Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, §§ 5, 9, 14 Stat. 27, 28, 29. In
add it ion , th e Milita ry Re const ru ction Act of Ma rch  2, 1867, ch . 153, 14 Stat. 428,
established  five military districts embracing the ten States in  quest ion, each to be
governed un der  ma rt ial  law  by a  comm an din g gen er al w ith  an  am ple  force of fe dera l
terms. 238 The 1801 st at ut e just  descr ibed it  mor e convenien tly
a n d r e assigned it  to differen t inferior court s. Thus , when t he
1802 repea l reinst itut ed th e 1789 regime, no jur isdiction was
divested  from the fede ra l ju dicia ry a s a  wh ole.  Sign ifica n t ly,  not
even th e crit ics of the  1801 Act h ad  re gar ded it  a s  ves t ing  any
new ju r isdict ion ;239 an d t he re fore it  is u ns ur pr isin g th at  no
con tempora ry account  regarded the 1802 repeal as a
divestm ent . Neither in the six hundr ed column s of the  Anna ls
of Congress reporting the heated debate over repea l, n or  in  the
a ccom p a n yi n g press  comment ary  or  contempora neou s
l it e r a ture , is ther e any hint th at Congress or anyone else
per ceived th e 1802 r epea l as  a  dives tmen t  of any ju r isdict ion  a t
all.
On  t he  othe r  hand , impor t an t  p receden t s against
ju r isdict ion a l dives tm en t h ave  been generally overlooked. In a
1995 ar ticle,240 Gord on Youn g exhu me d t wo exam ples  from
1872—A rm strong v. United States241 and Witowski v. United
States242—admit t ing th at  th ey were rather  weak by themselves.
But  they a re n ot , in de ed , by t hem se lves: P r ofessor  Young’s
examp les cor robora t e  othe r s from the  same  decade tha t  I
un ear th ed th i r ty years  ago.243 I f anyone  were to undert ak e a
p a ge-by-page  sea rch  of the  old case s (or even  of only t he
publish ed ones, wh ich ar e effectively un indexe d),  more
examp les might  well be found; but  th ese seem s ufficient t o
make  the  poin t.
When  th e Ra dicals  in Con gres s r esort ed t o milita ry
expedient s for  “r econs t ruct ing” the  Sou th  a ft e r  t he C iv il  War ,244
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troops; and it ga ve these milit ar y comma nder s discre tion wh eth er t o try offender s in
mi li t a ry t r i buna l s o r  to perm it t ria ls by th e est ablish ed local civilian cour ts. Milit ar y
dist ri ct  comm an der s ou st ed t hou sa nd s of civili an  officials  an d si x st at e gove rn ors,
i n st a l li ng oth er s in  th eir  pla ces b y m ilit ar y fia t. S ta te  legis lat ion w as  set  as ide  or
modified by mi li t a ry decrees. A distinctively military force of some 20,000 soldiers
served as  th e pr im ar y pe ace ke epi ng  force. Con gr es s e ven  en act ed t ha t “n o dis tr ict
commander . . . or  an y of t he officers or appoint ees acting u nder  them , shall be
bou nd  in  hi s a cti on  by a ny  opin ion  of an y civ il office r of t he  Un ite d St at es. ” Act of
Ju ly 19, 1867, ch. 30, § 10, 15 Stat. 14, 16.
Twi ce du ri ng  th e fir st  mon th s a fte r e na ctm en t of t he  mi lit ar y r econ st ru ction
legis la t ion , st at es s ough t ju dicia l de nu ncia tion  of it; b ut  th eir  re qu est s for  inj un ction s
to p re se rve  a rguab le  r igh ts of sovereignt y again st exe cutive a ction wer e held  to lie
beyon d the const itu tion al lim its of feder al cour t ju risd iction. S ee Geor gia  v. St an ton ,
73 U. S. (6  Wa ll.) 5 0 (18 67); M iss iss ipp i v. J oh ns on , 71  U. S. (4  Wa ll.) 4 75 (1 867 ).
245. The court h eld:
If,  in for eign  inv as ion or  civil w ar , th e cou rt s a re a ctua lly closed, and  it is
imposs ible t o  adm inist er cr imin al ju stice a ccording t o law, t hen ,  on  the
t h eater  of active military operat ions, where war r eally prevails, there is  a
necessi ty to fur nish  a su bst itu te for t he civil a ut hor ity, t hu s over th rown , to
pres erve  the sa fet y of t he ar my an d society; and as n o power is left but th e
milita ry,  it is allowed to govern by mar tial ru le u nt il the  laws ca n h ave
th eir  fre e course . As n eces sit y cre at es t he  ru le, s o it l im its  its  du ra tion ; for,
if this government  is continued aft er the courts are reinstat ed, it  is a gross
usu rp at ion  of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts ar e
open , and in the proper and u nobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It
is also confined t o the locality of actua l war.
Ex parte Milli gan , 71 U .S. (4 W all .) 2, 12 7 (186 6); see gen erally En gdah l, Soldiers,
Riots, an d R evolu tion , supra  not e 243; E ngda hl, Foundations, supra  note 106.
246. Act  of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
247. Act  of March 2, 1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat . 428.
248. S ee, e.g., In re Eg an , 8 F . Ca s. 3 67 (C .C. N. D.N .Y. 18 66) (N o. 4, 303 ).
th ey mu st h ave an ticipated  judicial denun ciation. The ancien t
ru le of due p rocess  pr ohibit ing m ilita ry m easu res  whe re civil
au thor i ty exists wa s rea ffirm ed by the S upr eme Cou r t  in  Ex
parte Milligan 245 only days before Congress  ena cted th e 1866
Civil Right s Act ,2 4 6  wh ich called for m ilita ry en forcemen t of its
terms,  and on ly e leven  months b efor e Congres s subord inat ed
the civilian governm ent s of ten  sta tes  t o milit ar y dist rict
commander s th rou gh t he 1 867 Milita ry Re const ruct ion  Act .247
In  ad dit ion, a fede ra l circuit  court  in 186 6 inva lida ted  milit ar y
pr oceedings  pur sued a gainst  a civilian in  South  Car olina  seven
months a ft e r  the end of th e war. 248 Th e u nconst it u t ion a lit y of
such  milit ar y expedien ts  was  not orious: Gen era l Gra nt  him self
is r epor t ed to have sa id  of the Reconst ruct ion  leg is la t ion , “mu ch
of it, no doubt, was  un const itut ional; but i t wa s  hoped  tha t  the
laws enacted would serve their purpose before t he ques t ion  of
cons t it u t iona li t y could  be  su bm it t ed  to the judiciary and a
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249. SA M U E L E. MORRISON , ET AL ., A CO N C I S E  H I S TO R Y O F  T H E  AME RICAN
REPUBLIC  344  (197 7).
250. Act  of March 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat . 432.
This  1867 divestment  statu te did not prevent th e journ alist’s habeas corpus
pet iti on  invo lved  in  Ex pa r te  M cC a rd le, 73 U .S. (6  Wa ll.) 3 18 (1 868 ), beca us e t he  fact s
of tha t case ar ose a ft e r  th e st at ut e’s cut off date of J uly 1, 18 66. Howe ver, t he
su it ab il it y of those facts to occasion a Supr eme Court  denu nciat ion of the m ilitar y
Recon st ru ction  en te rp ri se p rom pt ed C ongr ess  to r epe al t he  pa rt icul ar  st at ut e on
wh ich  Sup rem e Cour t jur isdiction  of McCard le’s ap pea l ha d been  bas ed. S ee Act of
March  27, 1868, ch. 34, § 2, 15 Stat. 44. That r epeal, however ,  was  not  a  d ives tmen t
of jurisdiction from the judiciary as a whole: not only had McCardle’s case already
been hear d by a federal court, but also th ere  r e m ained another avenue of recourse
to the Supreme Court in such cases.
251. S ee Mil ligan  v. Hovey, 17 F . Cas. (C.C.D. In d. 1871) (No. 9,605). The jur y,
however , awarded only nominal damages.
S ta t e cour t s  ruled simila rly r egar ding ea rlier  Acts of Congress  ha ving a
compar able  effect. S ee, e.g., John son v. Jones, 44 Ill. 142, 161-63 (1867); Griffin v.
Wilcox, 21 I nd . 37 0, 3 73 (1 863 ).
252. 98 U. S. 2 66 (1 878 ).
de cis ion  obta ine d.”249 Seekin g  ways to evade or  pos tpone
judicia l embarra ssment of their enterpr ise, the Radicals first
cons idered  elimin at ing a ll of th e Su pr eme  Cour t’s a ppella te
ju r isd ict ion . Then , however, they ins tea d ena cted in 1867 a
ju r isdict ion a l d ives tmen t  t ha t  was  na r row in  subject  ma t t e r
scope  bu t  app li ed  to all court s, st at e as  well as  feder al: it
provided tha t  “no civil cou r t  . . . s ha ll h ave or  t ake ju r isdict ion
of” an y case ar ising out of military a ction tak en be t we en  t he
da te of Pre side nt  Lincoln ’s in au gur at ion a nd  J uly 1, 1 866, a
da te fiftee n m ont hs  aft er t he e nd  of the Civil Wa r. 250
Federa l court s n onet hele ss exe rcised  jur isdict ion as  if this
divestm ent  stat ute ha d never passed. One  exam ple involved the
very sam e person wh ose habea s corpu s app eal ha d occasioned
the Supreme Cour t ’s pr omin en t  reit er a t ion  of the con st it u t ion a l
ru le aga ins t  mi li t a ry exped ien t s in  Ex parte Milligan .
N ot w it h s t a n d in g C on gr e ss ’ a t t e m pt  a t  ju r is d ict i on a l
divestm ent , a  fede ra l cou r t  gave Mill iga n  a  judgmen t  for
dam ages  aga ins t  the a rmy genera l who ha d seized an d confined
h im in Indiana  du r ing the  war .251
Another  inst an ce of a federa l cour t’s disrega rd of the 1867
divestm ent  st at ut e wa s a ssigned a s err or by the Att orney
Genera l in Beckwi th  v . Bean ,252 an  187 8 ca se  gr owin g ou t  of a
m ilita ry  ar res t a nd  confinem ent  in Ver mon t d ur ing t he Civil
War. However , th e Su pr em e Cour t d eclined  even  to crit icize the
t r i a l cou r t  for defyin g t he d ivest men t  st a tu te. I nde ed , J ust ice
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253. Ex parte Mil liga n,  71 U .S.  (4 Wa ll.) a t 1 27 (1 866 ).
254. Beckwith , 98 U .S.  at  298  (Fi eld , J ., d iss en ti ng ).
255. Id . at 285.
256. In  term s of twentieth centu ry practice, “abated” would be equivalent  t o  be ing
dismissed.
257. Beckwith  v .  Bean  was d ecided alm ost t hir t e e n  yea r s  a ft e r  t he end  of  the
per iod to  which  the  purpor ted  d ivestment  app lied,  and s u ch  c la ims a s  t he  dives tmen t
migh t  rea ch wer e sub ject to a  valid t wo-year st at ut e of limita tion s. S ee Mitche ll v.
Clark , 110  U. S. 6 33,  641 -46 (1 884 ).
258. S ee, e.g., Ra ym on d v.  Th om as , 91  U. S. 7 12 (1 876 ).
259. An ti t er ro r ism and  Effec t ive  Dea th  P enalt y Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
§§ 106 (b)(3)(E ), 44 0(a ), 11 0 S ta t.  121 4 (19 96).
260. Imm igra n t  Responsibility Act of 1996, § 377 (amen ding 8 U.S.C.
§ 125 5a (f )(4)(C)).
Field  (in a  sepa ra te op in ion  wh ich  J ust ice C liffor d join ed ), after
re it e ra t ing the constitut ional rules against  mili t a ry exped ien t s
except i n  “t he thea ter  of active military opera tions, where wa r
rea lly pre vai ls,”253 de cla red  tha t  neit her  the P res iden t  nor
Con gress could “shield t he d efend an ts  from r espon sibilit y in
d is regard ing them . P rotect ion  aga in st  the d ep r iva t ion  of liberty
and propert y would be defeated if remedies for red res s, wher e
su ch de pr ivat ion wa s m ad e, could be  den ied.”254
The ma jority in  Beckwith v.  Bean purported to reserve these
issues, reversing instead on a different ground an d sa ying,  “We
express no opin ion  as  to the  cons t ruct ion  of [the  dives tment
s ta tu t e and a nother ], or  as t o the ques t ion s of con st it u t ion a l
law wh ich m ay a ris e t he re un der .”255 Tha t , however ,  was
disingenuous: if th e dives tm en t s ta tu te  wer e val id, t he case
should ha ve been ordered  aba ted 256 for  l ack  of subject  ma t t e r
ju r isdict ion , b u t  in s t ead  th e Cour t r em an ded  for a n ew t ria l. A
new  t r ial,  of course, would be no less defiant  of the divestm e nt
s ta tu te than  the  fi r st  had  been .
The J u s t i ces foun d n o other  occas ion to consid er t his
divestment sta tu te;257 but  th e ma jority’s rea soning in oth er
cases of th e s a me per iod258 ma kes it s eem pr obable tha t t he
othe r s would have agreed wit h J ustices Field and Clifford had
th ey been  willing in  Beckwith  to address the divestment  issue
with  candor .
Follow in g t h ese  lon g-for got ten  exa mples , fed er a l cou r t s
confront ed today with pur ported divestments like those
att empted, for exam ple, in  th e 1996 Ant i t er ror i sm and Effective
Dea th Pena lty  Act ,259 the 1996 Immigr a t ion  Respons ibility
Act ,260 an d similar  mea sur es recent ly enacted or pr oposed,
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261. S ee, e.g.,  Amar ,  A N eo-Fed eral ist  Vi ew , supra no te 2 , a t  205;  Akhi l Amar ,
Marbury, Section 13, and t he Original J urisdiction of the Supr eme Court,  56 U. CH I .
L. RE V. 443 (1989). Amar’s thesis was r ecently critiqued by  a  former stu dent of his,
Ju l ian Velasco, Congressional Control Over Federal Court Ju risd icti on: A D efens e of
the T rad iti ona l V iew , 46 CATH . U. L. RE V. 671  (199 7).
262. S ee, e.g., Pu sha w, supra  note 2.
migh t  simply ignore them and pr oceed with s uch cases a s th ey
would h ave pr oceeded oth erw ise. F or som e conceivable
sit uations, solu t ion s m igh t  be  les s ob viou s b u t  a re n ot  too
difficult  t o fashion. For exam ple, if Congress n ot only divested
an  ele men t  of ju r isdict ion  b u t  a lso abolished th e only federa l
cour t  or  cour t s  where tha t  element  of ju r i sd ict ion  had
the retofore reposed,  it  migh t  be s ufficient for the Su prem e
Cou r t  to review cases of that  description decided in state court s,
ignoring any exceptions tha t otherwise wou ld p lace  them ou t  of
it s a pp ell a te r ea ch .
~~~
For  much  of t h is  cen tu ry, res tr iction or r epea l of the  federa l
court s’ diver si ty ju r isdict ion  has been a  topic of earn est deba te.
There ar e const itut ionally permissible ways  t o diminish the
inst i tu t iona l costs  of th is an achr onistic (to some) but ben eficent
(to others) branch of jurisdiction, if that  should be desired .
Divestm ent , however, is cert ainly not one of them .
The idea  of diversity divestmen t a ppeals even t o some who
find th e possibilit y of federa l quest ion divestmen t a bhorr ent .
One of thes e—Pr ofessor Akh il Am a r  of Yale—a dvances  a  “two-
tier” theory of Article III261 to justify the one while foreclosing
the othe r . P rofessor  Robert P ushaw of Missouri propounds a
var i at ion  of th at  view.262 The “two-t i er ” th eory of subject ma tt er
jur isdict ion, however , cann ot su rvive a na lysis.
Amar ’s t h e or y tur ns on the fact th at, in the first paragraph
of Art icle III, S ection  2, th e a djective  “a l l” appea r s i n connect ion
with  some ca tegor ies of subject  ma tt er (in cluding  federa l
ques t ions) bu t  not  other s (inclu ding dive rsi ty). Am ar  wa s n ot
the first to tr y arguin g from th is verbal deviation. Two
cen tu r ie s ago,  Sou th  Carol ina  Fede ralist Congressman
Abraham Nott used the sam e teasing contrast t o suppor t  the
1801 bil l en la rgin g t he fede ra l ju dicia ry. N ot t  a rgued th at  by
exte nd ing th e federal judicial power t o “a ll” feder a l qu es t ion
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263. S ee 10 AN N A LS  O F  CO N G. 893 -96 (1 801 ).
264. S ee id . at 891, 896.
265. 14 U. S. (1  Wh ea t. ) 304 , 33 4 (18 16).
266. Amar, A N eo-Fed eral ist  Vi ew , supra  note 2, at  254-55 n .160 ; see also id.  a t
229-30.
cases, the Constitution precluded sta te cour t s  from cons ider ing
any of them, and  he a rgued tha t  s ince  st a t e ad jud ica t ion  of such
cases was foreclosed, the Congress mus t  p rov ide enough  federa l
cour t s to bea r  the caseload.263 Ot he r F eder alis ts  su ppor tin g th e
same bill took  pa in s t o disa vow N ot t ’s d ubiou s in fer en ce fr om
the word “all”;264 but fifteen years l a t er  J u s tice St ory re vived it
a s h i s own dictum in  Mar ti n  v.  Hunter ’s L essee.265 There  Amar
found it and tu rned it to this differen t  u se.  The  a rgumen t ,
however, ha s grown n o more credible with a ge.
Those subject ma tters a ttended by the word “all,” Amar
designa tes  as  th e firs t  tie r. As t o th ese, Am ar  cred its  St ory’s
view t h a t  t h e duty to vest is manda tory; and th is he finds to
preclude any divestment  of them. As t o t he others,
however—the s econd t ier—he finds other wise:
Because  Ar ticle  II I d oes  n ot d efin e w ith  pr ecis ion  wh ich  of
these  cases  mu s t  b e  h e a rd  by  a  f ede ra l  cour t—in  sha rp
con t r a s t t o  t h e c om m a n d  t h a t  all  m a n d a tory- t i e r  ca ses  be  so
h e a r d— t h e p o we r  t o d e li n e a t e t h e  bo u n d a r ie s  of fe d er a l
ju ris dict ion  ove r  t hese  penu mbr a l  ca ses  r e s t s  w i th  Congres s ,
a s  p a r t  of i t s  g e n e r a l  c on s t i t u t i o n a l  p o w e r  t o  “m a k e  a l l  L a w s
w h ich  sh a ll be  n ece ss a ry  a n d p ro pe r for  car r y in g  in t o
E xecu tion  . . . .”266
Amar  supposes that th is “power to delineate the boundaries”
includes  not  on ly d iscre t ion  to ves t  or  decline to vest second-tier
ca tegories in th e first ins ta nce, but a lso discret ion to divest
th em a t a ny tim e.
The fi r st  embar ra s smen t  t o th is  t heory  s h ou ld be obvious:
the re ar e differences am ong all, s ome, a nd  non e. When  Art icle
III sa ys t he ju dicial power  “sh all extend  to” diversity cases,
even t hough it does not s pecify “all,” it certa inly does not mea n
“none.” I f the  impera t ive “sha ll ext end  to a ll” pr ohibit s
dives tment of any of a  fir st -t ie r  ca tegory,  the same “sh a ll
extend  to,” with out  th e word  “all,” m us t a t lea st  pr ohibit
complet e divest men t of a cat egory in  the  second  t ie r . Thu s, even
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267. Id . at  254-55 n .160. Tacitly, A ma r a ssu mes  th at  th is pur port ed “power” is
su ff ic ien t to enable Congress not  only  to d elim it,  bu t t o elim ina te  an y r esi du um  of
any second-tier category. He does not explain, however, how this can be reconciled
with  Article I II’s man dat e: “shall e xten d to.”
268. John Ha rr ison , too,  tr ea te d t he  Ne cess ar y an d P rop er  Cla us e t oo ca s u ally
(if not flippan tly), in  The Power of Congress to Limit the Ju risdiction of Federal
Courts and the Text of Article III. S ee Ha rr ison, supra  n o t e 2 , a t  211, 217, 248-49.
He said, for exa mple, “In e sta blishin g  a n  in ferior tribun al, it is necessary an d proper
to give it  jurisdiction—say, jurisdiction over all cases between citizens of  th e  sa m e
Stat e. So m uch  for  en umer a ted  ju di cia l p ower .” Id . at  217. But  while givin g a  federa l
cour t  such  non-diver sity ju risdict ion in n on-federa l ques tion ca ses m ight  conceivably
be “necessary a nd proper” to something-or-other , it could not be considered necessa ry
and proper “for carr ying into execution” a judicial power  l im ited to the Article III
menu . The Necessary an d Proper Clau se does not empower Congress to do what ever
s e em s like a  good idea; th e power gr an ted b y th is claus e is en d-specific, and th e end
must  be “w it hi n t he  scop e of th e constit ut ion .” McCu lloch  v. M ar yla nd , 17  U. S. (4
Whea t ) 316 , 42 0 (18 19).
269. F o r an  eve n m ore  ext re me  mi sa ppl icat ion o f  t he Necessary and P roper
Clause,  see Eugene Gr essman  & Eric K. Gressm an , N ecessa ry a nd  Prop er R oots of
Except ions to Fed eral  J ur isd icti on , 51 GE O . WA S H . L. RE V. 495  (198 3).
The least  of the Gr essm an s’ err ors is in  revivin g, see id. at  508-09, th e na ive
“taut ology” view  of th e N eces sa ry  an d P rop er  Cla us e wh ich Ale xan der  Ha mi lton
propounded  in  Th e Federalist No. 33,  and then  (to his credit) quick ly abandoned . The
Gressmans employ that t ransient m isunderstanding, instead of Hamilton’s m a tu re
unde r st and ing of the N ecessa ry a nd P roper  Clau se set  forth  in h is  Opi ni on  on  the
Constitutionality o f an  Act  t o Es tab li sh  a  Bank, see H AMILTON, supra  note 196, at 97-
134, and r eitera ted an d appr oved for th e Supr eme Cour t by Chief Ju stice Mar s h a ll
if mos t  of a  second-t ier category (such as  diversity) could be
divest ed, som e re sidu e of it would m an da tor ily ha ve to r ema in.
Of course , t he Const it u t ion  pr ovid es  no clu e a s t o wh ich  or
how many cases  wi thin  ea ch “second-t ier ” cat egory a re
dispens able, and  which  or  how many mus t  r ema in.  Amar ’s
att empt  at  escap e from t his  emb ar ra ssm ent  is h is ba ld
as ser tion  tha t  “the power  to del inea te the  boundar ies  of federa l
ju r isdict ion  over t hes e pen um bra l cases  res ts  with  Congr ess .”267
However , t he  “power” wh ich  Amar  thus pos it s  is  t he same
un tr am melled  discret ion to pick an d choose a m on g
ju r isdict ion a l categories th at  conven t iona l op in ion  a t t r ibu tes  t o
the Tribu na ls a nd  Except ions Cla us es. Th e only differen ce is
tha t  Amar restricts this plenary discretion to “second-t ier ”
cases, and at tributes it  instead to the Necessary  a n d Pr oper
Claus e.
But  the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot patch  Am a r ’s
leaky ball oon. He  pla st er s it  th er e wit h n o rega rd  for it s
car efully chosen l anguage,268 or  for  th e r ole which  th at  lan gua ge
was cra ft ed to p lay in p reserv ing the  sepa rat ion  of powers.269
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ E N G - F I N A. W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
75] CONGRE SS’ LIMITS AND TH E J UDICIARY 149
in  McCulloch v. Mary land, 4 Whea t. 17 U .S. (4 Whea t.) 316 (1819). (Indeed , Mar sha ll
in  th at  cla ss ic cas e sp ecifica lly r eject ed M ar yla nd ’s Gr ess ma n-li ke  re viva l of
Hami lton ’s na ive ea rlier  view. S ee 17 U.S . (4 Whea t.) at  412-13.)
Mor e gra vely, th e Gre ssm an s ta ke t he N ecessa ry a nd P roper  Clau se as  th e bas is
no t for laws effectuat ing “the judicial Power” contem plated by t he Const itut ion, but
rat her  for l aw s e ffect ua ti ng  wh at  th ey ch ar act er ize as Congress’ “authority over the
judicia ry.” Gressman & Gress man ,  supra , at  510; see also id.  at 511. This pur ported
“au thor i ty over the judiciary” they attr ibute no t  to the Necessary and Proper Clause
a t  all, but t o the conven tion al m isconst ru ction of th e Tr ibun als C lau se, see id. at 510-
11, and t h e  E xception s Cla use , see id. at  511. Thu s, disr egar ding t he in tr insic
cons t r a in t  t he Necessary and Proper Clause was crafted to impose, the Gressmans
use it  in st ea d t o com pou nd  th e li mi tl es s d iscr et ion  th ey a tt ri bu te  to t he  fam ilia r fa lse
premises  of Congress’ judiciary power!
Bu t  th e flaws in  th e Gre ssm an s’ an alysis d o not en d even  th ere. U tilizing t he
unfo r tuna te “p r et e xt ” d ic tu m  fr om  McCul loch  v . Maryland—wh ich con founded  jud icia l
an alys is in some pre-New Deal cases like Ham mer v. Dagenhart , 247 U.S . 251
(191 8)—t he  Gre ssm an s as ser t t ha t Con gres s ma y not , “ ‘un der t he pr etext  of executing
i t s powe rs ,’ . . . pas s la ws for  t he a ccomp lish me nt  of object s n ot e nt ru st ed t o th e
govern men t.” Gre ssm an  & Gre ssm an , supra , at 51 4 (quotin g McC ul loch , 17  U. S. (4
Whea t.) at 423). On this ground they asser t  t h a t  l aws  to “thwar t  or  undo the
en fo rcemen t of preva iling cons tit ut iona l doctr ines , develope d by t he S upr eme  Cour t,”
i d ., and l aw s de sign ed “t o des tr oy or r en der  un en force ab le a  pa rt icul ar  cons tit ut iona l
r igh t  or claim  r ec ogn iz ed  by  the S upr em e C ou r t ,” i d . a t  515,  as  wel l as  l aws  tha t
“de s t roy or wea ken  an y par t of the  Sup rem e Cour t’s jurisdict ional fun ction a nd a bility
to achieve and  ma in ta in  the supr e m a cy an d un iformit y of the fed era l Const itu tion ,”
id . at 519 , would be  un const itu tion al beca use  of the “illegit ima cy” of thos e en ds. S ee
id . at 513, 514.
The Necessar y and P roper Clau se,  how ever, does not restrict Congress’ exercise
of an y power confer red b y another provision,  wh et he r t ha t is  th e com me rce  powe r or
the power (if any) regar ding th e judiciary at tribu table to  the  Tr ibuna ls  and
Excep t ions Cla us es.  In st ea d, t he  Ne cess ar y an d P rop er  Clause gives additional power
to Congres s , l imi t ing onl y t ha t a dd iti ona l pow er i n  ter ms  of the ends t o be served.
Tha t is why Ham mer v. Dagenhart  was  overr uled  mor e th an  ha lf a cent ur y ago. S ee
United  Stat es v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Consequent ly, if eith er t he Tr ibun als
Clause or t he  Exce pt ions  Cla us e r ea lly d id gi ve p ower  to C ong ress  t o  con t rol  t he
cour t s or th eir ju risdict ion, th e Gre ssm an s’ ar chaic “pret ext ” a r gum en t cou ld n ot
cons t ra in it at  all.
270. S ee 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  147, 168.
He mis ses t he w hole poin t of rep lacing Ra nd olph’s “sha ll
organize” clause with  Wilson’s “necessar y and  proper” clau se;270
tha t  point is th e differen ce between  Congr ess  contr olling t he
discr etion  of another  branch  and  Congress facilita ting a noth er
br anch’s e xer cise of it s ow n discr et ion .
Amar  seem s n ot t o ha ve per ceived —a t  leas t  he does  not
expla in—h is m u t a t ion  fr om  s t a t u t or i ly  “ca r rying in t o
E x ecu t i on ” the Art icle  III jud icial power  with  it s
constitu tionally de lin ea ted  bou nds , t o statutorily “delinea tin g
the bounda ries” instea d. If this m ut an t r at ionale could su rvive,
Congress could lik ewise  exclud e var ious offens es fr om execu tive
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271. U.S  CO N S T . art . II, § 2, cl. 1.
272. Amar, A N eo-Fed eral ist  Vi ew , supra  note 2, at  254-55 n.160.
273. 1 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  22.
clemen cy: The  Pr esid en t h as  power  to “gra n t  Repr ieves  and
Pardons for Offenses against the Un ited Sta t es,” but  th e t ext
does not  s ay for  “all” such offenses,271 and  by  Amar’s  mutan t
logic it mu st t her efore fol low tha t  Congress , “a s  pa r t  of i t s
genera l const i t ut i ona l power to ‘ma ke all La ws which sh all be
necessa ry an d pr oper for ca rr ying in t o Execu t ion’”272 t he
Presiden t ’s powers, ma y “delineat e th e boun da rie s” of clemen cy.
Su re ly, however , t ha t  wou ld  be  recognize d as  a p lain ly
uncons t itu t iona l in t rusion  in to another  branch’s  domain .
Amar ’s supposed power  to “del in ea te t he bounda r ies ” of so-
called second-tier jurisdiction, however, exhibits th e same
logical flaw.
Moreover , Amar ’s  “two-t i er ” concept ion  i s r e fu ted by the
su rvivin g records of the d ra ft in g proces s,  wh ich  make  it  eviden t
tha t  the  use  or  omiss ion  of “a ll” in Article III’s subject m at ter
list  is m ere ly a  va r ia t ion  of s tyl e,  having no subs t an t ive impor t .
The adjective “all” was  used  once in th e nin th  Randolph
Resolu t ion  as p ropos ed  to the Conven t ion : only in  the fir st  of
the several  ph ra ses constitu ting t he pr oposed su bject m at ter
list. Tha t  li st  was  a  melange of ph r a ses, some linked  by
conjun ctives and s ome by dis junct ive s b u t  som e n ot  link ed a t
all,  an d some sepa ra ted by sem icolons but  other s sepa ra ted
merely by commas. It specified:
a l l p i r ac i e s  &  felon ies  on  th e h igh  sea s, ca pt u re s fr om  an
ene my;  cases  in  wh ich foreigne r s  or  ci t i zens  of  othe r  S ta t e s
a p p ly in g t o s u ch  ju r isd icti on s m a y be  in te re st ed , or  wh ich
respec t  t h e  c ol le ct i on  o f t h e  N a t i o n a l  r e v en u e ;  im p e a ch m e n t s
of a n y  Na t iona l  o ff ice r s ,  and  ques t ions  wh ich  m ay  invo lve  the
na t iona l  peace a nd  ha rm ony.273
It  seems highly unlikely that Ran dol ph  an d h is fellow
Virginians, by specifying “all” with r espect to pira cies, meant  to
provide only for  “some” captures from enemies, “fewer  than  a ll ”
cases res pe ct in g n a t ion a l r eve nue collect ion ,  and “some bu t  not
all” of the p ossible im p ea ch m ents of national officers. Perhaps
the “all” at  th e head of the list wa s intended to apply to every
ensu ing phr ase, n otwiths ta ndin g the contr ast  of conjun ctives
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274. 1 i d . at 232.
275. 2 i d . at 132-33.
276. The widesp read r ecogn ition  of this nar rower connota tion of “case” was
illustrat ed a few weeks  la t e r  wh en Dr. J ohnson moved to add jurisdiction over cases
a r i sing unde r  t he Constitut ion. Neglecting the narr ower connotat ion of the word as
commonly  un der st ood in  th is con te xt,  Ma dis on
doubted whet her  it wa s not  going too far t o extend t he  ju ri sd ict ion  of th e
Cour t  gener ally to cas es ar ising U nder  th e Const itu tion, & wh eth er it  ought
no t to  be  l imi ted  to cases  of a  Judic iary  Nature. T he  r igh t  of  expounding
the Const itu tion in  cases n ot of this  n a t u r e  ou ght  no t  to be  given  to tha t
Depar tmen t .
2 F A R RA N D, supra  not e 61 , at  430.  Bu t M ad ison  him sel f infor ms  us th at t he na rrower
conno tat ion  was am ply clear t o others, reporting t hat  “[t]he m oti on  of Docr . J ohn son
and d is junct ive s,  and r ega rdles s of the vagaries of punctua t ion .
It  s eems much  more likely, however, that “all” was unn ecessary
(and super flu ous a s t o pi racies ), be cause  the in ten t  to em br ace
th ose cat egories comp lete ly was  quit e pla in en ough w ith out  it.
Tha t fir st  lis t  of su bject  mat ter s w as s upe rse de d on  June  13,
when  th e delega tes  am end ed t he N int h Res olut ion  t o provide,
“tha t  t he  ju r isd ict ion  of t he na t iona l Jud ici a ry  sha ll  ex t end  to
cases, wh ich  res pe ct  the coll ect ion  of th e Nat ional revenu e,
impeachmen t s of any na t iona l office r s,  and q ues t ion s w hich
involve the  na t iona l  peace and  harmony .”274 He re the  word “all”
was nowher e used. P erh a ps  “any” made i t  unmis takable tha t
every impeachmen t  was in ten de d,  bu t  ther e is  no rea son  to
th ink th at  th is a men ded r esolut ion cont empla ted only “some” of
the revenue or “nat ional peace and harm ony” cases.
After  fu r the r  amendments  (includin g de let ion  of th e
impeachment jur i sdiction), in J uly th is resolut ion was r eferred
t o t he Com mit tee  of Det a il. As  refer red , it  pr ovided , “[t]h a t  t he
Ju r i sdi ct ion  of th e na tional J udiciary sh all extend  to Cases
a r i sing un der  th e La ws pa ssed  by th e gene ra l Legisla tu re, an d
to s u ch  ot her  Quest ions as involve the n at ional Pea ce and
Harmony .”275 Again, the word “all” nowhere appeared.
Jus t  as  it u sed  enu me ra tion  to de ta il th e gen e r a lit ies  abou t
na t iona l legisla t ive  pow er , so the Det a il Commit tee  unde r took
t o sp ecify  for  the ju dicia ry wh at  “oth er  Qu es t ion s” migh t
“involve the  na t iona l  Peace  and Harmony.” The word
“questions” was dropped, probably because p ea ce and  harmony
“questions” would also arise in  legislative an d execut ive
conte xts ; an d since centu ries of usage ha d given the  word “case”
specialized connot at ions in  th e jud icial cont ext ,276 t ha t  word
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was agreed  t o  nem: con: it being generally su pposed tha t th e jurisdiction given was
constr uctively  limit ed t o cases of a  J udicia ry n at ur e.” Id .
277. 2 i d . a t  147 . The  othe r  cat egories on Randolph’s “peace and harmony” list
were “the collection of the revenu e,” “disputes b etwe en cit izens  of different  sta tes ,”
“disputes  betw een  differen t st at es,” an d “dispu tes , in  which subject s or  citi zen s of
o ther  countries ar e concerned.” Emenda tions in Rutledge’s han dwriting added
“disputes  between a St ate & a Citizen or Citizens of another  Stat e,” and “Cases of
Admi ra lty J ur isdn .” Id .
278. Art icle II I’s u se o f t he t wo  di ffe ren t  words  “ca ses ” and “c on t rover sie s” ha s
occasioned other a ttem pts at  explanat ion. Some comment ators h ave asser ted—rat her
too confident ly, tha t “case” is a broa der t erm  includin g both cr imin al a nd civil
matt ers, while “controversy” includes only civil matters . S ee, e.g., William A. Fletcher,
The ‘Case or Controversy’ Requ irem ent in S tate Court Adjud ication of Federal
Ques t ions, 78 CAL . L. RE V. 263, 265-67 (1990 ); Har rison , su pra note 2, at  220-47;
Melt zer , supra  no te 2 , a t  1575; James  E . P f a nder , Rethinking the Supreme Court’s
Original J ur isd icti on i n S ta tes -Par ty  Cas es, 82 CAL . L. RE V. 555, 604-09 (1994). I find
the evid en ce assembled  for t hi s t he sis  un per su as ive.  No s uch  sp ecia lize d a nd  te chn ica l
usa ge of th e t er m “con tr oversy” ha s been  shown  to ha ve been  common a s ear ly as
1789; indeed, it appear s to have been qu ite uncommon even la ter.
Rober t Push aw, in his article entitled Article III’s Case/ Controversy Distinction
and the Dua l Funct ions of  Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE  DA M E  L. RE V. 447  (199 4),
uncovered the more credible explanat ion; but I a m  n o t sure  he  knew what  he  had
found,  because he went on to confound th e case/cont rover sy dichotom y with  an
ent irely  differ en t d ist inct ion.  “Cont rov er sy” is t he  br oad er  te rm , in clud ing  not  on ly
those disputes which are “cases” in the technical sense—disputes resolvable by
ap plica tion  an d exp osition of existin g (or argu ably exist ing) law—bu t oth er a rbit ra ble
disputes  as well. As Pushaw noted, “[a] paradigmatic ‘controversy’ was a dispute
between  govern men ts,” id . a t  483; and as to ma ny such disput es, there would be no
established  law t o apply. Th e sam e migh t be s aid , for examp le, of disputes “between
citizens of the s am e St at e claim ing La nds  un der  Gra nt s of differen t St at es.”
Pushaw went  awry , however ,  when  he  assoc ia t ed  the  t e rms “case” and
“contr oversy” with  th e lat e twen tiet h-cent ur y dichotom y of “law-declar at ion” and  mere
“d ispu te re solu tion ” roles . Th us  he  sa id t he  “dist ing uis hin g fea tu re ” of a “case” was
tha t  it  in volve d “a l ega l qu es ti on t ha t t ra ns cended  the  in t e re st s  of  the  immedia t e
l it igan ts,” wh ile “a ‘cont rov er sy’ was  an  ad ver sa ri al p roce edi ng  in w hich  re solu tion  of
the dispu te bet ween  th e par ties—n ot th e law in volved—was crit ical.” Id . at 480, 483.
This  fit nicely with Pu shaw’s Amarian “neo-Federalist” view that  feder al j ur isd icti on
is expendable as t o “controversies” because only the par ties’ intere st s are involved,
while  ju risdict ion over “cases” cann ot be dives ted b ecaus e it’s really im port an t t o have
federa l judges expoundin g federal law for all to obey. Pusha w a dded tha t  judicia l
exp osit ion  (an d el ab ora tion ) of feder al l aw  is s o im por ta nt  th at  i t  should not be
cons t r a ined with doctrines of justiciability suited to merely inter-party disputes.
was used instead. Thus, Randolph’s outline for th e Committ ee
enumera ted sever al ca te gories  of “case s . . . involvin g th e
na tion al p ea ce an d h ar mon y”277 in a list.
Wilson ’s d ra ft  a r ranged Ran dolph’s list of peace and
harmony ca tegor ies  in to one compound clause—a series of
par allel prepositional phrases shar ing in  common a  s ing le
noun . The  nou n Wils on u sed , however, was n ot “cases,” but
“cont roversies”:278 Randolph’s  mos t  n ot able “peace an d
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The pr oblem with Push aw’s view is that, un til decades (or genera tions) after the
f r aming, n o t hing quite like wh at t he m odern “law declarat ion” model connotes was
coun tenanced for a ny cou rt  in a ny k ind of cas e. See generally En gdah l, supra  no t e
204. At bot tom, impa tien ce with  just iciability doctr ines is  impa tien ce with  th e
dis tin ction  between judicia l and legis la t ive work.
279. Wil son’s list  incl ud ed con tr oversie s  “be tween  Sta t e s ,” “be tween  a  Sta t e  and
a  Citizen  or Cit izens  of anot her  Sta te,” “betwee n Cit izens  of diff e ren t  St a t e s ,” and
between  a sta te or citizens a nd a foreign st ate or citizens . 2 FA R RA N D, supra  note 61,
a t  173. Randolph’s list had included r evenu e colle cti on  as well , bu t  tha t  was
redunda n t  to “cases, a risin g un der  laws ” of th e na tion al legis lat ur e. 2  i d . a t  147 . The
pr ovisi on  for dispu tes  “between  a St at e an d a Cit izen or Cit izens of anoth er Sta te”
had been  add ed t o Ran dolph’s list b y Rut ledge. S ee 2 i d . a t  137 n.6 & 14 7. Rut ledge
also ha d su ggest ed t he p rovis ion for ca ses  of adm ira lty a nd  ma rit ime  jur is d ic t io n . S ee
id .
280. 2 i d . at 172-73, 186.
281. The se pa ra te  “cont rov er sie s” cla us e cove ri ng  th ose  “to wh ich  the U nit ed
Stat es sha ll be a P ar ty” was la ter  add ed by floor a men dme nt . S ee 2 i d . at 423, 430.
harmony” ca t egory, “disp ut es be tw een  differen t s ta te s,” ha d
been pr ovid ed  for  by Ar t icle  IX of t he Ar t icle s of Confed er a t ion ,
which  had  used the word “con t rover sies .” When  Wilson
ass embled  that  and t he other  categories279 in pa ra llel
p repos it iona l ph rase s,  he a r rayed  them  a ll u nde r  the n oun
“contr oversies” used in tha t Confederation Article IX.
In  add it ion  to these  peace  and  h a r mony ca tegor ies , Wilson
and the Committee proposed add in g t wo ot her  ca tegor ies  of
ju r isdict ion , one in volving diploma ts  (am bas sa dors , pub lic
ministers, and consuls) a n d th e oth er  involvin g ad mir alt y an d
mar it ime ma t ter s. Ra ther  than  ar rayin g t hes e wit h  the p ea ce
and ha rm ony categories in parallel prepositional phra ses,
however, th ey placed them  in sepa ra te claus es par allel t o the
clause  about  cases ar ising un der  federal laws. Thus the re came
to be three parallel clauses each separately usin g the  noun
“cas es.”280
No one ever has supposed that this  va r ia t ion  of st yle—a
ser ies of pa ra ll el  clauses  each  us ing  the same noun bu t
modifying it  with  differen t d escrip tive p hr as es, cont ra st ed wit h
one compound clause 281 in  wh ich  a single  nou n is  modified  by a
series  of par alle l pr eposit iona l ph ra ses —ha s a ny s ub s t an t ive
m ea nin g. The  us e or d isu se of th e word  “all,” however , is
likewise a m ean ingless var iation of style.
The use of the word “a ll” in  Ra ndolph ’s ou t lin e for  the
Commi t tee migh t h ave ca rr ied a  mea nin g like Ama r wou ld
sup pose, for  a l though  he  proposed extending ju r isdiction “to all
D :\ 1 9 9 9- 1\ F I N A L \ E N G - F I N A. W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
154 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999
282. Randolph omitted the word “al l” as  t o “impeachmen ts of officers,” a ma tter
he propos ed r est orin g to th e su bject m at ter  list. I t se ems  un likely, h owever, th at by
th is omission he intended t o provide that some impeachmen ts should be left to other
tribunals.
283. 2 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  147.
284. The Committee Report  did p rov ide  th at  th e le gisl at ur e cou ld a ssi gn  an y of
the contemplated jur isdiction—including impeach m e n ts, e xcep t of t he  Pr es ide nt —to
federal cou r t s  othe r  t han  the “supreme” one.  S ee 2 i d . at 186-87. If it t roubled  thus
to provide explicitly for other federal court s doing so, su rely t he Com mit tee could  no t
ha ve mean t to silently leave some federal officer impeachmen ts  t o state tribu nals by
simp ly omit tin g to pr eface “imp each me nt s” on th e feder al ju ri sdi ction a l  menu  with
the word “all.”
285. S ee 2 i d . at 186.
cases, ar ising un der la ws pa ssed by th e genera l legislat ur e,”2 82
for  h i s peace an d ha rm ony categories Rand olph proposed
exte nd ing ju r isdict ion  only “to such  othe r case s, a s the  na t iona l
legisla tu re  ma y as sign .”283 Tha t , h owever , is  the ve ry fea ture of
Randolph’s outline tha t defied the Convention’s J un e 13th
re solve again st legislat ive con tr ol of jur isdict ion—th e r esolve
tha t  th e Conven tion  lat er  ins ist en tly r ea ffirm ed, r epellin g an y
inference of legislative discretion to pick an d choose.
Wilson ’s dra ft an d th e Committ ee’s Report a lso used the
word “a l l. ” In  them,  as in  the fin ished  Con st it u t ion , t he word
app ear ed in e a ch  par alle l ph ra se t ha t u sed  th e nou n “cases ,”
bu t did n ot a ppea r in  th e sin gle compound  clause  employ ing  the
noun “contr oversies.” In these drafts, however, the use or
disuse of “a l l” cannot  be g iven  Amar’s  mean ing,  because  bot h
also omitted  “all” from th eir  cl a u ses  ext en ding ju r isdict ion  “to
the tr ial of impeachm ents  of Officer s of th e Un ite d St at es.”
Legisla tive  discret ion  to omit  feder a l ju r isdict ion  over  som e
federal  officer imp eachm ent s284 cannot  have been contemplated;
bu t tha t  is th e conclusion to which Amar ’s th esis—if it were
valid—would lead.
Moreover , a l though the Commit tee ’s R ep or t  pr ovid ed  for  the
Supreme Cour t t o ha ve origin a l  ju r isdiction in “cases of
impeachmen t , cases affecting Ambassadors, ot h er P ublic
Minister s and Consuls, and t hose in wh ich a St at e sha ll be
pa r ty, ” un like th e compa ra ble clause  in th e finished
Con st it u t ion , th i s was  not  p refaced with  t he word  “all.”285
Pr esu ma bly Amar  would th erefore supp ose tha t t he Comm ittee
consider ed such origina l jurisdiction dispen sable wh eth er  or  not
other federal courts  existed; but in  fact, the per ceived
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286. S ee 2 i d . at  547 , 55 0-52, 572, 576. Earlier, the impea chment  clause had been
postponed. S ee 2 i d . at 423, 424.
287. S ee 2 i d . at 423, 430.
288. S ee 2 i d . at 423-24, 431.
289. S ee 2 i d . at 425, 431-32.
290. S ee 2 i d . at 423, 430.
291. Although  the m otion was to inser t th e new p h r a s e  a ft er “controver sies” in
the pr eex ist ing  comp oun d cla us e, wi th out  exp lan at ion (or  cons equ en ce) it  got
tra nscribed as  a  separa te  “cont rovers ies” c lause  ra ther  than  a n o th e r  parallel phrase
in  the pr eexisting one. Therefore, the resolution as lat er re ferred to the Commit tee
of Style already contained the two separate “controversies” clauses th a t  a p p ea r  i n  t he
finished  Con stit ut ion. S ee 2 i d . at  576. This , too, is sur ely just  a m ean ingless  fortu ity
impr opriety of leavin g any such  case withou t  som e federal
forum was  th e wh ole rea son for in cludin g th e origin al
ju r isdict ion  pr ovis ion !
Conven tion  act ions following the Deta il Commit tee ’s R ep or t
make any a t t r ibu t ion  of sign ifica nce t o the word “a ll” eve n more
indefensible. Ju r i sdi ct ion  over impea chment s was  delet ed a gain
when  th e decision for Senat e tria l of impeachmen ts wa s
m ade, 286 an d th en, as  addit ional subject ma tt er cat egories were
suggest ed an d a ppr oved, th ey wer e pla ced wh ere ver in  th e
subject mat ter list the movant happ e n ed  to p ropose . For
examp le, Dr . Johnson  move d t o ins ert  th e word s “this
Con st it u t ion  and th e” before the word “laws”; the word “laws”
ha ppened  to be in a  clau se wh ich did  inclu de “all.”287 Mr .
Rut ledge  moved t o include  “tr eat ies” in th e sa me cla us e;2 8 8
t he refore ma tt ers a rising u nder  tr eat ies ar e cover ed by t ha t
adjective, too. Mr. Sh erm a n  moved to insert  “between  Citizens
of the s ame S ta te cla im in g la nds  unde r  gr an t s of d iffer en t
S ta tes” im med ia tely  followin g t he p hrase  “bet ween  Cit izens of
differen t  States”;289 th at  ph ra se wa s located in t he  long,
compound clau se which  la cked the word “all.” There seems to
have been  no discuss ion  abou t  any poss ibl e con se qu en ce fr om
placing any of these new cat egories in one clau se ra th er t ha n
an oth er , by virt ue  of its h avin g or la ckin g th e word  “all.”
Likewise, Madison a nd Gouver neur  Morris pr oposed
ins ert ing the  words “to which  the  United  S ta tes  sha ll  be  a
P a r t y” after  th e word “cont roversies”; th is “was a greed t o nem:
con:,” wit hout  recor de d d iscuss ion .290 Of course the only pla ce in
the r es ol u tion at t hat  time where the word “contr oversies”
app ear ed was  in t he lon g, compound  cl ause omi t ti ng the  word
“all,”291 yet  no one s eems t o have s upp ose d t ha t  th is  ca tegor y
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of style.
292. S ee 2 i d . at 424.
293. S ee 2 i d . at 576.
294. S ee 2 id . at 600-01.
295. S ee 2 i d . at 628.
296. F o r additional critique of Amar ’s reliance upon this fortuity of draftin g style ,
see  Cas to, supra  not e 2, at  89, an d Melt zer, supra  note 2, at  1573-82.
s h ou l d in clu de  only “som e” lit iga t ion  mat ter s t o wh ich  the
Unit ed S ta t es  is  a  pa r ty. In deed , th e Conven tion  deem ed t his
ca tegor y so impor t an t  t ha t  for  a  while it wa s in cluded  in t he
se lect  gr oup of ca tegor ies des ign a ted  for  Su pr em e Cour t
origina l ju r isdict ion ;292 yet e ven  th en , the word  “a l l” was  not
used.
The jurisdiction provisions were  not  d iscussed  any more
before refer r a l t o the Commit tee  of St yle  for  fin a l r evi sion;293
and that  Committ ee made no chan ge except to delet e on e
exce pt ion  in  the in terst a te con t rover sies  pr ovis ion .294 No
subsequen t discussion of the judiciary occurr ed a t  the
Conven tion , except w ith  rega rd  to civil jury t ria l.295
On th is  recor d,  it  is  sh eer  fancy t o a t t r ibute even  the
slightest  sign ifica nce t o the u se  or  omission  of “a ll ” in Art icle
III’s subject  ma t t e r l is t .296  Withou t  the  suppor t  of the
inconse que nt ia l “a ll,” Ama r’s “t wo-t ier ” st ructure fa lls  fla t , for
the re i s n o other r eason to consider Congress’ duty to vest as
a n y less ma nda tory (or its capacity to divest a ny grea te r ) for
some categories of jur isdiction tha n for others .
The sa me “sh a ll ext en d” m anda te a pp lie s t o each  ca tegor y
pres cribed in  Art icle  II I; a nd Congress’ only power  rega rd ing
judicia l bra nch  jur isdict ion is  to ma ke laws  appr opriat e “for
ca r ry ing into Execut ion” a “judicial Power” having th e extent  so
prescribed. Thus,  the  fede ral cou r ts in  th e 1870’s acted
ap pr opria tely  in disregarding and ignoring Congress’ att empt s
a t  st rip pin g jur isdict ion. While Con gres s m ay cre at e or a bolish
in fer ior  t r ibuna ls  and may shuffl e a s s ignmen t s a m ong  such
federal  court s  as exist , no cat egory of subject mat ter
jur isdict ion , once vest ed, m ay be d ivest ed from  th e judicia ry a s
a  wh ole,  exce pt  by con st it u t ion a l am end men t. Th is br igad ing of
the judicia l power  aga in st  leg is la t ive  discr et ion  i s a  funct ion  of
the intrinsic  limit s of Congr ess ’ power , not  an y extr ins ic limits
like  t h ose in th e Bill of Right s. And it is not a  ma tt er of
inference; it  is explicit on  th e face of th e const itu tion al t ext .
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297. S tua r t v. L ai rd , 5 U .S.  (1 Cr an ch) 2 99,  309  (180 3).
298. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868). McCardle, a journa list, was confined dur ing
Recon st ru ction  by a military district comma nder in Mississippi a n d sought r elease by
writ  of ha bea s cor pu s. H is p et it ion  wa s d en ied  by t he  Cir cui t C our t for  th e Di st ri ct
of Mississippi, and h e sought S upr eme Cour t review.
One need only be careful enough  to look in t he r ight pla ce.
Am ong i t s othe r  funct ions , the  ca re fu l ly  cra fted  Necessa ry  and
Pr oper Cla use  is  a  funda men t  of ou r  C ons tit ut ion’s sep ar at ion
of powers.
B. Discretion  as to S ystem  Design
 Con gr es s h as d iscret ion  to cons t itu te  in fe r ior  t r ibuna l s (and
recon st i t ut e t hem) “from t ime to t ime.” For  “ca r ry ing  in to
Execut ion ” the ju dicia l power , Con gr es s h as d iscret ion  to
a lloca te (and reallocate) the ma ndat ed subject  ma t t e r
ju r isdict ion . Con gr es s t hus m ay r eva mp t he ju dicial br anch’s
s t ructu re as exper ien ce migh t s ugges t: so long a s t he  requ isites
of the Necessary a nd P rope r  Cla use  a re m et , Con gr es s ca n
make la ws  to va ry t he n umber  of t r i bu n a ls, to differe nt iat e
th em by venu e, to sp ecialize t he m b y su bject m at te r, t o
des igna te  some  for  t r ia l s and  othe r s for  appea ls , and  to
organize and reorganize the system in other ways.
Congress’ discretion over judicial branch design ha s been
re cognized from th e beginning. As alrea dy noted, twelve year s
after  the or igina l J udicia ry Act , Con gr es s,  by t he J udicia ry Act
of 1801, r ep la ced  the exis t in g cir cu it  cour t s wit h  a  new set  of
differen tly  cons t it u ted  one s; t h e n  it ch an ged it s m ind  th e ne xt
year  an d r ein st it u ted  the p revious r egime. T he S upr em e Cour t
in  1803 uph eld  the s t a tu tory r ea ss ign men t  of case s fr om the
new an d su bst an tia lly differen t cir cuit  court s t o th e origin al
ones th at  were r estored by  th e 1801 Act’s r epea l, observin g tha t
“Congress ha ve const itu tion al a ut hor ity . . . to transfer a cause
from one  such  t r ibuna l t o anothe r .”297
This  point  is a lso illu s t rat ed by the n oted Civil War  era
case, Ex parte McCardle.298 While Article II I m anda tes  t ha t  a
federal  foru m be a vailable for ea ch  case wit hin  its  ter ms , it
ce r ta in ly does not  r equ i re  t ha t  any case be a fforded  more
federal  hea r in gs  than  one. Ad judica t ion  with  no pos sibil it y of
appea l is a lmost  un hea rd  of today, bu t it  was  the norm in  some
of th e or igina l s t a tes , a nd t he Const it u t ion  permi ts  Congress  t o
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299. In  United S tates v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), Chief Just ice Chase
w r ot e th at  Con gr ess  “ma y confe r or  wit hold  th e r igh t of a ppe al fr om” de cision s of
“in fe r io r” federa l court s, an d if the  sta tu te bein g consider ed in Klein had  done
n o th ing more , it would b e our  dut y to give it effect. If it s imply d e n ie d  t he
r igh t  of appeal in a pa rticular  class of cases, th ere could be no doubt t hat
it  must  be  reg arde d a s an  ex er cise o f t he p ower  of C on gr es s to m ake “s uch
excep tion s from the appellat e jurisdiction” as should seem  to it expedient.
Id . at 145. Chase’s assumpt ion that  the E xceptions Clause is the source of th at  pow er
was mistak en, but oth erwise his un dersta nding of the effect of the clause was  co r rec t .
300. The McCardle opin ion  it se lf  emphasi ze s  t h is. S ee 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 515;
see also Van Alst yne, supra  note 178, at  246. Som eon e else did  emp loy this
alt ern at ive a few months la ter, bringing before the Su prem e  C ou r t  some of the  same
issues  McCardle had tried to press. See Ex parte Yerger , 75 U.S . (8 Wall.) 85 (1 869 ).
301. 1 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  124.
follow  tha t  p a t t ern  with  th e feder al cour ts , whet her  wholes ale
or  piecem eal. 299 One federa l cour t  ha d alr eady h ear d McCardle’s
ha bea s corpu s pet ition, a nd  th ere fore cut tin g off his  recourse  to
an other  cour t  was  no offense  to the  Cons t itu t ion .  In  any event,
however, Con gress had left open anoth er aven ue of review tha t
McCar dle could have employed;300 and cert ain ly if Congre ss
could have foreclosed any app ea l, it s e lim in a t ion  of ju s t  one
alt er na tive  wa s const itu tion ally in offen sive. McCard le d id  not
involve a  d ives tmen t  of ju r is d ict ion from the judiciary as a
whole; it  ra ther  illust ra tes  Con gr es s’ dis cretion  to r e st ructu re
the sys tem  so lon g a s a t  lea st  one  feder al forum is  ava ila ble  for
each constit ut ionally eligible case.
The framers denied Congress discretion over subject ma tt er
ju r isdict ion , bu t  their  J une 5 th  compr omise a bou t  “infer ior”
cour t s did g ive  it  di scr et ion  over th e judicial system’s size.
Moreover , wha t m ade t ha t compromise seem  tolerable to those
who wan ted jus t one federa l tribu na l was Madison’s  a rgument
tha t  “unless inferior tr ibunals were dispersed throughout the
Repu blic with  final jur isdict ion in  m any case s,  app ea ls  [to the
one ‘su pr em e’ cour t ] wou ld  be  mult ip lie d t o a  m os t  oppr ess ive
degr ee.”301 Not  on ly would the  single cou r t ’s  ca seload  become
excessive, b u t  a lso, u n les s t he cou r t  it se lf we re p er ipa tet ic,
litiga nt s from a ll over would ha ve to tra vel to one, us ua lly very
d is t an t , place, even though  tr avel condit ions were pr imitive.
Nonetheless, no law t ermina ting cases  a t  an  in fe r ior  federa l
cour t  level could h ave p as sed m us ter  as  “car ryin g int o
Execu t ion” Art icle  II I’s ju r isdict ion a l t er ms,  bu t  for  the
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302. Rober t Clint on re ached  a sim ilar  conclusion in  A Mand atory View of Federal
Court Ju risdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Und erstanding of Article III,
supra  note 2, at  749-50, 754-57.
Except ions Cla use  qu a lifyin g t he Ar t icle  II I m anda te of
Supr eme Cour t a ppellat e jurisdiction in n on-origina l cases.
The pur pose and funct ion  of t he  Except ions  Clause a re
the refore eviden t. Cer ta inly it  i s not  a  gran t  of power; however,
it  does en lar g e Congr ess ’ discr et ion beyon d wh at  th e la ngu age
of the Appellate and Necessa r y an d P roper  Clau ses w ould
oth e r wise allow. Th e judicia l power  mu st  be vest ed t o its full
subject ma t t e r  exten t , bu t  t he Except ions Cla us e ma kes  it
immater ia l whether  the full ra nge of su bject m at ter  is vest ed in
any one tr ibuna l, even on  app ea l. Beca use  and on ly beca use  of
the Exceptions Clause, Congr ess’ power to cur ta il S u prem e
Court r eview of an y (or even of all) Article III subject ma tt er
compor t s wit h t he  Neces sa ry a nd  Pr oper Claus e, so long as,  and
to the extent that , t her e is  som e ot her  feder al cour t  where  the
“excepted” ma t t e r  can  be hea rd.302
The most im porta nt  ra mificat ion of its discret ion over
system  de sign  is  tha t  Con gr es s ca n  choose  whether  and to wha t
extent  the ju dicia l br anch  sh ould  be  pyramid ic in  form. We take
our  h ier a rch ica l ju dicia ry for  gra nt ed beca us e it  is familiar , but
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303. S ee generally Engda hl, supr a note 69.
J ust ice S tory , i n  Ma rt in  v. H un ter ’s L essee , 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), argu ed
tha t  Congress’ discretion regarding judicial system design is cons tr ain ed. His
a rgumen t  com bi ned  sev er a l p rem is es : fi r st , t ha t  the c a teg or ie s “or ig in a l” a nd
“appellate” for th e Suprem e Court ar e mut ually exclusive; second, that t o some exten t
a t  lea st , th e fed er al j ud icia l powe r is  exclu sive ; th ir d , t ha t  Congres s  canno t ves t  t he
federa l judicia l power  in st at es; an d four th , th at  “the duty to vest t he whole judicial
power” is ma nda tor y. Id . at  330.  Fr om t he se h e con clud ed t ha t “con gress  a re  bound
to cr ea te s om e i n fe r ior  cou r t s.” Id. at 331.
Only  th e la st  of St ory ’s fou r p r e m is e s,  h owever , was s ound . The Con stit ut ion itse lf
does not  exclu de s ta te  cour ts  from  an y ca tegory specified  in Ar ticl e II I; st at es d o not
need  to be invested with th e federal judicial power , becaus e th ey each  ha ve t h ei r own
(in the exercise of which t he Su prem acy Clau se r equir es th at  th ey app ly applicab le
federa l law); and  conceiving “original” and  “appellat e” as mu tu ally exclus ive ignores
bot h  th e r ea son  for t ha t d ist inct ion a nd  its  ap plica tion  in p ra ctice . Th e pr ovisi on for
“origin al” juris diction origin at ed as  par t of the  Pa ter son P lan , which a ut horized  only
one  na t iona l  cou r t  and  le ft  v ir tua l ly  a ll  li t ig a t io n  to  beg in  in  the  sta tes . I t  thus  was
con ceived not t o inhibit  rea llocation of workloa d am ong feder al t ribu na ls, but  only to
ensu re tha t  som e na tiona l tr ibun al would  be ava ilable in  th e first  instan ce for cases
though t  ina ppr opria te for considera tion by states (even if not prohibited to them ). The
origina l/appella te  “mutu al exclusivity” v iew was  employed  in  Ma rbu ry v . Ma di son , 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); but even t he n i t w as  cont ra ry  to t he  Cou rt ’s own  pr ior
practice, as documented in En gdahl, supra  note 211, at 540 n.88. From t he very
outset  it  was acknowledged that Congress may assign Suprem e Court “original” cases
to other federal courts in stead, with “appellate” jurisdiction  in  the  Supreme  Cour t ;
and in t his r egar d even  Joh n Ma rsh all him self l a t er  a cknowledge d th e err or of his
Marbury  pre mis e. See id.  at 541 n n.90-91.
Thus, alt hou gh  St ory  wa s cor re ct in  per ceivin g th at  Con gr ess  ha s a  ma nd at ory
dut y to vest all the Article III jur isd icti on ,  he was  wrong in  th ink ing tha t  t h i s l imi t s
Congress’ discret ion rega rdin g judicial structure.
304. S ee En gdah l, supra  note 69, at  468-72.
305. S ee 1 F A R RA N D, supra  note 61, at  21.
it  is not som e t h in g  the Constitut ion ordains;303 i t  is just an
organizat ional form  ent irely optional with  Congress.
In  th e eigh te en th  cent ur y, the  label  “supreme” as applied to
cour t s connot ed a  re lat ive gen er alit y of competen ce more often
than  h ie ra rch i ca l  au thor i ty . Among the  or iginal  st a t e s,  Nor th
Car olina  ha d two “sup rem e” cou r t s and  Vi rgin ia  had  fou r ;
Georgia  had a “su pr em e” cour t in  ever y count y, each  one  a  t r ia l
t r ibuna l from which  the re was  no appeal; and Delaware had a
“sup rem e” cour t  with  no appel la te  role,  bu t  the  cour t ’s  ru lings
were  subject to appellate r eview.304 Thu s it wa s neit her  accident
nor  an omaly when  t h e Nint h Ra ndolph Resolut ion (drafted by
Virginians) proposed th at  th e federal judiciary h ave “one or
m ore su pr em e t rib un als ,” in addition to “infer ior” one s,3 05 or
when  Ma dison  (a  Vir gin ia n) a rgu ed  for  several court s ha v ing
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306. 1 i d . at 124.
307. F o r document ation a nd furt her d etail, see th e discussion of the 1789 Act in
En gdah l, supra note 69, at  493-501.
308.
Accordin g to th e ru les of judicia l a rch itectu re, a  syst em of court s sh ould
res emble  a pyramid. .  .  . [I]ts summ it should be a  sin gle  poin t.  . . . [O ]ne
s u p re m e tr ibun al sh ould su per int end  an d govern  all oth ers . . . .
. . . .
. . . [Other wise] different  courts might  adopt differen t  and even
cont rad ictor y r u les of decision; and t he distr actions, springing from these
different  and cont r a d ic t ory rules, would be without r emedy and without en d.
2 TH E  WO R K S O F  J A M E S  WILSON , supra  note 62, at  495-96.
309. 2 i d . a t  458.
310. S ee 2 i d . at 501-03.
“final jur isdict ion in many  cases”306 even  though  not  labeled
“supr em e.”
The first  Congr ess in  fact  reject ed  th e pyra midic model
when  esta blishing th e judiciar y in 1789 . Most ca ses b eginn ing
in  th e sin gle-judge dist rict  court s wer e ma de r eviewa ble in a
multi-judge circuit  court , but  only th ose involving admira lty  or
mar it ime mat ter s cou ld  cont in ue t hen ce t o the S upr em e Cour t .
Congress ma de t he cir cuit  court s t he p rin cipal t ria l t r ibuna l s
and a llowed  no appea l from them in  a ny crimin al cas e. Even  in
civil cases, Congress r estr icted Supr eme Cour t r eview by a very
l a rg e a m ou n t  in  con t r ov er s y p r er e qu i si t e e st a b li sh ed
specifically to make appellate recourse rare; and there was no
mechanism to ensur e  t h at decisions of th e severa l federal
t r ibuna l s wou ld  be  consi st en t  or  un ifor m.307 So far did  t he
s t ructu re esta blished in 1789 ignore t he  pyram idic “rules of
judicia l a r ch i tectur e” espoused in  his lectur es308 t ha t  or igina l
Associate  J ust ice J a m e s Wilson described it  as a  “very
un common  est ab lish me nt .”309
Pyramid iza tion  evolved gr ad u a lly fr om a  combin a t ion  of
inadver tence an d choice;310 and  now tha t  we  have  such  a
str uctu re,  it  rem ain s d iscret ion ary with  Congress wh eth er a nd
how fa r  to change i t . I t  migh t be pr efera ble t o leave t his
s t ructu re as  is, bu t r ad ically d iffe ren t  a r rangements  a re  equa lly
per mis sible  const itu tion ally. If it s eem s des ira ble t o ter min at e
some (or e ven  a ll) n on-ori gin a l ca se s a t  the cou r t  of ap p ea ls
level, or  to crea te some new n a t ional court for appeals,
Congress ce r t a in ly can  do tha t . Any not ion  tha t  the
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Con st it u t ion  requ i res  a  pa r t icu la r  h iera rchy—or  any  jud icia l
hierarchy at all—is simply uninformed.
Congress’ discretion over system  design also ena bles it  t o
alter  the  flow of Ar t i cle I I I cases fr om state to federal courts.
Und er  current pra ctice, eligible cases may be rem oved  from
s ta t e t o infe r ior  fede ra l cou r t s  ea r ly in t heir  pr oceedings; bu t if
not  so removed, they m ust  proceed  t o fina li t y i n the  st a t e
sys t em, aft er w hich —in case s in volving fed er a l qu es t ion s—a n
imp roba ble federal r eview in t he one overbur dened “supr eme”
federal  court  ma y be sou ght . It  would be  equ ally cons t itu t iona l ,
however, to make s t ate court  dispositions of Article III cases
re viewable by one or m ore cour ts of appea ls (or oth er inferior
tribunals) in st ea d.  Wh et her  tha t  wou ld  be  wis e or  foolish , of
cour se, is for Congress  to judge.
If federal t rial dockets a re overbur dened by divers ity cases,
Congress’ discretion over system  desig n m ak es possible other
and ar guably bett er solut ions th an  jurisdictional divest men t
(wh ich , of cour se, is  un const itu tion al). F or exa mple, diver sit y
cases could  be  a fforde d fe de ra l cou r t  appellate review,  r a ther
than  a  federa l cour t  t r i a l; tha t  s h ou ld sufficiently ser ve the
origina l pu rp oses of divers ity ju ris diction (a lbeit n ot a ll th e
advan tageous pur poses th at  modern  lawyers m ight m ust er in
its  de fen se ). Be cause  fed er a l cou r t s do not  have the last word on
ques t ions of sta te law a nyway, federa l review of diversity cases
cou ld be ca pp ed  a t  the d is t r ict  cour t  or  cour t  of a p p ea ls
level—or  en t rus t ed  to some new cour t  or  cour t s s pe cia lized  for
diver sit y cases. Wheth er  to exercise diversity jurisd iction wh ere
no pr ejud ice or oth er s pecial cir cum st an ce is shown, m ay be left
for  judicia l br anch  discr et ion .
Cer ta in ly changes  in  the ju dicia l br anch  s t r uctu re  shou ld
only be undert aken  aft er  mature a nd p ract ica l deli bera t ion .
Nonetheless, arr angements u nfamiliar enough to seem at  first
qu it e rad ica l st ill  a re con st it u t ion ally  a llow ed . Im agin a t ion  and
crea tive  deliber at ion sh ould n ot be in hibit ed  by  n otion s fals ely
at tr ibuted  to the  Cons t itu t ion ,  bu t  a ctu ally r ooted in
mis un der st an din g or ha bit.
C. Law s E ff ectu at in g J udicial  Potency
 I t  ha s been  gen er a lly  recogn ized fr om the beginn in g of our
cons t itu t iona l jur ispr ud en ce th at  in m ajor  re spe cts, a t le as t, a s
to judicia l poten cy (in  cont rast  t o ju r isd ict ion  and  st ructu re ),
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311. McCu lloch  v. Marylan d, 17 U.S. (4 Whe at .) 316 , 412 , 420  (1819 ); see also
United  St at es  v. F ish er , 6 U .S.  (2 Cr an ch) 3 58,  396 -97 (1 804 ).
312. Ha mi lton  u s e d t hese wor ds in  his 1 791 ba nk  opinion . S ee Ha milt on, supra
no te 196, at 102.
313. Chief Jus t i ce  Marsha ll  u sed  these  ph rases in  McCul loch  v . Maryland , 17
U.S. at 423.
314. T h is ph rase was  used  in  Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United Stat es ,  379
U.S. 241 , 26 2 (19 64).
Art icle III is self-executing. This difference mak es it n ecessar y
to conside r  som e fea tures  of Necessary and P roper Clause
ana lysis th at  wer e of little or  no consequ ence in  the contexts of
ju r isdict ion  an d st ru ctur e, but m at ter  a  grea t  dea l a s  t o some
elem en ts  of jud icial pot en cy.
F i rs t , th e Necessar y and  Pr oper Clause suppor t s  more  than
just th ose laws which a re indispensable to effectua t in g  ot h er
powers. The  pr evailin g un der st an din g s in ce t he  begin nin g ha s
been  th at  th e word  “ne cessa ry”
i m p or t s  no m ore  th an  th at  one  th ing  is conv en ien t, or  us efu l,
or  e s se n t i a l t o  a n ot h e r .  T o em ploy  th e m ea n s n eces sa ry  to a n
e n d , is ge n er al ly u n de rs too d  a s  em ploying  any  m eans
ca lcu la t ed  to p rod u ce t h e en d, a n d n ot a s be in g con f in e d  t o
those  sin gle  m ea n s, w ith ou t w h ich  t h e  en d  wou ld be  en tir ely
un a t t a inab le .
. . . .
. . . [I]t ca n n ot b e con st ru ed  . . . t o  i m p a ir  t h e  r i gh t  o f t h e
l e gi sl a tu r e  to e xer cise  its  be st  ju dg m en t in  th e s ele cti on  of
mea su res  t o  ca r r y  in t o  ex e cu t i on  t h e con s t i t u t iona l  powers  o f
t h e  g ov e r n m e n t .311
Conseq uen tly, in  order  for laws  rega rd ing ju dicial  potency to be
valid  it  is not necessa ry th at  th e cour ts be u na ble to proceed
without  th em. Con gres s is n ot lim ited  to doing for th e judicia ry
what the judiciary cann ot do for its elf.  Laws can qua lify as any
of th e following: “us eful, or  condu cive to,”312 “pla inly  ad ap te d,”
“rea lly calcula te d,”313 or  “r easonab ly  adap ted to, ”314 ca r ry ing
int o execution the federal courts’ judicial potency—and th us be
cons t itu t iona l—even  if the  judicia ry could m an age qu ite w ell
withou t  t hem.
Second, in every context, the Necessary and Proper Clause
gives Congress discretion to choose am ong th ose me an s wh ich
a re appropr ia te  for  e ffectua t ing  th e ta rget ed en d. Th ere fore, if
it  qu a lifies  as a pp ropr ia te “for  car ryin g in to Execu t ion ” the
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315. U.S. CO N S T . art . VI, cl. 2.
Reflecting  its or igin in t he P at ers on Pla n (un der w hich on ly one federa l  cou r t
would  exist and virt ually all litigation would commence in sta te courts) the secon d
par t of the S upremacy Clause specifies state judges on ly. Beyond evide ncing t ha t
origin  of the Clause, th is specific address to stat e courts demonst rat es tha t even th e
finished Con st i t u tion contemplates state courts handling federal questions as a
regula r  part  of their r outine. The first  p a rt of the clause, however, is sufficient as a
s t a t emen t  o f t h e  su p r em acy principle, wh ich of cou rs e is  equ all y bin din g on t he
federa l cou r t s .
316. In  cer ta in s ta te s, a  sep ar at ion of p owe r s  pr ovisi on in  th e st at e con st itu tion
may give cour t r ules  pre ceden ce over st at ut es wh en t hey con flict. S ee, e.g., P A. CO N S T .
a r t . 5, § 10 (c) (su sp en din g st at ut es  in  confl ict  w it h  court r ules). In the federal
Cons t it u t ion , however, the Suprema cy Clause esta blishes the opposite rule—provided,
of course, the r equisites of the Necessary an d Proper Clause ar e satisfied.
317. “The mo de  [of se rv ice of p ro ces s] if it be not otherwise prescribed by  law , or
long  usa ge, is in  th e discr etion  of the C our t.” Chish olm v. Geor gia, 2 U .S. (2 Dall.)
419, 428 -29 (1 793 ) (em ph as is a dd ed ).
318. Ju stice  I r ede ll ’s  d isagreemen t  i n  Chisholm  over th e scope of the power th at
inheres  in the judiciary without legislation does not suggest an y disagr eement  either
Ar t icle II I ju dicia l power , a  la w r ega rding ju dicia l poten cy can
be valid even  i f t he judges  would  prefer a  d if feren t ru le inst ead .
Indeed, Con gr es s m ay legis la te a  ru le of i t s ch oice which is just
min imal ly apt, even if a different r ule would effectua te t he
judicia l power  bet ter . The Necessar y and  Pr oper Claus e never
requires that  Congress choose the best means.
Third, becau se of th e Su pr em acy Claus e,315 a la w wh ich
qua lifies a s  necessa ry and  proper  for  ca r rying in to exe cut ion
the judicial power supersedes any discr et ion t he  judge s m ight
otherwise exe rcise for  themse lves in tha t  r egard .316 Pr obably
th i s is wh y At t orn ey Gen era l Ran dolph  in 179 3, while  ar guin g
in Chisholm  th at  th e J ust ices th emselves  could  pr es cr ibe  forms
of process and modes of serv ice  wi thou t  s t a tu tory  au thor iza t ion ,
conceded tha t  the J us tices could  not have done so if process and
ser vice had been “otherwise prescrib ed by la w.”317 Four  of the
J ust ices agreeing with Randolph (P a ters on, Ells wort h, Bla ir,
and Wilson) ha d been  pr esen t wit h h im  a t  th e Conven tion  six
years  ear lier; and Wilson ap par ent ly was th e au t h or  of th e
Necess a r y an d Pr oper Claus e. Probably th ey all remem bered
t ha t  one function th at  clause wa s specifically calculat ed to
per form was empowering Congress to addr ess a ny d eta ils
req uis ite  to effect ua t in g t he ju dicia l power  tha t  were le ft
un add ress ed in t he  Cons tit ut ion it self. Th ey could n ot h ave
failed to unders tand  the app lica t ion  of the Supremacy  Clause to
legislation prem ised on th e Necessar y and  Pr oper Claus e.318
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as to the sou rce of Congress’ relevan t p ower, or as to its su prem acy  over jud icial
preferences when exercised.
319. S ee, e.g., P la ut  v. S pe nd th ri ft F ar m,  In c., 5 14 U .S.  211  (199 5).
320. This  “r at ional ba sis” test  un der t he N ecessa ry a nd P roper  Clau se, howeve r ,
is ve ry d iffe ren t  fr om  the “r a t iona l b asis ” test  app lied at t he low-end of equal
pr ote ction  and du e process review. In those contexts—because t he law is  one  tha t  t he
government  otherwise ha s power to make—it is sufficient “if t her e is an y rea sona bly
conceivable  stat e of facts th at could provide a r ationa l basis,” regardless of what  th e
l eg is la tu re ha d in  mi nd . Fe der al C omm un icat ions  Com m’n v. B ea ch C omm u n ications,
Inc.,  508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). The situa tion is quite different  where t h e very
exis te nce  of congressional power is at issue and a telic judgment is t he indisp ens able
requ is it e of that  power. U nder  th e classic r ule t he legis lat ur e itself m ust  actu ally
It  by no m ea ns  follows, h owever , th at  every s t a tu t e
regard ing judicia l poten cy supe rse de s ju dicia l discretion. Her e,
just  as wit h s ub ject m at te r ju ris diction , th e Ne cessa ry a nd
Pr oper Clau se oper at es a s a  one-wa y ra chet: it only aut horizes
“Laws  . . . for ca rr ying in t o Execution” the “Powers vested by
th i s Const itu t ion  . . . in  any De pa r tmen t  or  Office r ,” not  for
dim inis hin g those powers or int erfering wit h t heir in depend ent
exercise by the respective bran ches.
It  is ha rder  to apply th is ra chet  concep t  to judicia l poten cy
than  to jur isdict ion, h owever, because some laws might assist
in  ce r t a in  r espects while hin derin g in other s. Fu rt her more,
opin ion s migh t  d iffe r  a s t o whether a law hinders or helps, or  a s
to wh et her  a  pa r t icu la r  h in dr ance in h ibi t s ju dicia l poten cy
ma te ria lly. In a ddition, th e intrinsic  Necessar y and  Pr oper
Clause issue of wheth er a  law effectu at es (or ins tea d
debilitates) jud icial p oten cy can ea sily be obs cur ed wh en  vagu e
not ion s of the  separa t ion  of powers ar e discussed  as  an  extrinsic
cons t r a in t .319
Given th ese complications, det erm ining whet her  a
par t icu la r law s ufficie n t ly e ffect ua tes  judicia l poten cy t o pa ss
must er  under t he Necessary and P roper Clause requires the
applica t ion  of jud gme nt . Moreover , becau se t he  re leva nt
consider a t ions ar e nu mer ous a nd  complex, differen ces in
judgment must  be expected, and th e quest ion  the re fore
becomes : wh ose  judgmen t  is  to cont rol, a nd h ow fa r?
Gen er ally,  cou r t s  de fe r  t o congres sional  judgments  under
the Ne ces sa ry a nd P rope r  Cla use . Th e cla ss ic r ule i s tha t
Congress’ fin ding of a  t eli c r e la t ion  to some end  wi th in  an
enu mer at ed pow er  pr eva ils  eve n  if it  can  be  pr oven wrong, so
lon g as  it is  ra tion ally ba sed.320 However, this “rat ional basis”
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make this crucial judgment, and a reviewing court must  not subst itu te it s own
judgmen t  inst ead . S ee McCu lloch  v. M ar yla nd , 17  U. S. (4  Wh ea t. ) 316 , 42 0 (18 19).
Thus, a s J u st ice J ack son  pu t i t,  un de r t he  Ne ces sa ry  an d P ro pe r C la us e “[t]h e
p redominan t  cons ide ra tion  is t ha t w e sh ould  be s ur e Con gr ess  ha s in te nt ion ally pu t
i t s powe r in  iss ue  by t he  legis lat ion in qu est ion,” and sh ould only defer “to deliberat e
judgmen t  by . . . Congress . . . when it appear s tha t th e precise point in issue her e
has been  consi de r ed by Cong res s an d ha s been  explicitly a nd d eliber at ely re solved.”
United  States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 , 449  (195 3). To  th e s am e effe ct,
Ju stice  Black observed:
[T]h e f ede ra l governmen t  ma y find th at  regu lat ion of pure ly local and
in t r a st a t e commerce is “necessary an d proper” to  preven t  in ju ry to  in t e r s t a te
commerce. In a pplying t his doctr ine t o par ticula r sit ua t ions  th i s Cour t
properly  ha s be en  cau tiou s . . . .  It  ha s in sis te d u pon  “suit ab le r ega rd  to t he
prin ciple th at  wh en eve r t he  federa l power is e xert ed with in wh at  would
otherwise be  the  domain  of  st a te  pow er , th e ju st ificat ion of t he  exe rcis e of
the feder al powe r m ust  clear ly app ear .”
Polish  Na t’l Alliance v. N LRB, 322 U.S . 643, 652-53 (1944) (Black, J., concu rr ing)
(cita tion s om it te d).
The d is sen t ing Jus t i ce s  in  Un ited  S ta tes  v. L opez , 514 U.S. 5 49 (1995), utt erly
failed to grasp this distin ction, m ista king “ra tiona l possibility” an d “a mer ely implicit
congressiona l ju dgm en t” a s s uffi cien t t o sa ti sfy t he  “ra ti on al  ba sis ” re qu ir em en t of t he
Necessa ry and Pr oper Clause just because they suffice for pur poses of due process
and equa l  pr otect ion. See id.  at  603-0 4, 61 4 (Sou te r, J ., dis sen tin g); id . at 615, 618-19
(Breyer, J ., d iss en ti ng ).
ru l e developed, an d is most often em ployed, wher e th e
Necessa ry and Proper Clause operates in the context of
Con gress’ own  oth er  power s (su ch a s t he  comme rce p ower). In
such  contexts, of cour se, th e discretion over mea ns given t o
Congress by the Necessary and Pr oper Cl au se is compoun ded
by th e dis cret ion Congr ess  its elf enjoys over t he end s by vir tu e
of th ose oth er  power gra nt s. It is becau se of Congress’ plena ry
power over  th e ends th at  no review  of th e  chosen  means more
exact ing th an  “ra tiona l basis” is appr opriat e. Closer scru t iny,
for  examp le, could displace Congres s’ choice of less effective
means (prefer red  for politica l  r ea sons ) for  ach iev ing ends  a s  t o
which  Congress has plena ry discret ion, and t her efore free
choice wh et he r t o achie ve m uch  or lit tle  or n oth ing a t a ll. T h is
would  curt ail Congress’ power over the en d by con st r a in ing  it s
choice of mea ns.
Where  th e end is constit ut ionally confided n ot  to Congress’
d iscre t ion , however ,  bu t  to tha t  of another  branch—for
examp le, wher e Congress a cts to effectua te t he  ind ependen t
power of the ju dicia l br anch—it  se em s h igh ly a pp ropr ia te for
the judicia ry t o make it s ow n  judgment  whe ther  the  power
con templa ted by the Constitut ion is actually facili t a t ed , or
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321. The Tenth Amendm ent affirms popular sovereignty and th e d efa ult
competence of th e states, but it  says nothing to curta il or delimit the powers that  are
“delegated  to th e Un ited  Sta tes  by th e Cons tit ut ion” (includin g, of cour se, the power
delegated  by the Necessar y and Pr oper Clau se). S ee David  E. E ngda hl, Sense and
Nonsense About Sta te I mm unity , 2 CO N S T . CO M M . 93, 9 4-100  (1985 ); see also
G a r db a u m , supra  note 97.
The notion of mut ually exclusive state and  federal sphe res  was a  ha l lmark  of  the
discredited “dua l f ede ra li sm” e r ror .  S ee En gdah l, supra  note 89, at  761-64.
322. S ee, e.g.,  Ci ty of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Nixon v. United
States,  506 U .S. 2 24, 2 28 (19 93); see als o Pow ell v.  McCor ma ck, 395 U .S. 486, 519
(196 9).
323. Cf. Cit y of Boe rn e v.  Fl or es , 11 7 S . Ct . 21 57 (1 997 ).
instead imp eded , by an y congr ession al a ct pu rp ort ing t o h elp.
There i s no reason  for  t he  jud ici a ry  to indu lge rat ional mist ak es
by Congress wh en t he power  encu mbe red  is t he cons tit ut iona lly
in de pe nde nt  power  of th e ju dicia ry it se lf.
 Moreover, the “rat ional basis” standa rd  under  the
Necessa ry and Pr oper Claus e developed in “federalism” cases as
a  st anda rd for  revi ewin g t he t eli c ju st ifica t i on for federa l laws
reach ing  mat t e r s wh ich  othe rwise  a re for  governance by stat es.
Of course the  Cons t itu t ion  does n ot r eser ve an y activit y
exclusively for  s t a te legis la t ion ,321 an d th erefore a closer
scru t iny of Neces sa ry a nd P rope r  Cla use  en actmen ts cou ld  not
be justified as protecting the stat es’ “tur f.” In contr ast,
however, th e Cons tit ut ion does  cert ain ly conte mp lat e a  high
degree  of distin ctn ess a nd  rela tive exclu siv ity  among the  three
bra nches  of th e federal governm ent . Ther efor e,  al t hough  mere
“ra t iona l basis” review of Congress’ pe rcep t ion s of t eli c rela t ion s
between  ext raneous  means  and en um er at ed p ower e nd s m ight
be sufficient for federalism cases, it  seems inadequate to ensure
the great er dist inctnes s, indepen dence, and r ela t ive  isola t ion  of
functions required by the separation of powers.
Federa l judges rightly insist that  t h ey  must  dete rmine  the
meaning of constitut ional words and phrases for th emselves,
ra th er  than  yield to in terp re tat ions  by  a  coordina te  branch .322
“The judicial Power of the United Sta tes” is a  cons t itu t iona l
phr ase,  and  the court s must  not defer to Congress’ view of wha t
th i s lan gua ge me an s; it wou ld be anomalous  to compromise  the
card ina l featu re of judicial indepen dence wher e the jud iciar y’s
own  power  is  a t  st ake . Of cours e “car ryin g int o Execut ion” is
dis t in guis ha ble from ascer ta in ing meaning ;323 bu t  when  the
power a law purpor t s to ca r ry  in to execu t ion  belongs to the
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324. S ee, e.g.,  Abram Chayes, T h e Rol e of th e J ud ge in  Pu blic L aw  Li tig ati on , 89
H ARV. L. RE V. 128 1 (19 76).
325. Valley For ge C hr ist ia n C olleg e v. Am er ica ns  Un it ed for  Se pa ra ti on of C hu rch
and St at e, I nc. , 45 4 U .S.  464 , 48 7 (19 82).
326. S ee, e.g., Lujan  v. Defe nd er s of Wild life, 5 04 U .S. 5 55 (19 92); see als o Allen
ju di cia l b ranch ,  even  a  rat iona l mis take by Congress as t o
whet her  the  law actually effectua tes  th at  power  migh t r esu lt in
the ju dicia l power  be in g dim in ished  or  de fea ted  in  fact .
Thus, to un dert ak e n ot hing more than “rational basis”
review of laws purportedly ena cted “for ca rr ying in to
Execu t ion” the judicial power would  leave t he ju diciar y
vuln era ble to being impeded, cr ippled or disem powered by
congr es siona l in adver ten ce or  mis take (n ot  t o suppose
mischief ). For  th is r eas on, wh ile th e p ract i ca l  ins igh t s and
de liber a t ion s of Congr ess cer ta inly m e ri t  thought fu l  a t t en t ion ,
the judicia l br anch  must  de cide for  it se lf wh et her  any a ct  of
Congress regard ing  t he  jud icia l b ranch  actua lly does help
effectua te th e judicial power. Ju diciary laws m ust  not be
disrega rded  sim ply becau se t hey a re le ss u seful t ha n
alter na tives the  judges migh t  prefer ; but  whe n t he ju dges fin d
such  a law detrimental to judicia l pote ncy, t he y ma y disr ega rd
it as  beyond Congress’ power.
If th is is tr ue, th e differ en ce bet ween  su pposin g th at
Congress has plen ary power  to regu la te t he ju dicia l br anch  and
recognizin g inst ead t ha t Congres s’ r ele va nt  pow er  de r ives fr om
the Ne ces sa ry a nd P rope r  Cla use  is  pot en t ia lly p rofound. The
di ffer en ce is qu ite s ubs ta nt ial a nd  pr act ical, however , even if
noth ing more r igorous t ha n a  ra tional ba sis tes t sh ould be
employed. A small ha ndful of exam ples will serve to i ll u st r a t e
the  poin t.
1. Pruden t ia l  s tand ing
 For  almost forty years now, the law of “sta nd ing” has been
an  in de x of t he con t rover sy  over  the “pu bli c la w” model324 of
lit iga t ion . On e m igh t  have e xpect ed  tha t  once a  ten uous
hegemony h ad been  at ta ined  by those most  insist ent  tha t  “[t ]he
federal  cour t s w er e s im ply n ot  const itut ed as ombu dsm en of th e
genera l welfar e,”325 sta n d in g law would ret ur n t oward pr e-
Warren cour t  concept ions ; and  for  a  t ime , a t  lea st , t h a t  seemed
to be th e direct ion .3 2 6  Indeed , the r etu rn  might  ha ve been
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v. Wr igh t,  468  U. S. 7 37 (1 984 ).
327. “The firs t q ue st ion i s wh et he r t he  pla int iff all ege s t ha t t he  cha llen ged  act ion
has caused him in jury in fact . . . . The ‘legal interest’ test goes to the mer its. The
ques tion  of standing is different .” Association of Data P rocessing Serv. Org. v. Cam p,
397 U.S . 150 , 152 -53 (19 70); see als o dis cus sion  supra note 6.
328. Benne t t v. S pe ar , 11 7 S . Ct . 11 54,  116 3 (19 97).
329. S ee, e.g., Wa rt h v . Se lde n,  422  U. S. 4 90,  498 -502  (197 5).
330. As socia tion  of Data Processing , 397 U.S . at  153; see als o Na tiona l Credit
Un ion  Adm in . v. F ir st  Na t’l Ba nk  & Tr us t C o., 1 18 S . Ct . 92 7 (19 98).
331. Valley Forge  Chr is t i an Colle ge v. Am er ican s U nit ed for  Se pa ra ti on of C hu rch
and St at e, I nc. , 45 4 U .S.  464 , 48 7 (19 82).
332. Raines  v. B yr d, 1 17 S . Ct . 23 12,  231 5 (19 97).
333. Id . at  2318  n.3 ; see als o dis cus sion  supra note 6.
334. Federa l El ect ion  Com m’n v . Ak in s, 1 18 S . Ct . 17 77,  178 4 (19 98).
thought accompl ished  wh en  J ust ice S ca lia , wr it in g for  a
unan imous Cour t  in  1997 , tu rned wha t  had  be en  a  dichotomy
s ince 1970327 into an apposit ion , saying standing requires “tha t
the pla int iff h a ve suffer ed  an  ‘in ju ry in  fact ’—an in va sion of a
jud icially cogniza ble in te re st .”328
But  jud icia l doct r ine abou t  s t and ing had come to distinguish
between  prin ciples att ribut ed to Article III’s “case or
contr overs y” requirement an d pr incip les  conside red  ru les  of
prudence instead.329 Becau se one of th ose “prud ent ial”
cons idera t ions in volve d looki ng t o “t h e zone of interes ts t o be
p rotect ed . . . by th e st at ut e . . . in qu est ion,”330 i t  became easy
t o equ ivocate  bet ween  pr ud en ce exer cised ju dicially in
ad judica tion  and d iscret ion  exe rcised  by C ongr es s in  leg is la t ion .
Thus, Chief Ju stice Rehnqu ist, who ha d writ ten  in 1982 t ha t
federal  cour t s  a re not  “ombudsmen  of th e gen er al w elfar e,”331
casua lly conceded in  a  1997 footnote for  the Cour t  tha t  a
s t a tu t e sa yin g, “[a ]ny Me mber  of Con gress or any individual
ad vers ely affected”332 may  sue , “e limina tes any pruden t ia l
s t and ing limit at ions.”333 The sa me C hief J us tice in  1998, in  th e
Akins case , joined in  findin g no “pru dent ial sta ndin g” bar rier
wh er e Congr ess  ha d “int en ded  to a ut hor ize t his  kin d of suit .”334
However , the notion tha t Congress has car te b lanche t o
broaden or restr ict sta nding within th e bounds  of Art icle III , is
unsust a i n able. P rudence  is  par t  of wha t  judging  i s abou t ,  and
the pow er  to make ju dgmen ts a bou t  case s a nd con t roversies
with in  th e pa r am ete rs  of Art icle III—inclu din g whe th er it  is
p ruden t  to hear  them—is const it u t ion a lly  confided  to the
judicia ry  as a n  asp ect  of “th e ju dicia l P ower .” If a  cour t
under took, for example, to determine what regulations of
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335. S ee discussion supra note 6.
336. S ee U.S. C O N S T . am en d. XII I, § 2; id . am en d. XIV, § 1 , cl. 5; i d . am end . XV,
cl. 2; id . am en d. XIX (se cond  pa ra gr ap h); id . am en d. XXII I, § 2; i d . amend.  XIV, § 2;
id . amen d. XXVI, cl. 2.
337. S ee, e.g., Ha ven s Re alt y Cor p. v. C olem an , 455  U.S . 363  (1982 ); Gla dst on e
Re a lto r s v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Trafficante v. Metr opolitan  Life Ins. Co., 409
U.S. 205  (197 2).
338. S ee J on es  v. Alfr ed  H.  Ma yer  Co.,  392  U. S. 4 09,  413 , 43 9 (19 68).
i n te rs t a t e commerce are prudent , that imm ediately would be
perceived as  us ur pin g legislative power ; and  a t  least  as a
genera l rule, th e reciprocal seems equ ally tr ue.
In  fact, no attempt seem s ever t o have been m ade t o
a r t icu l at e any  ra t iona le suppor t ing a  general power of Congress
to dictat e or dispense with pru dential standing rules.335 One
migh t  conceivably  ass er t  it  as a nother  “neces sa ry im pl ica t ion ”
of th e Tribun als Clau se, like the supp ose d p len ary power  of
Congress over  ju r isdict ion ; bu t  tha t  “neces sa ry im pl ica t ion ”
theory has  alrea dy been shown unten able . Or , if t he Except ions
Clause were  a  gran t  of power ,  one might argue tha t sta tut es on
s tand ing ar e am ong “such Regu lat ions a s t he Con gres s sh all
ma ke”; but  th at  clause, of cour se, does not  reach  inferior court s.
Thus, unless ma ter ialized  from t hin  air  by some ju ris pr ud ent ial
m a gic, an y power in  Congr ess t o legislat e ab out  pr ud ent ial
s t and ing must  be traced to (and delimited by) t he  Necessa ry
and Pr oper Cla us e—or one of th e “enforcemen t” clauses tha t
a re modeled after the Necessary and Pr oper Clause but  ada pted
for effectua ting rights instead of powers.336
This  can  be don e t o just ify t he  compromise  of p ruden t ia l
st an din g rules by th e Fa ir Hous ing Act of 1968,337 for exam ple.
Tha t s t atu te wa s par t of the Civil Right s Act of 1968, ena cted
pursuan t t o Congress ’ enumer a ted power  to enforce  the
Th ir t een th Amendment  “by appropr ia te  legi sla t ion .”338 O t her
civil rights laws, enforcing the Fourteent h Amendmen t  for
examp le, arguably could compromise prudential standin g in
mu ch t he  sa me  wa y.
But  th is is ver y differen t fr om posit ing power  in Congress  t o
dispense at  will with pr uden tial st an ding. The enforcement
clauses  a u thorize only such laws as are “appropriate,” and th at
wor d su bsu mes  not  only th e te lic (“neces sa ry . . . for”) but  als o
the “p r op er ” requ isite explicit in t he Necessa ry an d Pr oper
Clau se. “Proper ,” and  hence  “appropr ia te ,” impor t  more  than
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339. McCu lloch  v. M ar yla nd , 17  U. S. (4  Wh ea t. ) 316 , 42 1 (18 19).
340. This  is a na logous  to t he  cont ra st  bet wee n con sid er in g Con gr es s’ pra cti cal
judgmen t  as r e le va n t  to judica l asse ssm ent s of equal p rote ction a nd yield ing t o
Congress’ judgm ent . S ee Katzenbach  v. Morgan , 384 U.S. 641, 66 5-71 (1966) (Harla n,
J ., dis sen tin g); see als o Cit y of Boe rn e v.  Fl or es , 11 7 S . Ct . 21 57 (1 997 ).
341. The th ree  di ssen ter s  in  Akins found unsa tisfied the constitutional requisites
of st an din g. Th e ot he r s ix di sa gr eed  wit h t ha t; b ut  ha d it  occ u r r ed  t o t hem to doubt
Congress’ power t o displace t he ju dges’ own pr uden ce in th e exer cise of their  “judicial
Power ,” some of those six might have voted the othe r wa y even wit hout  ass ert ing a
cons t i tu t iona l s t a n di n g p r ob le m .
There is, however , an othe r cre dible wa y to expla in Aki n s. Breye r ’s  op in ion  fo r  t he
Cou rt  seem s to cha ra cterize  th e sta tu te n ot as  au th orizing  sui ts  by  zea lo t s w ith  no
l e ga l righ ts a t st ake , but  ra th er a s conferr ing a  subs ta nt ive legal r ight  upon
individu als  (albeit upon man y individuals at once)—a subst ant ive ri gh t , in  fact ,
“d ir ect ly re lat ed t o voti ng , th e m ost  ba sic of pol iti cal r igh ts ” (which  als o belongs  to
many individuals a t once). As Breyer p ut it , “ther e is a sta tut e which .  . .  does seek
just th e telic a da pt at ion to a n en d: as  Chief J us tice Ma rs ha ll
said, th e law mu st “consist wit h t he lett er  and sp ir i t  of the
cons t itu t ion .”339
So, fa r  from repos ing  in  Con gre ss p len ar y discr et ion, a
s t a tu tory provision on standin g  must  pass two d iffe ren t
screens. F ir st , it  must  condu ce t o som e civ il r igh t s or
enu mer at ed power  end; and on th is  qu es t ion , Con gr es s’ ra t ion a l
judgment me rit s de feren ce. In  addition, however, it  mu st
compor t  wit h  the “sp ir it ” as  well a s t he le t t er  of th e
Con st it u t ion . This  calls u pon ju dges to exercise for t hem selves
the sam e kind of pru dence th at  genera t e d  t h e p ruden t ia l
s t and in g r u les in th e first pla ce. In the light  of Congress’
r a t i on a l choice of m ea ns a nd p olit ica l com mit men t  to a
pa r ticu lar  civil right s or en um era ted  power s en d, jud icial
p rudence might  suggest  relaxing a  requ iremen t t ha t ju dicial
p rudence in  other  ci rcumstances  migh t  enforce ; bu t  the
pru dence ultima tely mus t be th e judiciar y’s own.340
The re su lt u nd er  some th ing l i k e t h e Fa i r  Hous ing  Act
shou ld probably be the sa me. In oth er ins ta nces, however,
recognizin g th at  both t he Neces s a r y and  Proper  and  the
En forcemen t  Cla use s ca ll for  im por tan t  judicial judgmen t s
could easily lead to different conclusions th an  might be dr awn
from th e a ssu mp tion  th at  Congr ess m ay d ispen se wit h
pruden t ia l st an din g at  will. In  1998, for exa mple, th e vote in
Akins migh t h ave be en d ifferent  ha d t he J us tices conceived of
th i s middle ground between capitulating to Congress and
racing to the rampa rts of Article III.341
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t o prot ect ind ividua ls su ch as  res ponden ts from  th e kin d of har m t hey sa y th ey ha ve
suffer ed.” Fed era l Elect ion Com m’n v. Akins , 118 S. Ct . 1777, 17 84 (1 998 ). “[W]e
conclude that Congress, intendin g to protect voters such as r espondents  from su ffering
the kind  of injury h ere a t issu e, int ende d to au th orize th is kin d of suit. ” Id . at 1786.
This  lan gua ge is re min iscent  of the Cour t’s stat emen t in  Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman , 455 U.S. 363 (1982), that “Congress has thus conferred on all ‘persons’ a
lega l rig ht  to t ru th ful i nfor ma tion  ab out  ava ila ble h ousing.” Id .  at 373. So underst ood,
the m a jority opin ion in Akins could readily be joined even by an un reconstru cted
adhe ren t  of the pr e-1970 “lega l int eres t” test  for sta ndin g (if he were w illing to
indu lge “legal interests” that ar e very widely shared).
342. Cohens v. Vir gin ia , 19  U. S. (6  Wh ea t. ) 264 , 40 4 (18 21).
343. S ee, e.g.,  Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987); Ohio Civil Right s
Com m’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986); M idd les ex C oun ty  Et hi cs
Com m.  v. Garden State Bar Ass’n., 457  U.S . 423 (1982); Trainor v. Her nan dez, 431
U.S. 434  (197 7); J ui dice  v. Va il, 4 30 U .S.  327  (1977); Colorado River Water
Con ser vat ion  Dis t. v . Un ite d St at es,  424 U .S. 8 00 (19 76); Hicks v.  Miranda, 422 U.S.
332 (1975); Younger v. Ha rris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Louisian a P ower & Ligh t Co. v.
C ity of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Burford v. Sun O il Co. , 31 9 U .S.  315  (194 3);
Rail road Com m’n o f Te xa s v.  Pu llm an  Co.,  312  U. S. 4 96 (1 941 ).
344. S ee Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. 800.
345. S ee Wilton  v. Se ve n  F alls C o., 515  U.S . 277  (1995 ); see also Wil l v . Ca lver t
F i r e Ins . Co., 437 U.S . 655 (1978). But see Moses H . Cone Mem ’l Hosp. v. Mercu ry
Cons t r . Cor p.,  460  U. S. 1  (198 3).
346. S ee Lee & Wilk ins, supra  note 4, at  361, 364, 366, 371, 374.
2. Abstention
 No less t ha n eq uit y cour ts  in  our  h i stor ica l  t r adi t ion , federal
cour t s ha ve th e discr etion  req uis ite t o doing justice—a nd t o
doing it r e s pon sibly in  our  complex fe de ra l sys tem . J ohn
Mar sh all’s hyp erb ole th at  for federa l court s t o decline
exer cising th eir  ju r isdict ion  wou ld  be  “tr ea son  to the
cons t itu t ion”3 4 2 migh t  have m ea su red  h is  own  disinclin a t ion ,
but it  is mistaken as a  pr opos it ion  of la w. (When  Con gr es s for  a
cen tu ry declined subst an tially to exercise its jurisd iction over
in te r st a t e commerce , was tha t  t r ea son  to the  Cons t it u t ion ?) In
a  nu mber  of circu mst ance s t he  fede ra l judiciar y ha s dee med  it
appropr ia te  to absta in .343
In  fact ,  the ea r li er  not ion  tha t  abs ten tion  is per mis sible only
in  high ly “except iona l  ci rcumstances”344 ha s been  yieldin g in t he
face of expan ding experien ce, in cert ain in sta nces even t o t he
poin t of permi t t ing  t r ia l  cour t  d iscre t ion .345 If abs ten tion
doct r ine has  grown  un gain ly to t he  point  of uncer ta int y an d
confusion , a  leg is la t ive  “rest a tem en t” in s ometh ing like th e
ma nn er  su ggest ed  by a  former  Sol icit or  Gene ra l in 1990346
migh t  be useful  as guida nce; bu t a n a tt em pt  at  legisla tive
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347. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
348. Kline v. B ur ke  Con st r.  Co.,  260  U. S. 2 26,  234  (192 2).
349. “We mu st  be s cru pu lou s in  our  re ga rd  for t he  lim it s wi th in  wh ich  Congress
has confined t he a ut horit y of the cour ts of its own  creat ion.” Toucey v. Ne w York  Life
Ins. Co.,  314  U. S. 1 18,  141  (194 1).
350. S ee, e.g., Pa rs on s S te el,  In c. v. F ir st  Ala . Ba nk , 47 4 U .S.  518  (198 6);
pr escrip tion  or  pr oscr ip t ion  wou ld  be  va in . Le gis la t ion
a t t empt ing to cur ta il or delim it ju dicial abs ten t ion  does  not
seem  su ppor ta ble as necessa ry  and p roper  to ca r ry  in to
exe cut ion  th e judiciary’s own discreti on  (i.e., power) in t his
regard. By st ru ctu rin g th e judicia ry in  h i era rch ica l  form,
Congress has made  it possible for t he Su prem e Court  to oversee
and govern  abst ent ion by the other  federal courts ; but Congress
la cks pow er  it se lf t o const r a i n or divest not only su bject m at ter
ju r isdict ion  but an y dimension of the judicial power , includin g
d iscre t ion  to absta in .
For  the sam e reason, it  seems impossible to uphold the
Ant i-In junct ion  Act .347 Why Congr ess in  1793 en act ed t his
pr ovision is u nclea r, bu t in  moder n t imes  th e only
cons t itu t iona l g round  in t imated  for  i t  has been  th e sp eciou s
in fer en ce of plen ary con gr es siona l d iscret ion  d rawn from the
Tr ibuna ls Cla use . J ust ice S uther la nd for  the Cou rt  in 1922,
app ly ing th e Act to foreclose enjoin ing a n  equ iva len t  s t a t e
proceed ing commen ced aft er a  feder al p roceedin g had  begun ,
sa id th at  Congr ess, “ma y give, withhold  or  res t r ict  su ch
ju r isdiction  at  its  discr etion . . . . And  th e jur isdict ion ha ving
been confe r red  may, a t  the will of Con gres s, be t ak en a way in
whole  or  i n pa r t .”348 Ju s t i ce  F rankfu r t e r  for  t he  Cour t  in 1941
alluded  to the s ame fa u lt y prem ise when  app lying t he Act  to
preclude en join in g st a te cou r t  reli t iga t ion  of an  a lr e ady
feder ally a djud icat ed claim .349
With  th at  Tribun als Clau se prem ise discredited, h owever,
no constit ut ional sup port for th e Anti-Injunction Act can be
found. However lau dable its  aim m ay be, a st at ut e at tem pt i ng
to foreclose a remed y otherwise jud icially deemed s uita ble to
the ci rcumstances of a case  wit h in  the cou r t ’s ju r isdict ion
cannot  be  conside red  a  la w “for  ca r r yin g in to Execu t ion ” th e
pow er  (hen ce d iscret ion ) of the ju dicia l br anch .
In  some ca ses , wit hou t a ctu ally im pu gnin g its  valid ity, t he
Supreme Cour t  has  coun tenanced compromising  the  An t i-
In jun ction Act  or  b roaden ing its  exceptions.350 Pe rhaps  jud icia l
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Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Leiter Mi ne ra ls,  In c. v. United St ates , 352
U.S. 220  (195 7).
T h e Ame ri can  La w In st it ut e in  196 9 pr opos ed a  re vis ion  of th e Act  to codify
judicial  comprom ises t ha t a lrea dy ha d been  ma de by t h a t  tim e. S ee AME RICAN  LAW
INSTITUTE , ST U D Y O F  DI VI S IO N  O F  J U R I S DI C T IO N  BE T W E E N  STATE AND F E DE R A L  CO U RTS
51-52 (1969). For a more r ecent proposal, see Diane P . Wood, Fine-Tun ing Jud icial
Federalism: A P ropos al f or R eform  of th e An ti-I nju nct ion  Ac t,  1990 BYU L. RE V. 289,
319-20.
351. S ee, e.g., You ng er  v. H ar ri s, 4 01 U .S.  37 (1 971 ).
352. Marbury v. M ad iso n,  5 U .S.  (1 Cr an ch) 1 37,  163  (180 3).
power, like t ru th , event ua lly will pre vail; th e Act is su ppor t ed
only by a false imp ress ion of Congress’ power.
However , the p olicy conside ra t ion s s eemin g t o underlie th e
Act  a re cer ta in ly a pp ropr ia te for  cour t s  to cons ider  in  making
their own  judgmen ts on  the a pp ropr ia ten es s of an  in junct ion  (or
any othe r  r emedy).3 5 1 Th us,  the Act  migh t  only be a  gr a tu it ous
ins tr uct ion to do what  th e cour ts would do an yway. Ther efor e,
while  i n t e rms of cons t it u t iona l p r incipl e t he  An t i-In junct ion
Act  seems  un sus ta inable (an d so should not be t ak en a s
“p receden t” or as a model for  ot her le gislat ion), its va lidit y
might never be confronted if their own good judgment leads the
jud ges t o exercise  th eir  discr et ion t he  sa me  wa y.
3. Remedies
 Cour t s i n ou r  t r adi t ion  a r e forums  for  redress,  not just  the
a i r ing of gripes. En glish cour ts wer e fashioning r emedies long
before th e pr imor dia l legislat ur e t ook form: the s ign ifica nce of
sta tu tes  dat es to th e reign  of Edward  I i n t he  la t e r  t hi r teen th
cen tu ry, bu t  by t hen  the Cou r t  of Com m on  Pleas  ha d been
rem edyin g in ju st ice t h rough  it s w r it  syst em  for  abou t  a
hu ndr ed years , and  Glanville an d Bra cton ha d alr eady wr itten
their  a ccounts  of common law remedies . Surely “remedy” i s the
most fundamenta l  and essent ia l e lem e n t  of judicial power.
Chief J us tice Ma rs ha ll as ser te d, “[t]he ver y esse nce of civil
liberty ce r t a inly consis ts  in t he r ight  of every ind ividua l to
claim  th e protection of the law s, whenever he receives an
in ju ry. One of t he  fi r st  d u t ies of gover nmen t  is  to afford t ha t
pr otect ion.”352
Insofa r  as t h is  “firs t  du ty” fal ls  upon  cour t s,  the “pr otect ion
of th e laws” owed t o t h ose p rovin g th eir  claim s is, p re cisely, a
sufficient  rem edy or  rel ief . To ens ur e fulfillm en t of th is du ty,
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353. S ee Bel l v. H ood,  327  U. S. 6 78 (1 946 ); cf. B u r ton v. Mayer, 118 S.W.2d 547
(Ky. 193 8) (de al in g wi th  st at e ju dici al  pow er ).
The sam e ar gua bly is t ru e as  to cert ain  defen ses. I n  Ya ku s v. Un ited  S ta tes , 321
U.S. 414  (194 4),  the Su preme Cour t declined to count ena nce a cons tit ut ional cha llenge
to th e Em ergen cy Price Con tr ol Act of 1942 in d e fe n se t o a cr im ina l pr osecu tion
under  th e Act , wh er e t he  Act a llowe d ch a l le n ge s  t o th e Act t o be h ea rd  only  on
review of administr ative proceedings which  the  defendant  had  foregone .  The  re levan t
sect ion  of the Act, § 204, however,  was written in t erms of “jurisdiction,” and th e
decis ion  plainly rests on t he false premise t hat  Congress’ power over ju r i sd ic t ion is
plena ry.  The actual operation of the Act, however, seems plainly distin g u is h able fr om
jur isd icti on,  an d equ ivalen t t o what  was r ejected in  United  States v. Klein,  80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 128 (1871 ). S ee also Plau t v. Spendt hrift F arm , Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (199 5).
Ju stice  Ru t ledge ’s  d is sen t  i n  Yakus was  le s s pe r suas ive to  h is  b reth ren t ha n it  migh t
ha ve been, because even he concede d  pl en a ry  cont rol ov er  jur isd icti on. T he  out come
in  Yakus thu s illustrat es tha t th e orth odox view enta ils mischief even for matt ers
distin guish able  from ju risd iction it self. See also Plaut , 514 U.S. 211.
354. S ee, e.g.,  Th om pson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988); Merre ll Dow Phar m.
Inc. v. T ho mp son , 47 8 U .S.  804  (198 6).
355. The Supreme  Cour t ’s  holding in  Bivens  v . S i x  Unknow n  Nam ed Agents of
the Fed . B ur eau  of N arcot ics , 403 U.S. 388, 397 (197 1) (ho ld ing  tha t  even  withou t
au thor i zing legislation a petitioner “is entitled to recover  money  damages for  any
injuries  h e  h a s  su ffer ed a s a  re su lt of [a  gover nm en t] a gen t’s viola tion  of th e [F our th ]
Ame nd me nt ”), was t her efore too ten ta tive a nd m odest. I ndee d, it se ems  ina ppr opria te
even to  analogize claims of constitutional violation to “implied causes of action” under
statut es.
356. Cf., e.g., Bu sh  v. L uca s, 4 62 U .S.  367  (198 3).
the Con st it u t ion  pr ovid es  for  an  independen t b ranch  competen t
to exercise “th e judicial Power of th e Uni ted St a tes” withou t
lea ve of any p olitical b ody. Givin g r eli ef as deem ed appropriate
by the courts i s an  inheren t  and  ind ispensable  pa r t  of the
federal judicial power.353 I t  there fore  is  not  credible  to m ain ta in
tha t  fed er a l cou r t s ca nnot  rem ed y viol a t ion s of legal r ight
unless and u n t il Congr es s cr ea tes  a  cause  of act ion  enabl ing
them t o do so.
As to r igh t s  cl a imed under  feder a l  st a tu tes,  the ques t ion  of
remedy can  mer ge wit h t he ques t ion  of r igh t ; for  whether  any
remedy i s availa ble depends ultimately on whether t here is a
r igh t , and wheth er Congress cr eat ed a r ight is somet imes
inferr ed from wha t  (i f any) r emedy Congress  con templa ted.3 5 4
But  t h e r e a r e  r igh t s tha t  a re  not  subject  to congress iona l
con t r ol. In pa rt icular, it seem s an omalous t o suppose th at
uncons t itu t iona l  act s  may be r eme died on ly if an d in  su ch wa ys
as Congr ess m ight  pr ovide.3 55 Exer cising it s own ju dgm ent  in
light  of other  red res s m ech anisms t he le gis la t ive  br anch m ight
have pu t in  pla ce, the ju diciar y its elf migh t opt  to den y judicial
r emedies;356 but t his is a m at ter  for t he judiciary’s own
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357. It  might very well be that proliferation of purported “constit u t i on a l rights”
compounds  th e s ocia l cost  of th is i nd efea sib le ju dici al  pr erogative. That pr oblem,
however , mu st be  dealt  with  by fran kly an d critica lly assessing wh a t  “r igh t s” a re
tr uly  of constitut ional dimension, not by abrogating the inde p e n de n t  judicial power.
358. 28 U .S.C . § 220 1 (199 4); see Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hawort h, 300 U.S. 227
(193 7).
359. 28 U. S.C . § 20 72 (1 994 ).
d iscre t ion . For  a  cour t  to de clin e ju dicia l r eli ef for  a  viola t ion  of
a  cons t itu t iona l  r igh t  simply because Congress  deems  an
alt er na tive  to be sufficient would be t o abdicate an  essent ia l
as pect  of the  “th e jud icial P ower of th e Un ite d St at es.”357
Legis la t ion  add ing  or  enhan cing rem edies, however,
ce r ta in ly can  pass mus ter  und er  t h e Necessar y and  Pr oper
Claus e. An  example  is  t he Decla ra tory  Judgmen t  Act ,358
supplement ing th e judicia l a r se na l wi th  a  new rem ed ia l devi ce
tha t  helps to effectua te t he ju dicial power  with out  hobblin g
jud icial discr et ion . Th e Act  is  compa t ibl e wit h  t r adi t ion a l
judicia l pr act ice alt hou gh n ot h ist orically a  pa rt  of it.
4. Practice
 Rules  of judicial practice an d  p r oce du r e  ca nnot be  thought
to depen d  on  sta tu tory au th orization. The ea rliest J ust ices
made  the ir  own way concern ing p rocess  in or igina l act ions, a nd
doubtless would have done so on all mann er of procedural
ma t t e r s even  if t he  Jud ici a ry  Act  had  not  au thor i zed them to.
As explained at  th e beginning of th is section on “Laws
Effect u a t ing Jud icia l Potency ,” however ,  the Necessa ry  and
Pr oper Clause empowers Congress t o make ju diciary laws even
if th ey a r e  n ot  i ndispensable because th e courts could make do
qu it e well wit hou t t he m, a nd  th e Supr ema cy Clau se ena bles
those la ws  to disp la ce ju dicia l prefe ren ces  so long as  the
requ isites of the Necessa ry an d Pr oper Claus e ar e met .
Nonetheless, th e operat ion of th e Rules  En abl in g Act 359 is
subject to se riou s const itu tion al d oubt . En a ct ed e vid en t ly on
the fa lse p rem ise of p lenary power  under  the Tribun als Clau se,
it  postpones t he effect  of judicia l r u le ch anges  to a llow  for
congr es siona l re view and d isapp rova l. This  se em s d es ign ed  for
cons t ra in ing ra th er t ha n “car rying int o Execut ion ” th e ru le-
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360. S ee Act of Mar. 30 , 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
361. S ee Act of Ja n. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
362. S ee 28 U .S. C. § 2 076  (199 4).
363. S ee, e.g., F E D . R. E VID. 302 (presum ptions), 501 (testimonial pr ivilege), 601
(witness  com pe te ncy ) (199 7).
364. Cf. Un ited  Sta tes  v. Klein , 80 U.S . (13 W al l.) 128 (1871). In Klein,  t he
S u p re m e Cou rt  inv ali da te d a  st at ut e wh ich d ecla re d t ha t p ar don s a ccept ed w ith out
making competence  tha t is  a  se lf-exe cut in g a sp ect  of th e Art icle
III “jud icia l P ower .” Th e exper ien ce wit h  the F ed er a l Ru les  of
Evidence is illu stra t ive. Congress first  blocked t heir
im plem en ta t ion ,360 th en  e n acted t hem  legisla tively wit h
numerous amendm ents;361 i t  then  pr oh ibited judicial rule-
making abou t t est imon ial p rivile ge362  a n d directed federa l
judges to fol low s ta te p ract i ce  ra ther  t h a n  using t heir own
judgment on ma tt ers of privilege, presumpt ions, and witness
compet en cy.363 I f noth ing more  r igorous  than  a  “ra t ional basis”
s t anda rd wer e a pplie d, these  directives might  possibly be
sus ta ined  as congr essional choices am ong various a ltern at ives
su itable for ca r ryin g t he ju dicia l power  in to execut ion . If,
however, a s  I  have u rged , a  “r a tion al ba sis” sta nd ar d is
inappropr ia t e he re,  it  mus t  be  open  to th e judges themse lves  to
dete rmine whe th er t he ju dicial power  is facilita t ed by such
cons t r a in t s (in which  case  they m ust  be  followed , even  if n ot  to
t h eir  liking), or ins tea d is hobbled (in which case th ey may be
ign ored ).
Had the  Necessa ry and  P roper  Clause basis of Congress’
power regar ding th e judiciary been r ecogn ized s ixt y years a go,
a ffect ed l it i gan t s  might  have  though t  t o cha ll enge  some
congres siona lly prescribed ru les of pra ctice before now.
Howe ver , a fter  decad es of relia nce a nd  ha bit, p ra gma tic
cons idera t ions migh t b e per su as ive aga ins t r et rosp ective
app lica t ions of th i s ana lys is  to set t l ed  ru les of pra ctice. Tha t,
however, can not  just ify obeisa nt  complian ce with  compa ra ble
directives enacted in the futu re. Statut es pres cr ibin g or
foreclosing in fer en ces , cr eat ing pr esu mp tion s, a nd  allocat ing
burdens of pleadin g, produ ction, a nd  per su as ion, all m erit
s cru t in y in ter ms of wheth er t hey help r at her  th an  hind er t he
cour t s in  th eir own exercise of th e “judicial Power of th e Unit ed
St at es.” Any s uch  st at ut e sh ould onl y be  followe d insofa r  as  the
judges find it  apt t o faci li t at e , r a the r t han  to displace, their own
sou nd d iscret ion  in  mat ter s of p roof.364
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written  disclaimer an d protest, and reciting that  the pe r s on  p a rdoned  had t aken  pa r t
in  the  Confedera t e r ebell ion,  mu st  be t re at ed a s “conclu sive  evid en ce” th at  th e pe rs on
had a ided  the r ebellion an d so was  disqu alified from r ecovering h is capt ur ed pr opert y.
365. S ee Pl au t v . Sp en dt hr ift  Fa rm s, I nc. , 51 4 U .S.  211  (199 5).
366. Cf. Atch iso n,  T. &  S.F . Ry . v. L on g, 2 51 P . 48 6 (Ok la . 19 26).
367. Cf. DeCha stellu x v. Fair child, 15 P a. 18 (1850); Lewis  v. Webb, 3 Me. 326
(182 5).
A Con ne cticu t a ct of this kind w as  upheld in  Calder v. Bull , 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386
(179 8).  At that very ear ly date, however, Connecticut ha d no constit u t ion  r e fl ec t ing
a  sep ar at ion of p ower s; it st ill was operat ing under  the su rviving colonial charter a nd
pr act ice which gave to i ts  legislat ur e (called th e “Gener al Cour t”) judicial as we ll as
legislat ive power s. See id.  at 395.
368. The first Ju diciary Act recited th at federa l cou rt s sh ould gra nt  new t ria ls
“for r ea son s for  wh ich  ne w t ri al s h av e u su al ly b ee n g ra nt ed  in  th e cou rt s of la w.” Act
of Sept . 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat . 73, 83.  There is no rea son to think , however,
they  cou ld no t  have done  so withou t t ha t  s t a tu tory  au thor i za t ion .
369. Se ct ion  17  of t he 1 78 9 J udi cia ry Act  r ec it ed  tha t  fede ra l cou r t s “sha l l h a ve
power . . . to pun ish by fine  or imp rison men t, at  th e discre tion of said  court s, all
contempt s of a u thor it y i n  any cause o r  hea r in g b efor e t he s ame. ” How e ve r , t h is
s t a tu tory recognition was not deemed requisite to a power in those cour t s t o sa nct ion
for  contempt . Ear ly Ju stices a nd comm ent at ors r egar ded t he power  to dea l with
contempt s as inher ent in t he judiciary, as did their su ccessor J ustices a centu ry later .
S ee, e.g., Mi cha els on  v. U ni te d S ta te s, 2 66 U .S.  42,  65-6 6 (19 24).
Ma n y other e xam ples ca n be  conceived. A law dir ectin g
r einsta tement  of cases alr eady finally dismiss ed, for exam ple,
could be  found offe nsive t o th e intrinsic  l imit of the Necessary
and Prope r  Cla use  by a  lin e of r ea son in g n ot  ver y d iffer en t  from
th at  recent ly employed by the Supr em e Cou r t  in  the gu ise of a n
extrinsic “separa t ion  of powers” l imi t  in  the  Plau t case.365
Perha ps a law m an dat ing th e tr ial of cases with in a p rescribed
per iod regar dless of exigencies confronting t he litigan ts or oth er
demands  on th e judicia ry’s t ime 366 could be challenged as
im pe r iou s i nt e r fere nce, r at her  th an  as sist an ce, with
effectua tin g the judicial power . Now th at  devices like  mis tr ial,
new t r i a l,  an d dir ected  verd ict h ave be en lon g an d r out inely
used  by court s, laws r estr icting them 367 migh t be  difficult  t o
jus t ify as “car rying int o Execut ion” th e judicial power.368 The
same might be said of laws  circum scribin g con tempt  p rocedures
in  ways  found  by  the judges  to in ter fer e wit h  the m ain ten ance
of cour t room order  and  decorum.369
V. CO N C L U S I O N
 O n ce t h e  t r u e b a sis  of Congress’ power to legisla t e
regard ing th e jud iciar y is  p er ceived,  and t he in t r in sic lim it s of
tha t  power are un derstood, consequences appear almost
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eve rywh er e on e look s in  the law of feder al cour ts . The p oten tia l
ramifica t ion s ar e too num erous to be listed, much less
evaluated, in  a  single  a r t icle  or  by a  single  comme n t ator; but
the exam ples suggest ed her e—some a s to jurisd iction, some a s
to s t ructu re , and  some  as to jud ici a l poten cy—are su fficient  to
sh ow th e th esis  of th is a rt icle to be p oten tia lly quit e un set tlin g.
One of the m ost  b enefice n t  funct ion s of a  wr it t en  const it u t ion ,
however, is occas iona lly to imp el some  crit ical r et hin kin g of
concep t ion s wh ich  have com e by lon g h abit  to pr eva il,  bu t  wh ich
cannot  be squa red  with  wha t  had once been  car din al a nd  st ill is
fundamenta l . The Necessa ry an d Pr oper Clause supplies a
cogent  r a t iona le enabling Congress t o do all th at  might  be
needed  to he lp t he ju dicar y do its job. The  int rin sic limits  it
conta ins, however, preclude legislation su bvert ing t he ju dicial
independence  tha t is  crucia l t o the jus t ice  our  Cons t itu t ion  was
designed to establish.
